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ABSTRACT
Of the many different ways in which economists have tried to 
analyse public expenditure, the most relevant to Indian economic 
development is that which links the level of public spending with 
the rate at which the state can accumulate capital. The abstract 
theory of this link, however, must be complemented by an historical 
account of the degree to which a state accumulation policy was 
understood by Indian policy makers, and of the other (often 
inconsistent; elements in the economic strategy of Indian nationalism.
After attempting to provide accounts both of the abstract 
theory and of the institutional and policy context within which it 
was applied, the thesis analyses original empirical data on public 
expenditure in India between 1960 and 1970. The real growth rate 
of public expenditure, its functional and economic composition 
at the all-India level are presented, and the strong contrast 
in the patterns of the first and last five year periods is 
elucidated. The effect of the 1965-7 droughts and bad harvests in 
producing this contrast is assessed.
At a more disaggregated level, studies are made of changes in 
the degree of centralization of public expenditure, public capital 
formation and public saving. Differences between individual states 
in their rates of growth of real public expenditure, public capital 
formation and public saving are also examined, and possible explanations 
considered.
The public expenditure data is argued to be consistent with 
a specific view of the way state accumulation took place within 
the context of the Indian nationalist economic strategy. The thesis 
proposes that the attempt to create a ’’modem’1 structure of output, 
without using foreign trade to divorce domestic production from 
domestic demand, and without control over domestic demand either, 
was superimposed on the basic task of state accumulation and made 
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INTRODUCTION
This work had three major aims. The first aim is of a technical 
kind, and the second and third aims are broader, historical ones.
The technical objective -was to place the analysis of Indian 
public expenditure on a sounder and more informative statistical base 
than that on which it had hitherto rested. For a number of reasons 
which are explained in some detail in Appendix A the national accounts 
classification of public' expenditure is, when its advantages and 
disadvantages are balanced out, more useful for macroeconomic analysis 
than any existing scheme for ordering public spending data. At the 
time when this work was begun, in the early 1970s, the analysis of 
Indian public expenditure was caught in a pincer attack, between those 
who seemed quite ignorant of national accounts methods of expenditure 
analysis, and those who, following the superficial radicalism of 
Professor Myrdal, were convinced that national accounts categories could 
have no meaning in the economic circumstances of contemporary India,
The original plan for this work was that it should document as 
fully as possible all public expenditure data in India that had been 
reclassified on a national accounts basis, in order to build up 
continuous and fully reconciled time-series for the central and state 
governments and, If possible, for local authorities. This was to have 
been done with a critical commentary on the nature and limitations of 
this kind of data. The original plan had to be drastically modified, 
however. The economic classification of central government spending 
came easily enough to hand. Twenty-eight economic classifications of 
state government budgets (as detailed in Appendix B) were also collected. 
Although I had succeeded in gathering together more economic 
classifications of government expenditure than anyone seemedto know, or
care, existed, it nevertheless quickly became clear that this data 
was still much too fragmentary to be x^orth collating and reconciling.
The limited fruit of my earlier statistical explorations is to be found 
in Appendix A which is a comparative guide to, and assessment of,
Indian statistics on public expenditure.
Fortunately for me, one day when I was discussing national income 
statistics with C.S.O. officials at Sardar Patel Bhavan, I stumbled on 
the information that the Central Statistical Organisation had been 
engaged on the task of reclassifying all governments budgets since 
I96O/6I, for the purpose of building up certain components of the 
statistics required to conform with the United Nations 1968 System of 
National Accounts. The Director of the C.S.O, was kind enough to make 
available to me the worksheets on which this task had been done. 
Inspection and some random checks showed that the work had been done to 
a very competent standard. In the absence of copying facilities, it 
was then necessary to spend a whole month making a facsimile of these 
worksheets by hand. Once this was done, I had a data set which was 
in most, but not all, respects more comprehensive than the other, 
fragmentary set which I had collected so laboriously.
Once in possession of a copy of the C.S.O, worksheets, it was 
possible to make progress with my second aim, namely to trace the 
relationship betx^een changes in public expenditure and the implementation 
of macroeconomic planning in India, The data set restricted the', period 
for which this could be done to 1960/61 to I969/7O. Experience as a 
junior Treasury official in the 1960s suggested that the integration 
of public expenditure control x^ith the extensive economic dirigisme 
required to make a macroplan successful is an extremely difficult 
administrative and political task In a smallish developed country with 
a relatively centralized government. One was naturally ctxrious to 
discover how it was performed in a vast, developing country with a quasi-
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federal structure of government, but where the commitment to planning 
appears prima facie much. more strongly entrenched than in the U.K. with 
its single, abortive National Plan of 19&5*
The matching up of Indian public expenditure statistics with 
comparable data on the main macroeconomic aggregates quickly indicated 
that the relationship between actual public expenditure trends and the 
macroeconomic objectives of the Indian plans was in the 1960s initially 
not very strong and becoming progressively weaker. Part Two of this work 
is a detailed exploration of this relationship. The picture of the 
finances of the public sector at the all-India level is given in 
Chapter Three. Chapter Four considers how far the public authorities 
were responsible for causing the industrial recession in the late 1960s 
by their own expenditure programming. Changes in the degree of 
centralization of public expenditure are examined in Chapter Five.
Chapter Six presents a measure of the inter-state differences in public 
expenditure growth, and tries to account for them. Chapter Seven 
looks at changes in the centralization of government capital formation 
and saving, and tries to account for differences between states in their 
capital formation growth rates. These empirical analyses, taken 
together, show a growing disjunction between the reality of government 
spending and the planning objective of rapid capital accumulation on 
public account.
At that point one could have continued, in a vein familiar in the 
literature on public finance in developing countries, with recommendations 
for improving the integration of public expenditure control with planning. 
To do so, however, seemed rather otiose. The disjunction between 
expenditure control and planning does not appear to result from some 
kind of intellectual mistake on the Indian side, and, if it did, foreign 
“experts" with the requisite advice are not in short supply. The 
failure of understanding seemed to be more on the part of foreign
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observers who repeatedly have failed to take the full measure of Indian- 
style planning, The third, and most ambitious, aim of this work is to 
sketch the broad historical trajectory of Indian planning, in a way 
that accounts for its early history, its zenith between 1955 and 
1963/6^, i^13 subsequent decline.
This sketch is centred on a phenomenon which has here been called 
"mimetic nationalism", for want of a better phrase. Chapter Two begins 
with an attempt to define the concept of "mimetic nationalism" and goes 
on to interpret the early history of the state accumulation policy in 
India with the aid of this concept. Chapter Eight attempts to draw 
together the threads of the different arguments that have occupied the 
previous chapters. It shows the way in which mimetic nationalism 
shaped the concrete features of the Indian state accumulation policy, the 
concrete ways In which Indian public expenditure control (or, rather, 
the lack of it) undermined the Indian state accumulation policy, and the 
concrete inhibitions which a federal government places on Indian public 
expenditure control.
Disagreement will doubtless be provoked by the prominence given to 
the concept of "mimetic nationalism", The cruder kinds of misconception 
about the use of this term need not be taken very seriously, but even 
at the academic level two misunderstandings in particular seem to be 
difficult to dispel. First, historians busily revising the Indian 
nationalist account of recent Indian history easily jump to the Conclusion 
that the use of "nationalism" as a central explanatory concept contradicts 
their emphasis on localism, particularity and the confusions of 
happenstance. One can, however, accept historians* explanations of the 
nationalist movement without agreeing that they have explained it away. 
Second, scholars who take class analysis seriously easily jump to the 
conclusion that any manifestation of nationalism is only a convenient 
disguise for the vested interests of a ruling class. In the text there
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are detailed arguments suggesting why such a conclusion should be 
regarded as excessively reductionist. Without being over-defensive 
one can suggest that these two lines of attack really miss their mark 
As for the others well, let battle commenceJ
PART ORE : GENERAL
CHAPTER ONE
PUBLIC EXPENDITURE AND STATE 
ACCUMULATION IN THEORY
Economists have used a number of different basic ideas to provide 
their perspective on the phenomenon of public expenditure. For a 
variety of reason^, some of which will be mentioned shortly, most of 
these intellectual approaches very quickly run into the sands of 
irrelevance or absurdity. But some critical comment on them is 
required to explain why they have not been delved into and explored at 
greater length in the bulk of the work which follovjs. By the same 
token, some justification is needed for the particular theoretical thread 
which has been picked up in this work, namely the relationship between 
public expenditure and state accumulation,
I. Comments on Economic Approaches to Public Spending
The theory of public expenditure best known to the general
economist is that of Adolph Wagner, a German thinker of the so-called
Historical School, whose influence flourished In the fourth quarter of
the last century. Wagner’s famous "law" of expanding state activity has,
at least at a superficial level, some relevance for present day students
of economic development. Wagner predicted that as the process of
economic development took place "government expenditure must increase
1
at a faster rate than output’. Because of the mistiness of his prose 
style, the precise formulation of his prediction is controversial, but 
he is usually understood to mean that government expenditure divided 
by gross national product (G.N.P.) is a positive function of G.N.P,
1 Peacock and Wiseman (19^ 7), p.17.
21divided by population. The causes alleged to account for this
relationship were three influences that would increasingly augment the
demand for state activity. They were (a) for the protective and
administrative services of the states, as society become more complex;
(b) for cultural and welfare services (including income redistribution
through transfer payments); and (c) for the takeover by the state of those
industries which private entrepreneurship was unable to operate on the
scale or with the technology that were (in some undefined sense) required.
Wagner’s prediction has been tested with data from a number of
developed and underdeveloped countries* Most of the data examined
seems to be consistent with the overall relationship postulated by 
2
Wagner. But, although it might be plausibly claimed that Wagner
correctly identified a nearly ubiquitous feature of modern economic 
growth, he did not succeed in explaining why this feature is so generally 
found. He did not conceptualize rising income per head as an independent 
variable \yhich caused directly an increase in the dependent variables, 
the state's share in output. Further, he did not always clearly separate 
what he thought would happen from what he hoped would happen* Wagner 
was filling out a scenario of social progress, which comprehended the 
quantitative and qualitative improvement - simultaneous, interdependent 
and inevitable - of income per head, technical skills, urban life and, 
last but not least, public morality. As a philosopher of history, he 
concerned himself little with the details of subordinate causes. He 
also gave no consideration to what would happen to government spending in 
times of social retrogression, such as wars or depressions.
Despite wide influence based on superficial plausibility, Wagner's 
law is not very useful in helping one to understand the public
1 Gandhi (1971)* pp.^i■-*6,
2 Bird (1971), p.8 and (1970), pp.78-5; Goffman and Mahar (1971), p.65; 
Beddy (1970), p.90.
expenditure trends in today's underdeveloped countries. These countries 
tend not to have reliable time-series data for more than about twenty 
or thirty years. Before that time, estimates of national output, and 
sometimes even of public spending, tend to rest on very shaky 
foundations. In any case, they relate to a period in which the forces 
of social retrogression « two international wars and a desperate 
depression - were dominant. Since Wagner's law is a generalization 
about development in the very long run, there is not much point in 
trying to test it with time series for a medium-term period such 'as the 
ten years 1960-1970 covered by the present study of Indian public 
expenditure.
Professors Peacock and Wiseman, in their pioneering study of
public expenditure growth in the U.K., give war and social upheaval a
central place in their theory. They postulate that increased
government spending is a primal urge of politicians and bureaucrats,
vjhich is held in check only by taxpayers' democratically enforceable
1view of the "correct" level of taxes. The taxpayers' view of the, 
correct level of taxes is revised drastically upwards in times of war 
or social upheaval. Consequently, graphs of public spending show a 
ratchet, or "upward displacement" effect.
A recent study of Indian public expenditure has taken over the
Peacock and Wiseman approach.lock, stock and barrel and tried to apply
it to Indian data. It is claimed therein that In the Indian data
2
"the displacement effect is found clearly". This is a somewhat
misleading statement of the author's own conclusions, which show the 
relative size of India's public sector declining between 1911 and 
1921, and a "displacement effect" during the Second World War whiph 
"disappeared immediately thereafter". The only statistically evident
1 Peacock and Wiseman (1967), p.xxxiii,
2 Reddy (1970), pp.90-5; and (1972), p.A-6.
Idisplacement occurs in the period 19^7-66, To save the Peacock and 
Wiseman thesis, this period is then described as a "period of social 
disturbance1 despite the fact that, at any rate after 1951, social 
change has been neither rapid nor violent and wars have been short, 
localized and non-cataclysmic. We shall see in Chapter 5 that the 
attempt to make Indian data conform to Peacock and Wiseman's U.K^ results 
on the question of expenditure centralization results in equally absurd 
statistical and logical contortions. Reddy's work is, unfortunately, 
eloquent testimony of the inapplicability of Peacock and Wiseman's 
theory to India,
Apart from long-run historical studies of public expenditure trends,
recent economists have theorized about public expenditure from two
perspectives, one derived from microeconomics, and the other from
macroeconomics. The microeconomic perspective derives from a revival
of the concept of a "public good", which had been developed outside
the Anglo-Saxon public finance literature by Italian, German and
Swedish economists. This revival, led by Professor Samuelson, can be
seen as an attempt to cast the mantle of neo-classical legitimacy over,
at least some, public expenditure, once a large and permanent ptib’lic
1
sector had become an element of every advanced capitalist economy.
Theorizing about "public goods" is essentially a discussion of a certain
type of market failure, and of how social welfare can be optimized when
this type of market failure exists. As such, this perspective is
purely normative. In one of the classic texts of this style of
theory, Professor Musgrave notes that he will omit entirely what he
2calls "the sociology of fiscal politics". It clearly has nothing
to say about why public spending totals and patterns are the way they 
3are.
1 Samuelson (195*0, pp.387-9,
2 Musgrave (1961), p.4-,
3 Cf. Bird (1970), pp.^f-6.
5Nevertheless, certain neo-classical economists have not understood
the nature and limits of the public goods literature and have introduced
propositions from it as if they were descriptive statements about the 
1real -world. That governments would actually maximize social welfare
if they knew how to will seem sufficiently improbable to some. But
to this improbability mudt be added the prior impossibility, as argued
by Professor Arrox-j, of constructing a social welfare function while
remaining both rational and democratic. Despite various ingenious
attempts, a recent review of the Arrow problem concluded that "no clear-
2
cut solution has been found to Arrow’s paradox”. If this is so,
economists who persist in suggesting that governments actually do 
maximize social welfare are plainly latter-day Panglossians.
A variant of this microeconomic perspective on public expenditure 
is the attempt to construct a theory of political behaviour by applying 
the logic of utility maximization to political phenomena. If one 
assumes that voters are rationally maximizing their own utility, and 
politicians in a representative government are maximizing their votes at 
elections, one can derive a number of predictions about, inter alia, how 
public finance issues will be resolved. On closer examination it turns 
out that the number of public finance predictions that can be validly 
derived is very few. In addition, the assumptions on which these 
theories proceed can be shown to be very dubious.
The economist’s macroeconomic perspective on public expenditure is 
provided by post-Keynesian macroeconomic models. Oddly enough, in 
Keynes' own writing a government sector was never treeited as a specific 
and separate entity, With the refinement of Keynesian-style models it' 
is now so treated, and government revenues and expenditures are somewhat
1 E.g. Hirsch (1970), p.l; Grubel (1969), p.105.
2 Pattanaik (I971), p.l6l: cf. Winch (1969), p.169 and Tullock (I967), 
p.263.
3 Toye (1976), pp.433-^7.
6disaggregated by economic impact. But these models are policy models.
They are built so that policy makers can be advised on the macroeconomic
consequences of alternative fiscal policy changes. They do not
incorporate any assumptions about the way in which the government
itself behaves. Thus budgetary changes are exogenous to the model,
which, as has been candidly admitted, ,!is in effect an admission of
1ignorance” about the causes of government behaviour,
A good recent example of a macroeconomic policy model is that of 
2Leuthold and Due. Here the authors postulate a government objective, 
or set of objectives, such as stabilization and growth, and then 
determine the type of fiscal policy that is most conducive to that 
objective or set of objectives. But, despite the relative competence 
with t'tfhich this model is built, it is difficult not to remark how remote 
it remains from the economic reality of an underdeveloped economy such as 
IndiaTs. The basic Keynesian conceptual framework is retained, with 
its built-in trade-off between unemployment and inflation, despite its 
inappropriateness when, as in India, particular structural supply 
rigidities persist and non-integrated markets remain. Output 
materializes, in the model, from a Cobb-Douglas production function, a 
decision which gains it mathematical tractability at the expense of 
realism. Capital aggregation problems are ignored, land is excluded
as an input to production and the income shares of the factors of 
production which are included are constrained to take certain values. 
Balance of payments disequilibria are assumed away, and foreign trade 
flows are controlled solely by variation of customs duty. As for the 
government itself, its expenditure excludes transfer payments by 
assumption and its consumption expenditure is assumed to be a constant 
proportion of national output during growth - despite empirical
1 Peacock and Shaw (1971), pp.64-5,
2 Leuthold and Due (1970), pp.517-33.
7evidence which is consistent with Wagner’s "law". Despite the formal 
advantages of reasoning with the aid of a fully articulated macroeconomic 
model, one is inclined to forego them on the grounds that they imprison 
reasoning in a cage of unrealism.
As a reaction of impatience with these main strands of public 
expenditure theory, a large number of economists (particularly in the 
U.S.A. in the 1960s) tried to proceed with an almost purely empirical 
method. Starting with a large volume of statistical information, they 
searched it systematically for regularities that could form the basis 
of inductive generalisations. Because of the absence of sufficient
reliable time series, these studies, whether they were international
1 2 comparisons or inter-state comparisons within the U.S.A, .relied
heavily on cross-section data. Quite apart from the problem of ensuring
parity of purchasing power when making such comparisons, no necessary
logical connection exists between the determinants of international or
inter-state differences at one time and the determinants of changes
3
in a single nation or state over a period of time. The absence
of a clear a priori theory encouraged the practice in these studies of
selecting as determinants variables that appeared to "explain” the
highest proportion of total variance. Not only is this dubious from
the point of view of statistical theory. It has the added disadvantage
that it leads to a plethora of arbitrary and irreconcilable "scientific 
1|.
results". For economists of public expenditure, the empiricism 
of the computer has been a most thoroughly explored blind alley.
II. Development and State Accumulation
Clearly, then, a theory of some kind is required to give coherence
1 E.g. Martin and Lei^ is (195^).
2 E.g. Fabricant (1952),
3 Bird (1969) and (1970), pp.76 and 126; Morss (1966), pp.97-102,
Burkehead and Miner (1971), p.312.
both to what is looked for, and to what is found, in the process of
research. Thus one must enquire which is the appropriate theoretical
framework for the study of public expenditure in contemporary India?
Social science is not a value-free activity entirely. One major point
at which values make their mark is the choice of basic theoretical 
1orientation. The value underlying the present work is a desire that
the material living conditions of the mass of the people in India be 
rapidly improved. Such a value locates our study of public expenditure 
in the context of Indian development, and makes the appropriate theory one 
that links these two phenomena.
As a start, three concepts within the single word "development’1 
should be discriminated. Development in what may be called the passive 
sense is merely something that happens, a series of events to which one 
is related as a spectator or observer. Secondly, development has a 
"passive teleological" sense, in which the series of events observed 
is a sequence which culminates in some natural end (for example, an 
acorn becoming an oak-tree). Thirdly, there is an active sense of 
development, as when one develops a musical theme in composition, or a 
negative in photography. Obviously, our concern with Indian development 
is not a concern to observe what happens to Indian society and economy, 
nor (since the Aristotelian world view foundered in the fourteenth 
century) even to observe Indian society and economy evolving to some 
pre-ordained natural end. It is a concern to see Indian society and 
economy actively developed, in the same sense as a business, an estate, 
a new town or, to put almost too fine a point On it, a colony is 
•actively developed* In the economic aspect of active development, 
the theory that is needed is the theory of economic dirigisme, that 
is, of ways of forcing the pace of economic growth and, at the same
1 Hutchison (196*0, pp.53-9-
9time, moulding that growth into rationally pre-selected forms. It 
involves purposeful intervention in the economy, not merely the planning 
of the forms such intervention might take,’*'
The differences between the development of an estate or town and the 
development of a national economy are differences of scale and complexity, 
not differences of principle. But what this kind of comparison brings 
out is the immense ambition of the desire to plan and control an economy 
that serves, or fails to serve, six hundred million people. For
development studies, in their aspiration to become a policy discipline, 
there is a single basic question, namely, can economic dirigisme on 
such an immense scale be achieved? It can be attempted, of course, 
in any society, capitalist or socialist. But can it be achieved in 
both, or in neither or in only one? And what are the conditions for 
success? These fundamental questions will not be settled by appeal to 
the example of India alone. Yet progress towards an answer does 
require a thorough knowledge of dirigistic experiments, to which, for 
India, it is the intention of this work to contribute.
The links between dirigistic development and public expenditure are, 
conceivably, several. But in India they took a concrete form, which 
'may be termed the policy of state accumulation. This policy may be 
defined with the greatest simplicity as the pursuit of an end - national 
capital accumulation, by a particular means - state action. This
definition does two things. It interprets the aim of development as 
the continuous expansion of the stock of produced means of production.
It also identifies the government plus public economic corporations as 
the developer, or the development agent. Under a state accumulation 
policy so defined, public expenditure is necessarily one of the major 
policy instruments that regulate the rate of state accumulation.
1 Cf. Gadgil (1972), p,l88.
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This can be shown formally by adapting an analysis of capital
1formation made by Sachs. Although it is more useful to operate
with a four-sector model (i.e. agricultural, private domestic non- 
agricultural, private foreign non-agricultural and public sectors), 
for the sake of simplicity assume only two sectors, a private sector 
and a public sector comprising public enterprises and a unitary 
government. If we assume away all borrowing and lending between 
these sectors and all capital transfers on public account (i.e. "aid"), 
total national capital accumulation will be defined as
A = Id,f + In -r a(T + Y * P) (1)
where A is total national net capital accumulation, ld,f is private 
domestic and foreign net investment, In is the profits of non- 
departmental enterprises after allowing for capital consumption, T is 
government tax revenue, Y is government non-tax revenue, P is the 
operating surpluses of departmental public enterprises, and a is the 
coefficient of accumulation in the government sector. Public saving 
can be defined as
Sp 3 (T + Y + P) - (C + 2) (2)
where the first bracket on the right-hand side shows the components 
of total government sector's (or "public authorities’") revenue and the 
second bracket on the right-hand side shows the main components of 
public expenditure in the absence of inter-sector transfers, namely 
consumption of goods and services (C) and subsidy payments (2). By 
substitution, the capital formation of the public sector can be defined *
1 Sachs (1964), pp.37-51.
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as
Ip S In + a (S + C + Z) (3)
which can he re-written as 
Ip « In
a = . . (4)
S + C + 2
In the absence of foreign "aid", inter-sector borrowing and lending 
and forced saving arising out of governmental money-printing, the 
value of (Ip - In) must equal S, so that
a (3 )
1 + c + £
In the assumed circumstances, any increase in the size of current 
public expenditure (C + ZS) directly reduces a, the coefficient of 
accumulation in the government sector, ceteris paribus. Conversely, any 
reduction in current government spending will, ceteris paribus increase 
a, and also the value of (Ip - In) and S. It will, however, not 
necessarily increase A. Whether it does so or not will depend on 
whether, and if so how much, private and non-departmental public 
enterprises alter their investment in response to the government's 
spending cuts, which may fall on investment grants or economic 
infrastructure, which is regarded as complementary with the enterprises1 
own investment.
Apart from reducing current government expenditure, equation (3 ) 
indicates the two other major methods (apart from borrowing, accepting 
foreign "aid" and printing money) by which public capital formation can 
be increased. They are the raising of additional tax or non-tax 
revenues and increasing the profits or operating surpluses of enterprises 
in the public sector. Thus, from the perspective of the requiremeni. l/S
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of dirigistic development, the planning and control of public 
expenditure (both current and capital) is one of the three fiscal 
supports for the policy of state accumulation, the other two being 
revenue-raising and the profitable management of public enterprises.
It could be argued also to be the most critical support for that policy. 
For while, if public expenditure were satisfactorily planned and 
controlled, a poor performance in either revenue-raising or public 
enterprise management would not i>jreck the state accumulation policy, it 
is very difficult to conceive any method of gathering receipts for the 
public sector which couxld continuously out-pace the growth of public 
expenditure, once its leash has been slipped.
It is, therefore, no hyperbole to claim that the planning and control 
of public expenditure is a prerequisite for the success of a state 
accumulation policy. Public expenditure control implies the existence 
of some effective method of adjusting the trajectory of public spending, 
in a changing environment, in the pursuit of a previously planned target. 
Whatever this method is, it must embrace all types of public expenditure 
(and not merely that voted by the legislature) by all types of public 
authority. It must involve a survey of all public authorities' spending 
plans far enough in advance for adjustments to those plans to be 
practicable. It must involve scrutiny of the survey by a powerful 
central institution able to decide on adjustments to plans in the 
light of the latest medium-term economic forecast. It must involve 
effective curbs on subordinate institutions that will often try to 
depart from centrally-taken decisions without being able to show good 
cause. This, in turn, implies a continuous process of monitoring 
public expenditure and judging which departures from the decided-on path 
are permissible.
Our spelling out in this way the detail of what is involved in the 
adequate control of public spending is designed to suggest the immensity
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of the challenge to the intelligence of economists and administrators, 
to the organizing and persuading skills of politleans and to the 
collective self .-discipline of the mass of the people, which a state 
accumulation policy presents. But, although the structure and 
dimensions of such a policy may now be clear, its justification in 
theory has not been mentioned. The reader may very well be asking 
himself, why should any government think of attempting it in the first 
place? To answer that extremely difficult question is the next task.
III. The Rationale of State Accumulation
Material development can be defined as the enlargement of surplus. 
The surplus is the residual from current production after deduction of 
what is required (in replacement investment and consumption) to maintain 
the existing production level in the next period. The larger the 
residual, or surplus, the more lavish can be the material foundations 
of cultural life. The dilemma of development is that one well 
established method of surplus enlargement is the accumulation of physical 
capital (buildings, vehicles, machinery and equipment) which itself 
pre-empts part of the existing surplus. There are other methods of 
surplus creation, such as bringing unemployed labour and land into use 
or the introduction of changes in technique which are not capital- 
augmenting. But their efficacy in expanding the surplus without 
capital accumulation has always been taken to be rather limited. Thus 
development usually involves directing an increasing share of the actual 
surplus into capital accumulation, as well as creating additional surplus 
in the ways described, and by squeezing consumption that is not 
'replacement consumption'.
Is the stqte accumulation policy a "progressive" one, and one that 
ought to be supported? Formally, a policy of capital accumulation that 
is undertaken by the state can be justified by listing the advantages
which, hypothetically, the state enjoys over households or private
firms in the role of accumulation agent. For example: -
(1) States have powers to tax, to create money and therefore to 
guarantee their borrowing more substantially than can private agents. 
Taxation, money creation and state borrowing could be used to reduce 
inessential private consumption below what it otherwise might be, and 
thus create surplus in the State's hands for investment. If the 
inessential private consumption which is prevented with these fiscal 
instruments is the inessential private consumption of the rich; and 
if the state investment made possible by them benefits the mass of 
the people; the distribution of income and assets in the economy 
will be improved. Of course the state's powers to tax, to create 
money and to borrow on good terms do not necessarily create 
additional surplus in the state's hands for investment, They
may merely transfer part of the actual surplus from private to 
government hands - and even this may not be used for capital 
accumulation. It might be used to increase government consumption, 
and therefore, total consumption. (Such a use would also improve 
the income distribution if the erstwhile surplus of the rich was used 
for public consumption which benefits the poor, e.g. basic education 
and health care expenditure).
(2) The hypothetical advantage of the state in finding surplus - creating 
uses for the surplus which it controls derives from a number of 
different considerations. The sheer volume of capital it commands 
may enable the state to do surplus - creating things which private 
agents could not do at all because of technical indivisibilities; or 
could undertake only with the loss of economies of scale. The 
state may also be less restricted in the choice of methods of 
surplus-creation because it is less risk averse, has a lower rate of 
time preference and is not constrained to ignore created surplus
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that cannot be internalized under existing private property rights. 
Strictly speaking, these advantages may be obtained by ensuring state 
direction of investment. The assets may be owned and managed
privately, with public subsidies as required.
(3) But if the state were not to own the assets bought with the finance
capital it had acquired/created, it would be at a disadvantage compared
to private units. Whereas the latter can retain profits to contribute
to future finance capital, the state would not be in a position to
do likewise, so that at every stage its finance capital would have
to be created/acquired afresh. Even where there is no doubt
about the state's ability to do this in full measure, it would be an
unnecessarily costly and circuitous procedure. But where, as in most
underdeveloped countries, the conventional instruments of public
finance work poorly, the foregoing of public ownership involves a
substantial limitation of the state's ability to accumulate capital.
It is a strong advantage of widespread public ownership in poor
countries with weak fiscal systems that public saving "involves
simultaneous generation and mobilization of investible funds",
whereas "private saving, particularly household saving often presents
1
formidable problems of motalization and adequate canalisation."
Again, the formality of public ownership is not sufficient to ensure 
the generation and mobilization of surplus. Since state ownership 
usually involves state management to a greater or lesser degree, the 
state then has to organize production in a cost-minimising way - a 
task for which it has no inherent advantages, and perhaps even 
disadvantages. (Further, from the previous argument, it may be 
using surplus for activities that create surplus which it cannot 
internalize). However, public ownership creates a potential for 
state capital accumulation with a weak fiscal system, just as profit 
retention creates a potential for private capital accumulation with
1 Planning Commission, 197^, p.13.
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1an imperfect capital market.
So far, the arguments for state accumulation have been set out in
terms of the state’s advantages and disadvantages as an agent of capital
accumulation compared with private units. But the state could he more
than one atom, even a very large and powerful one, in the anarchy of
accumulation. In theory, it can regulate the overall rate of capital
accumulation. If the rule of maximizing the reinvestible surplus is
judged to be impossibly austere, some milder rule can be adopted, and an
2
attempt made to have it applied throughout the economy. In addition,
the conjunctural need to adjust total finance capital to total purchases
of capital goods may arise. The state could alter its own accumulation
programme in the short run to secure the required adjustment. Thus
the rationale of a policy of state accumulation includes the argument
that only the state has the potential ability to regulate the anarchy
of accumulation. Since that is precisely the declared aim of
macroeconomic planning, regimes where planning is taken seriously ought
if
to rely on the purposeful control of an extensive state sector.
It is very important, at this point, to be clear that the formal 
justifications for a state accumulation policy which have just been 
mentioned are couched in terms of the possibilities of state action, 
and not of the common characteristics of existing states. By speaking 
of the state’s ’potential abilities' and 'hypothetical advantages’, it 
is intended to emphasise that the specified abilities and advantages do 
not inhere in every state, simply by virtue of its being a state. One 
might easily conclude otherwise, however, from reading the most popular 
and influential account of capital accumulation in poor countries, that
1 Cf. Sachs (196*0, pp.^9-50,
2 Thirlwall (1972), pp.215-16; cf. Little and Mirrlees (197*0, pp.114-19•
3 Little and Mirrlees (197*0, p.l82,
^ Cf. Bachs (196*0, p.30.
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of Sir Arthur Lewis, Lewis holds that, in general, the agent of capital
accumulation may be "the state"; and, while not giving a full comparison
between state and private groups as agents, he implies the overall
superiority of "the state". He acknowledges that a question mark
attaches to the sociological basis of state accumulation. But in
response he offers only the following curious formula: "in these days,
many (sc, countries) (e.g. TJ.S.S.R., India) are growing a class of state
capitalists who, for political reasons of one sort or another, are
2
determined to create capital rapidly on public account". How a "class"
of state capitalists can be "grown", and what sort of political 
compulsions are required to motivate them, are both left unanswered; 
but in a manner which suggests that neither need be an enduring obstacle 
for the dedicated social engineer. That there might be some differences 
of consequence between India, where state and private capitalists co­
exist, and the TJ.S.S.R,, where they do not, apparently did not seem 
relevant to Lewis; otherwise he could scarcely have bracketed the two 
instances so casually.
The hidden assumption, that "the state" universally yokes power to 
benevolence and rationality, is an unselfconscious transposition of the 
political vision of British democratic socialism to situations where It 
is even more inappropriate than in Britain. The British social democrats' 
vision was of a 'Supreme Economic Authority' whose wise and just policies
3
generated their own broad popular support. It not only impregnated
the advice of economists like Lewis and Little, but pre-disposed a
section of Indiax post-Independence leadership to accept their advice,
k
since from the 193Cte it had been part of their own mental furniture.
Yet even for advanced capitalist countries, it is unrealistic, given the
1 Lewis (195&), p.^19*
2 Lewis (I95M 1 p.^20.
3 E.g. Durbin (19^9), pp.^1-7*
k Desai and Bhagwati (1975), p.219, note 3; Addy and Azad (1975), p.130.
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existing monopolies of capital and labour, to view government as the
work of a meritocracy with a popular mandate. It is even less.
realistic in India, where both civil servants and politicians are more
corrupt, and where the electorate is more illiterate. It is thus easy
to see how the abstract and politically unspecified justification of the
state accumulation policy, which Lewis uses, can be criticized as
utopian. This is particularly so because Lewis diverts attention from
the social base of the operators of the policy by identifying their
1class with their function. Actual "state capitalists" in India do
not form a class (or part of one) in any meaningful Marxist sense. On
the other hand, they do have symbiotic links with a private capitalist
class. They are one of the "professional groups who are not direct
2
exploiters, but (are) integrated into the system of exploitation".
It Is, therefore,■plausible to suggest that they will not make policy
impartially in the common interest and that their administration of a
state accumulation policy would be biassed in ways that favoured the
growth of private sector capital. Thus the potential advantages of
3
state accumulation would never be realized.
Those who attack the sociological naivety of the social democratic 
justification of the state accumulation policy often confer on that 
policy other justifications which, on examination, turn out to be no less 
naive. One familiar line of argument begins by postulating the state 
as the instrument of a dominant class, the so-called "national 
bourgeoisie". The national bourgeoisie, supported by progressive 
elements of the proletariat and peasantry, is held to be capable of 
directing a "peaceful transition to socialism", by undertaking a policy 
of state accumulation and thereby short-circuiting the development of
1 Lewis (195*0* p.**20; cf, Plamenatz (1963), pp.551-75.
2 Patnaik (1972), p.215.
3 Cf. Holland (1972), p.7.
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1capitalism. This thesis is logically weak. Lenin's policy of
socialist state accumulation took as its premise the prior removal of the
social dominance of feudal and capitalist classes. This premise,
despite the anti-Golonial movement, has never been fulfilled in India,
Therefore, (since a national bourgeoisie is an exploiting class and not,
like the proletariat, a ”class above classes”), a policy of state
accumulation in India could not have the same consequences as it would 
2under socialism. The national bourgeois state can neither eliminate
class conflicts, nor plan comprehensively to eliminate the crises of
3
capitalist production. But how a policy of state accumulation,
operating within these limits, can eventually transcend them to usher in
socialism peacefully, is nowhere explained, and, indeed, inexplicable,
Insisting on the Leninist premise for a state accumulation policy
involves a different difficulty,. To emphasize that ”the bourgeois state
machinery, even under state capitalism, must first be destroyed” restores
a certain consistency, but only by creating another dilemma. Why, it
may be asked, is a policy of state accumulation in any way desirable
before the Leninist condition is fulfilled? It is useless to argue
that ”by creating the necessary material base (sc. the policy)
facilitates the transition to socialism once the working class seizes 
JL|.
political power”. Private capitalism could be given exactly the same 
justification: it might even do better in creating the necessary material
base. In order to rule out the possibility of private capitalism doing 
better, or equally well, some argument must be put forward for the 
superiority of the state as an agent of accumulation. It is difficult 
to know what arguments would be regarded as acceptable for this purpose,
1 Clarkson (1972), p.623.
2 Habib (1979), p.167,
3 Ulyanovsky and Pavlov (1973), pp.96-8. 
h Chattopadhyay (I970), pp.17-18,
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■without, at the same time, being open to the very objection which is 
raised against social democratic theorists, namely their idealization 
of the state.
It is commonplace to justify the state accumulation policy with 
references to the inability of private capitalists to accumulate at the 
right speed and in the right sectors. This makes the state a superior 
agent of accumulation, so to speak, by default. In fact, this 
conventional faute de mieux defence of state accumulation is often
1shared by liberals and social democrats with their strongest critics.
This defence is only one half of an argument, in that the incompetence
of private units is not established relative to the competence of the
state. Only when that is done is a foundation laid for the claim that
the growth of the private sector at the expense of the public is necessarily 
2retrograde. But the belief in the relative competence of the state
is the central tenet of social democracy.
It is sometimes also argued that a state accumulation policy is 
desirable before the destruction of the bourgeois state machinery because 
it fights "feudal and semi-feudal production relations, monopoly
3
capitalism, and imperialism". Again it is unclear why state capitalism 
should make a better enemy to feudalism than would private capitalism - 
unless the faute de mieux defence of state accumulation is again being 
invoked. Further, why should state capitalism be preferred to foreign ;
t
monopoly capitalism? It is taken to be so, but surely any conflict :
between them should, if the state is the instrument of a dominant
if
bourgeois class, be regarded as an intra-capitalist quarrel? It is
also said to be a quarrel which the domestic bourgeoisie loses, and that
3
this defeat ultimately makes a state accumulation policy unworkable ,-
1 E.g. Bhagwati (1966), p,170; Tinbergen (1967), p. 3^; cf, Kalecki (1972), 
pp.162-3; Ulyanovsky and Pavlov (1973), pp.11^-13.
2 Chattopadhyay (1970), p.27; Payar (1972), p.32, note 63.
3 Chattopadhyay (1970), p.36; cf, Ulyanovsky and Pavlov (1973), p.115.
4 Warren (1973), pp.42-4; Kalecki (1972), pp.l67, 168.
5 Chattopadhyay (1970), p.37; Petras (1977), pp.7-8; Patnaik 0972), p.229.
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So it is doubly difficult to argue that a state accumulation policy 
is desirable as a bulwark against foreign monopoly capitalism.
One must conclude, therefore, that neither the social democratic 
viewpoint, nor that of its sociologically oriented critics, provides an 
adequate rationale for the state accumulation policy. The former 
highlights its potential economic advantages, but neglects the social 
and political disposition of its operators. The latter repairs this 
neglect, and in doing so discovers that "the political and social 
conditions for national state-capitalist expansion - requiring 
limitations on imperial/™ist_J7 influence while retaining the conditions
1
of capitalist exploitation - create an explosive contradictory regime".
The former holds that a state accumulation policy can always succeed, 
provided only that it is fully understood and firmly willed by a 
government. The underlying assumption, that every state, regardless of 
its political and social environment, exercises plenitudo potestatis 
in all relevant respects, is indeed evidence of a blandly technocratic 
attitude towards social change. The latter view, that a state
accumulation policy can never succeed for long, even when fully understood 
and firmly willed by a government, until social revolution abolishes 
private property in the means of production, is valuable insofar as it 
challenges bland technocratism. But, in doing so, it should not be
allowed to slide from historical analysis into dubious prophecy.
The future is only relatively predictable, and then onl5>‘ from a solid and 
extensive knowledge of the past. This suggests that the best that can 
be done, in principle, is to investigate the history of the factors 
influencing state accumulation policies in particular cases, and then to 
use such history as the foundation for intelligent judgement of the 
future.
1 Petras (1977), P,13.
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CHAPTER two
INDIAN NATIONALISM AND THE 
STATE ACCUMULATION POLICY
I. Mimetic Nationalism
Having examined the notions of "public expenditure control" and
"state accumulation" in the abstract1 they must now be located in the
concrete context to which our empirical evidence relates* This context
is the political economy of India in the 1960s, The theme that underlies
our characterization of the Indian political economy is that class
analysis must be supplemented by an understanding of the phenomenon of
nationalism, if over-simple, Europacentric conclusions are to be avoided*
One fundamental error which continues to plague class analyses of
India must be firmly rejected right at the start. That error is the
view that the state is merely the instrument of a single dominant class.
Rejection should be based on t w o separate grounds. First, in many
less developed countries, and certainly in India, the empirical analysis
of class shows that there is no single dominant class. Rather, several
distinct classes with conflicting economic interests are co-dominant.
Even with the most aggregative class analysis of India, the monopoly
bourgeoisie, the small bourgeoisie, landlords, rich peasants and other
groups like the bureaucracy and the armed forces (which are not strictly
classes on Marxist criteria) would have to be separately distinguished
as co-dominant classes and groups. This alliance of social co-dominance
is uneasy, and short-run and even medium-term class analysis for India
consists of charting the shifts in status, power and influence among the
1
parties to this alliance. Second, even if it were correct to speak in 
1 E.g. Toye (1977); cf. Kidron (1965), p.128, n.l.
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social terms of a single dominant class (say, the mythical ’’national
hourgeoisie”), it would scarcely he in a position to use the state
merely as an instrument of its dominance. Essentially, this is because
the colonial state was fashioned under external pressures, for purposes
exogenous to the interests of indigenous society, and cannot be assumed,
therefore, to be readily adaptable to the pursuit of its interests by a
1socially dominant class, even if such a class could be shown to exist.
In comparison with the European paradigm, the state apparatus inherited 
by independent India was over developed in relation to the social and 
economic strength of any indigenous class. So it had, and still 
retains, some power to act independently of the specific interests of 
any domestic class.
Some i^riters go further than this, ascribing to state sector 
employees, civilian and military, the social force to act with almost 
complete autonomy. This bureaucratic group has been termed ”a class­
conscious stratum ... functioning as an independent class ... with its 
own political economic project (sc. of national state capital accumulation)”. 
Whatever the aptness of this conception for other post-colonial societies, 
it exaggerates the autonomy of the Indian state. Its autonomy of action 
is definitely limited by its need to maintain a balance between the
conflicting interests of the classes which,in uneasy coalition, share 
3
social dominance.
In addition, the Indian state's limited freedom of manoeuvre vis a 
vis internal hegemonic struggles does not in any way make it immune 
from external pressures. These external pressures on the overdeveloped 
state arise from the rapid and uneven outward penetration of the 
capitalist mode of production from its European places of origin. In
1 Martiirussen (1976), p*5; Alavi (1972), p.1^7.
2 Petras (1977), p*3.
3 Cf, Martinussen (1976), p.5, n.3.
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the colonial period, capitalist penetration had been experienced as 
invasion and domination, a tidal wave of outside interference and control. 
The Indian reaction had been the ambivalent response of nationalism, felt 
as the twin imperatives "at once to resist / capitalism, in so far as it 
implies European domination^/ an(* somehow to take over its vital forces
/—  -7 1for / the non-European elite’s^/ own use11. The bureaucratic group 
which inherited the colonial state found itself with a certain limited 
freedom within the domestic arena to realize this double-edged response. 
There is motive enough to induce the bureaucratic group to attend to this 
task, since the preservation and strengthening of the sovereignty of the 
nationalist state are the conditions of their own self-perpetuation as 
a group.
It is worth distinguishing the above interpretation from others
apparently similar. Writers in the utilitarian tradition account for
economic nationalism in two ways; it derives either from an intellectual
err ox1, or from the fact that the private interests of bureaucrats are
2
best served by nationalist policies. Writers in the historical
materialist tradition sometimes seem to be suggesting that bureaucratic
strata have the power to choose which ‘'political economic project” they 
3
wish to advance. The above interpretation stresses what has been
called "the fatal impact” of European capitalism on peripheral peoples and 
civilizations as the determining factor of the form of non-European 
nationalism. It would dismiss the other three accounts as, respectively, 
idealistic, hedonistic and voluntaristic errors.
It follows that non-European nationalism has different meanings 
from the nationalisms of European history. Rationalism in India is not 
the same slow, interpenetrating development of capitalism and 
consolidation of state sovereignty which occurred in pre-industrial
1 Nairn (1975), p.12.
2 Johnson (I967), p.68; Bird (1970), p.127, n.19.
3 Petras (1977), p.3.
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Europe, Nor is it a programme of political self-determination for 
groups united by language and culture, of the kind so widely espoused in 
nineteenth and early twentieth century Europe, By contrast, it is a 
struggle to appropriate an externally designed and imposed state 
apparatus, and thereafter to preserve a modified version of it in 
indigenous hands.
This interpretation again appears close to theories of a
1modernization imperative. It certainly shares with such theories
an emphasis on the determinism of long-run historical tendencies.
Where it differs is in avoiding the teleological element in the concept 
of modernity, which implies a steady and successful achievement by non- 
European countries of the ideals of European civilization. Quite to 
the contrary of these ideals, the actual history of the spread of 
capitalism has been characterized by uneven development, international 
conflict and the rise to power of embodiments of unreason and barbarism. 
National sovereignty is pursued by ex-colonies like India because they 
have to exist, if they are to exist, in an international arena in which 
the ultimate rule of morality is sauve qui peut.
The only way to preserve national sovereignty in such a dangerous 
environment is to provide the nation with those types of property, and 
those types of skills, that will serve to defend it against those 
developed countries whose destructive impact has already been experienced 
so painfully. Initially this requires learning how to copy the relevant 
property and skills of those developed countries whose domination is 
feared. This process of defensive copying by post-colonial society 
may be termed "mimetic nationalism’*. Mimetic nationalism is a 
phenomenon which has frequently been noted although not, perhaps, under 
that particular label.
1 E.g. Nayar (1972).
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Sometimes it is remarked disparagingly, as by Trotsky, who claimed
that ’’the backward nation ... not infrequently debases the achievements
borrowed from outside in the process of adapting them to its more primitive 
1culture". This makes it clear that the mimesis is not, indeed could
not be, exact replication. As it has been more recently explained,
"unable to literally 'copyr the advanced lands (which would have entailed
repeating the stages of slow growth which had led to the breakthrough),
the backward regions we r e forced to take what they wanted and cobble it
2
on to their own native inheritance of social forms". The motivation
behind mimetic nationalism is also clear to'those who stumble upon it
without utilitarian blinkers: "the largest (poor) countries seem to be
engaged in duplicating work for the (purpose) of neutralizing the political
3
effects of more powerful alien achievements.
This kind of "nationalism" has as a consequence, a number of
unusual features. First, the process of nationalist struggle actually
stimulates regional linguistic and/or religious patriotism. The cultural
impact of British rule had already done much to prepare the ground. By
1920, the National Congress sought to harness this regional patriotism both
by re-organizing itself linguistically and demanding reorganization of
British India on linguistic lines. The arrival of independence made
manifest the contradiction - a nationalism which coexists with a low
5level of national integration.
The second unusual feature arises because mimetic nationalism tends 
to achieve mobilization by means of populist politics. Especially 
when pre-capitalist economic formations have failed to crystallize 
strong class identities, the over-developed state apparatus is directed
1 Davey (1975), p.109.
2 Nairn (1975), p.11.
3 Melzer (197*1), p.3.
h Clark (1970), pp.9-15; Rudolph and Rudolph (I969), p.1039; atates 
Reorganization Commission (1955), pp.10, 33.
5 Desai (1975), pp.30-5.
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by a political "united front", a comprehensive but loose coalition which
is quite heterogeneous in terms of class. Thus the managers of the
united front are not tightly constrained to develop their nationalism as
a disguise for a particular set of class interests. Limited scope for
the exercise of "great leadership" exists, and whether it is exercised
by a Bose, a Gandhi, a Patel, or as happened, a Nehru, is a matter of
real historical consequence. Nehru's personal responsibility for
setting up the Indian state accumulation policy cannot be glossed over.
Thirdly, while mimetic nationalism may launch itself on a wave of
radical anti-imperialism, including the nationalization of imperial
assets, this posture is maintained more in word than in deed. Before
long, former colonial or semi-colonial states take financial assistance
from multiple sources. That they become "'the clever calves who suck
two cows" is not necessarily the outcome of particular internal class 
1conflicts. Yet the fate of a state accumulation policy can often be
vitally affected, in the short-run, by the willingness of foreign 
sources to provide finance capital.
II. Pre-history of Indian State Accumulation Policy
The early history in India of the state accumulation policy has often 
2
been told. So a further detailed account would be out of place here. 
However, certain aspects of that history illuminate the relationship 
between classes, state and mimetic nationalism, which has so far been 
discussed in very broad terms. These aspects have not been sufficiently 
emphasized by previous writers, and because of their significance for 
a proper understanding of India's state accumulation policy in the 1950s 
and 1960s, they are worth pointing out, even at the risk of some 
repetition.
1 Kalecki (1972), pp.l67»8; Warren (1975), p.15.
2 E.g. Sachs (196*0 , pp.106-25; Chattopadhyay (1970); Martinussen (1976).
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The nationalist tradition holds that British laissez-faire iDolicies 
were the cause of India's failure to develop economically, and that this 
fact gave the anti-colonial struggle its "progressive" character. It is 
fair to say that the potentialities for development in nineteenth century 
India, and, therefore, the scope and the sophistication of the policies 
that would have been needed to realize them, remain very controversial 
among Indian economic historians. This is not the place to attempt an 
arbitration. For the more limited purpose of clarifying the history 
of the state accumulation policy, it must be emphasized that until the 
state apparatus was on the verge of transfer to Indian nationalist 
hands, the British administration in India was more interested in the 
possibilities of state entrepreneurship than the Indian nationalists 
themselves.
Certainly, even before 191^, the British adherence to laissez-faire
was not total and rigid. Rather in the manner of Moghul mercantilism,
the British had experimented with state ownership of large industrial
units, such as coal mines and ironworks. The motive was to try and
ease some of the supply difficulties of the state-owned railways. But
when the government found itself facing the demand for fresh capital to
maintain and expand its units, it shied away. It would not confront the
anticipated charge that public money was being used to Increase competition
1
for British manufacturers. Bo the state-owned units were sold off
to private entrepreneur’s, some to flourish, and others to be quietly 
closed down. Chatterton's state-owned consumer goods factories in 
Madras are perhaps better known. This personal and local experiment 
was, on the whole successful. But it was censured on grounds of laissez- 
faire principle by the Secretary of State; Lord Morley, in 1910, after 
which the remaining factories closed down. This censure also led to 
the closing of a state-owned cotton-seed oil factory in the United
1 Sen (1966), pp.31-5 ; pp.^1-5; cf. Spencer (1959), p.39*
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Provinces, in this episode, British dogmatism, and its ill-effects,
are seen most clearly. Shortly afterwards, however, a partial retreat
from dogmatism took place. The start of the 191^-18 war quickly exposed
the full extent of India's reliance on industrial imports, and the
glaring gaps in her indigenous production capabilities. The Indian
Industrial Commission of 1916-18 responded by recommending a range of state
aids for industrial development, including state ’'pioneer1' factories,
though not going so far as state ownership on a normal basis. But,
by this time, economic policy could no longer be isolated from larger
political decisions \»jhich were made under the shadow of nationalist
opposition. The Industrial Commission's plan for an Imperial Department
of Industries was swallowed up in the Montagu-Chelmsford decentralisation
of 1918, so that promotion of industrial growth became a duty of the new
provincial governments. Lack of revenue kept provincial efforts
miniscule. The provincial pioneer factories of the 1920s made about a
dozen different types of simple consumer goods, of which some succeeded
commercially, but rather more failed from technical problems, marketing
difficulties or surrender in the face of complaints from competitive
1
private enterprise. Once the war was over, and provincial autonomy
and certain protective tariffs had been conceded, financial stringency 
inhibited any further British official experiments with state entre­
preneurship.
Meanwhile, it is quite clear that Indian nationalist opinion was very 
far from advocating a state accumulation policy. Its position (as 
set out by the Indian Industrial Conference, 1905-1912) was that state 
powers of tarIff-making, procurement and development banking should be 
used to aid private industrial growth* At this time, state entrepreneurship 
was definitely favoured less by nationalists than by British officialdom
1 Sinha and Khera (1962), p.143; Clow (1928), pp.9^-103.
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1
in India. One nationalist publicly tried to defend Lord Morley’s policy
when his colleagues on the industrial Commission were condemning its
2
’’deadening effect” I Another example of the nationalist disdain of
state enterprise is the attitude of Sir M. Visvesvaraya. As Dewan 
of Mysore (19l**~l8) and Chairman of the Bhadravati Ironworks (1923-29), 
he established a major Industrial enterprise in the state sector, and
3
managed It with considerable success In adverse trading conditions.
Yet when, in 193**-, he came to write India’s prototype development plan,
despite its extreme emphasis on industrialization, the division of
investment between private and public sectors was an issue left
kcompletely unresolved. He saw the role of the government as one
of encouraging corporate and individual enterprise, advising India “to 
proceed along the lines practised in such capitalist countries as Ermnce
5
and the United States of America”. His later efforts aimed at promoting
industry (vehicles and aircraft manufacturing schemes in the late 1930s)
also centred on the private sector,
Nehru did, however, succeed in 1931 in having the Karachi Congress
resolve that the State “shall own or control key industries and services,
mineral resources, railways, waterways, shipping and other means of
public transport", as well as extending.tariff protection to indigenous
industries. But the socialism which he had absorbed on his visit
to Europe in 1926-7 was of a mild and timid variety - a peculiar blend
of British municipal socialism and Russian communism without the coercion -
7and the Karachi resolution was even milder and more timid.
1 Rider (1971), pp.177-82; pp.190-2.
2 Malaviya (1918), pp.292-3; p.31**.
3 Visvesvaraya (1931), pp.77-93.
*+ Visvesvaraya (193*0, p.297.
3 Visvesvaraya (193*0, pp.221-2; 2^0,
6 Shah (19**9), p.27.
7 Gopal (1975), pp.113-15; 125-6; 136-7; 152.
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In addition, most other Congressmen, and particularly Gandhi and Patel, 
were completely out of sympathy with both models and Nehru, when he 
came under pressure in the mid~1930s, was prepared to soft-pedal his 
socialism to preserve the nationalist united front.
In defining a state accumulation policy, the critical issue is 
the balance between state ownership and state control (which of course 
exists even under "night watchman" capitalism). No attempt was made to 
specify this balance until the National Planning Committee was set up in 
193S under Nehru’s chairmanship. So it is no exaggeration to maintain 
that Indian nationalists "until the mid-1950s ... had no clear conception 
of the part the government was to play in the process of industrialization".^ 
The reason for this is that a state accumulation policy could only become 
attractive to nationalist sentiment once the transfer of the state 
apparatus to Indian control was practically assured.
Nehru's basic viex^s on economic policy are clear enough. His final 
goals were the maintenance of Indian sovereignty and the increase of 
popular welfare. His proximate goal was industrialization, which, he 
believed, would secure both his final goals simultaneously. Planning was 
not a way of choosing a development path; it was a method of clarifying 
the practicalities of industrialization,^ This complex of aims and
beliefs is the economic strategy of "mime-tic nationalism". Its
characteristic is to measure progress by the degree of "ownership and 
control by nationals (individually and collectively) of desirable types 
of "modern property", defined "by imitation and emulation of the economic 
structure of established nation-states". The question of whether 
ownership and control by nationals of "modern" property should be weighted
1 Gopal (1975), pp.209-20,
2 Shirokov (1973), p.56.
3 Nehru (I96I), p.^20; pp.^32-3; Nayar (1972), pp.113-33.
Johnson (1967), p.67.
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in favour of collectivism or individualism is, for nationalists, a
subsidiary issue.
The purest Indian expression of mimetic nationalism is to be
found in Visvesvaraya*s volume on economic planning. The essence of the
doctrine is encapsulated in the following characteristic passages:
Industries and manufactures supply the elements needed to make a 
people self-sufficient and self-reliant and develop their 
organic life as a nation ... Industrial life connotes production, 
■wealth, power and modernity ... The principal nations of the 
world have all been concentrating on industries and manufactures 
with a view to strengthening their economic position ... No modern 
nation whose national policies are not guided by the two forces 
of industrialism and nationalism has gained military power or 
become rich and prosperous ... Industries flourish under any 
civilized national government, whether that government is semi- 
autocratic ... or oligarchic ... or under one-man dictatorship ...
Training in defence is the first step in the building up of 
national life ... No nation can regard itself as safe that is not 
prepared to defend itself ... the supervision and ultimate control 
of the defence forces should be completely Indianized within, say, 
fifteen years.
It is necessary that Indians should ... assimilate the beneficial 
experience of other countries in order to raise their own level 
of working capacity and material prosperity. 1
These sentiments are echoed again and again in Nehru's own writings
and speeches, but with the addition of his own strong preference for
2
collective rather than individual ownership of industry. He tried
to ensure that this preference was embodied in the decisions of the
National Planning Committee, But within the N.P.C. a marked difference
of opinion existed over whether "basic industries" other than defence
industries ought to be state owned. The N.P.C. as such never resolved
this issue in the affirmative, despite Nehru's own later statement to 
3the contrary, Nehru did obtain the agreement of a bare majority of 
N.P.C. sub-committee chairmen in February, 19'tO, but the full N.P.C. 
never pronounced a verdict before the various disruptions of wartime
1 Visvesvaraya (193*0* pp.220-2; 256-7.
2 Desai and Bhagwati (1975), p.2l8, notes 2 and 3.
3 Shah (19^9), Pp.^1; 50; 59; 100; 12^; 1^0; 2 k k * but cf. Nehru (1961), 
p.h22; Chattopadhyay (1970), pp.19-20; Spencer (1959), p.*+5.
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overtook its activities. Because of the disruption and incompleteness,
it is impossible to ascribe to the N.P.C, a coherent attitude towards the
policy of state accumulation. The outbreak of war saved Nehru from
having to confront the opposition which the right-wing of the Congress,
1led by Gandhi, was raising against the work of the N.P.C.
The Tata-Birla or Bombay Plan of 19^, written by eight big 
businessmen, four of whom had served on the N.P.C., serves as another 
exceptionally vivid statement of the nationalist consensus on economic 
policy. The Second War, like the First, had emphasized the serious 
lacunae in India's range of industrial production. Accordingly, it is 
not surprising to find that the Bombay Plan puts industry's investment 
share even higher than the actual Second Five Year Plan; and that the 
rationale of rapid industrialization in terms of national security is 
stated with exceptional clarity. But the commitment to ownership of 
industry by the state was hedged around carefully with qualifications. 
Btate control (presumably an improved version of the existing wartime 
economic controls) was held to be more important than state ownership 
as a general rule. Where state control was considered to be ineffective 
without state ownership, the candidate industries for state ownership 
given in the Plan were two that were already state-owned - defence and 
communications. The Plan certainly contemplated state ownership for 
new industries, but with the proviso that, once flourishing, they could 
be sold to the private sector. State ownership did not however 
require state management; management could be supplied by existing private 
firms of managing agents. The authors were not prepared to believe 
that the question of ownership, or their criteria for determining it, were 
matters of high principle. On the other hand, now that the transfer 
of power from British to Indian hands was so plainly on the cards, they
1 Gopal (1975), P.2^7.
I
3^
were not prepared to offer outright opposition to state ownership
either. What the Bombay Plan suggests is a compromise, by which
industries would be divided half-and-half between the private and the 
1public sector. Although the nationalist big bourgeoisie had softened
its attitude towards state ox^nership in this Plan, one cannot argue that
business espoused a state accumulation policy out of sense of its own
weakness vis a vis foreign capital. On the contrary, it suggests that
it felt strong enough to offer only a limited acquiescence in the policy -
provided that witholding of full support for it did not prevent a national
2
industrialization drive. . This interpretation is consistent with
statistical evidence that Indian capital decisively overshadowed foreign
3
capital in India on the eve of independence.
Calculated hesitation towards a state accumulation policy is also 
evident in the Report of the Interim Government's Advisory Planning Board. 
This Report argued that large-scale state ownership actually might 
prevent industrialization at the required speed. Accordingly, it 
proposed for state ovmership a list of industries even shorter than the 
list in S.N. Agarwal's Gandhian Plan. These were only to be state owned
if private capital was not forthcoming. Even this timidity did not save 
the Report from dissenting notes by the Board's chairman, K.C. Neogy,
kand another member, G.L. Mehta. Nor had the case for a state 
accumulation policy gone by default, thanks to Professor K.T, Shah.
As chairman of the N.P.C, sub-committee on Public Finance, he had already 
pointed out that "apart from other considerations, questions of finance 
and the necessity for increasing revenue for the nation-building 
activities of the State made it essential" for key industries to be
1 Thakurdas (19^5), pp.58; 9^-8; Shirokov (1973), p*57, n.3.
2 Kidron (1985), pp.103-12, cf. pp.72-3*
3 Shirokov (1973), p.^9. 
k Roy (1965), pp.59-62; p.56,
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state-craned, rather than just state~con.troiled. Shah repeated this
argument in his note on the Advisory Board's Report, together with
arguments for a state accumulation policy based on macro-planning and
2
distributional grounds. He got little support, even from
"industrializers".
The history of the debate on a state accumulation policy is quite
consistent with the actions actually taken after Independence by the
Indian government. With the perspective just presented, the strategic
economic policy decisions of the 1950s appear as an epilogue to that
history, rather than as a drama in their ovm right.
The principle of an industrializing course was adopted nearly
unanimously. The controversy of the time centred on the size of total
investments, not their pattern or the desirability of their expected
results. The industrialization strategy itself was regarded as
conventional wisdom that was the product of a long maturing national
3
consensus of politicians and academics. Its widespread, uncritical
acceptance undoubtedly rested on something more fundamental than the 
short-term influences which have been in the past cited as explanations. 
Export pessimism, often cited as the rationale of the industrialization 
strategy, may have existed, but it was not generated by any thorough
Apreliminary study of export prospects - for none was done. Optimism
about agriculture may have bred complacency, .but again no proper study
5of agricultural prospects was made, Mahalanobis certainly had advice
from the U.S.S.E., but it was to moderate his enthusiasm for ideas which 
were basically formalized versions of Nehru's own, and which he had
1 Shah (19ai-9), pp. 188-9.
2 Roy (I965), pp.61-6.
3 Deshmukh (1957), pp.69-77; Oadgil (1972), pp,3-^; ^2; Clarkson (1973), 
pp.722-3,
k Bhagwati and Chakravarthy (1971), p.12.
5 Byres (1972), pp.223-^7*
1
shared with Nehru since the days of the N.P.C.
The firmness of the industrialization commitment contrasts markedly 
with vacillation over the role cf the state in industrialization. Until 
the deaths of Gandhi and Patel, it was by no means assured that Nehru's
2
socialism would win a clear run even as official Congress Party doctrine.
As is well-known, even at the high tide of enthusiasm for the "socialist 
pattern" In 1956, the role of the state remained vague, the elaborate 
attempts at precision only emphasizing the underlying fluidity. The 
second Industrial Policy Resolution of 1956 closed to private enterprise
without any qualification only four industries, all of which had obvious
3
strategic importance. For all other industries, the Resolution is
consistent with any combination of public and private enterprise which 
the government cared to decide upon. The scope for prgamatism without 
formal breach of the Resolirbion is extensive. This latitude was 
certainly also used, particularly to secure the services of foreign
h
private oil companies.
Despite the pragmatism of government policy on the role to be played 
by the state in industrialization, after 1955 substantial public investment 
x-jent to create a heavy Industry complex in the public sector. By 1970, 
a furthex* seventy central government enterprises had so added to the 
twenty-one that existed at the start of the Second Plan, mainly in the 
iron and steel, heavy and precision engineering, chemical and transport 
industries.^ The amount invested in them had risen from 0.8 to ^3.0 
billion rupees at current prices. This, and related investment in 
state government departmental enterprises, probably Increased the
1 Nayar (I972), pp.14^-5; Shah (19^9)? pp.112; 119-
2 Kidron (1965), pp.83-8.
3 0,0.1., Planning Commission (1956), p.^6.
^ Chattopadhyay (I970), pp.21-3; Kapoor (197^), pp.25-65.
5 Cf. Martinussen (1976), p.l^.
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proportion of the national capital stock in public ownership from about 
13 per cent to about 33 per cent in the mid-1960s.
But far from being the first phase of controlled advance to a
society on a ''socialistic pattern", this public sector growth was
tolerated because, in the mind of mimetic nationalism, it could be seen
as a vital step in the consolidation of independent India's international
position. This, for India as for all nations, rests squarely on her
ability to dispose of modern material de guerre, Nehru’s statements
are notoriously opaque, but a powerful case has recently been documented
from them that the military advantages of the industrialization strategy
were always in the forefront of his thinking,’*" One finds for example,
that Nehru1s defense of the Avadi resolutions on the "socialist pattern
of society" uses the theme: "we have to fit India into the nuclear age,
and do it quickly". This, and many other similar examples, could be
cited in support of the judgement on Nehru’s work that "nationalism and
socialism were the intellectual driving forces ... (but) of these
2nationalism was by far the most powerful most of the time".
At almost the start of the industrialization drive, in 1957-58, the 
consequent acute scarcity of foreign exchange induced the government to 
impose stringent quota restrictions on imports. These restrictions 
provided strong protection for all forms of production in India with 
which, otherwise, imports would have competed. Behind the barrier of 
quotas an extensive range of new, but inefficient and internationally 
uncompetitive industries grew up, in the public and private sectors alike. 
This growth in the number and variety of domestically produced products 
was not viewed with alarm. On the contrary, the advent of each new 
import-substitute was welcomed as a further step towards national self­
1 Nayar (1972), pp.113-^3.
2 Tyson (1966), pp.21; 19,
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reliance, in accordance with the doctrine of mimetic nationalism that
"India should not import products which she can with some effort
1
manufacture for herself". In the effort to avoid the Scylla of 
indiscriminate importation, mimetic nationalism headed straight for the 
Charybdis of indiscriminate import substitution.
The concrete context in which a state accumulation policy, itself 
falteringly supported by the government, was supposed to work was 
composed of an industrialisation drive aimed particularly at basic and 
heavy industries, and a foreign trade regime which provided incentives 
for indiscriminate import substitution. It is the attempt to operate 
a state accumulation policy within the boundaries specified b5r mimetic 
nationalism which provides the framework for the ensuing studies of 
Indian public expenditure in the 1960s.
The state accumulation policy has its own political constituency 
in India, the "Left" who advocate economic growth through state capitalism 
and non-alignment in foreign affairs. Their opponents of the "Right" 
support private enterprise capitalism with a large, but subsidiary role 
for the state, and closer alignment to advanced capitalist countries,
What unites both Left and Right is agreement on the need for Indian
2
economic independence, the central objective of mimetic nationalism.
The Congress government naturally emphasized the point of agreement in 
its policy-making, and tried to blur the choice on the issues on which 
the two wings conflicted. Indeed, how it could be otherwise while the 
Congress Party remained the only political grouping capable of supporting 
an all-India government? The retention by the Congress as a party of 
a great deal of the allegiance it received as an anti-colonial movement 
was achieved by avoiding domestic divisions on issues of principle, a
1 Visvesvaraya (193^), pp.3?6~7.
2 ‘Kidron (1965), p*128, m.l.
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meticulous attention to the balanced distribution of governmental
favours amongst the co-dominant social classes, and more recently by
judicious acts of violence and repression. To survive in this form,
Congress had to remain extraordinarily catholic, and aim to comprehend
as many different ideologies and interests as will tolerate each other’s
company.^ The periodic suggestion that it was about to become "a
body of tightly-knit devotees, activists, militants in a cause" have 
2
proved illusory. Its leadership was largely recruited from the
3
dominant classes and groups. It draws the finance to pay its
candidates' election expenses from large firms in the organized sector, 
and the votes it needs to elect them from the vote-brokers of the
4countryside. In electoral terms, its support is more heterogeneous
5
than any other party. It is also the only party whose main support
does not cluster in merely one or two geographical areas of the country.
As the party of consensus par excellence, the Congress policy priorities 
were mimetic nationalism first and state accumulation a rather poor second.
To claim that mimetic nationalism shaped India’s economic strategy 
implies the denial of the view that international conflict is fully 
explicable in terms of class conflict. This denial is justified because 
the two treatments of international conflict as an epiphenomenon to class 
divisions both ignore important facts. Can the entire population of 
poor countries be treated as an overseas extension of the proletariat of 
advanced capitalism, with nationalism its revolutionary ideology? If 
so, why is non-European nationalism so frequently associated with
1 Baran (1973), pp.369-70*
2 Cf. Morris-Jones (1967).
3 Soy (1966-67), I, p.19; IV, pp.371-6.
4 Forrester (1968), pp.1087-93.
5 Sheth (1971), p.284.
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internal reaction? Is nationalism the ideology of capitalist 
2
latecomers? If so, why does it flourish regardless of the internal
3
class structure? Whichever class interest one tries to connect
with non-European nationalism, its variety and ubiquity is inadequately
explained. And quite apart from the discrepancy with fact, it is
doubtful whether a theoretically consistent explanation of international
k
conflict in terms of class division is possible.
The theory of mimetic nationalism implies that government policy 
is directed towards creating an industrial base that will supply 
material de guerre, extending political and economic control over 
peripheral land areas and increasing the manpower available for the 
preservation both of external defence and internal order. This will 
be so regardless of the professed welfare and other objectives of those 
who announce state policy.
1 Cf. Warren (1973), p.U.
2 Petras (1977), p*12.
3 Cf. Warren (1973), p.^3.
4 Berki (1971), pp.80-103.
PART TWO : EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
*n
CHAPTER THREE
THE FISCAL PERFORMANCE OF THE 
PUBLIC SECTOR
The Third Plan noted that "careful attention must be given to
factors which will increase the capacity of the public sector to expand
still more rapidly *.. As the relative share of the public sector
increases, its role in economic growth will become even more strategic
and the State will be in a still stronger position to determine the
character and functioning of the economy as a whole11 The public
sector was seen as "producing large surpluses for development1', and
therefore being "one of the most important factors determining the rate
2
at i\?hich the economy can grow". This was a more positive and
confident statement of the state accumulation policy than those in
either the First or the Second Plan0 The First Plan had only said
that "in promoting capital formation on the required scale ... the
state will have to play a crucial role. This need not involve complete
nationalisation of the means of production ... (but it) does, however,
mean a progressive widening of the public sector and a re-orientation
of the private sector to the needs of a planned e c o n o m y " T h e  public
sector, according to the Second Plan, had "not only to initiate
developments which the private sector is either unwilling or unable to
undertake; it has to play the dominant role in shaping the entire
A
pattern of investments in the economy
By the time of the Fourth Plan, however, a change of emphasis can
1 Planning Commission (1962), p.l^.
2 Ibid., p.50.
3 Planning Commission (1932), p.9.
b Planning Commission (1956), p.22.
hz
be detected. In specifying the aims and objectives of planning, the
statements in previous Plans were quoted selectively. Additional
prominence x\>as given to the themes of complementarity of public and
private sectors activities and the scope for private sector development.
This was at the expense of the usual homage to the role of the public 
1
sector. It was further noted that "the original expectations of an
expanding public sector yielding, in due course, substantial resources
2
for its continued development, have not been realized". As a result
special attention to operational efficiency and economic discipline 
in the public sector and to the coordination of the various p u b l i c  
sector activities was called for. After these implied criticisms, it 
is perhaps not surprising that the endorsement of the future of the 
public sector is vague and tautological: "a matter of crucial
significance will be the emergence of the public sector as a whole as 
the dominant and effective area of the economy (which) will enable it
3
to take charge more and more of the commanding heights" of the economy.
This decline, in the planners' official policy pronouncements, 
from confidence in, to confusion about, the state accumulation policy, 
accurately reflects the increasing failure to make the policy work in 
the decade 19&0 to 1970# In order to document the effective breakdown 
of the state accumulation policy, we rely mainly on national accounts 
data for the government sector or "public authorities". Supplementary 
data is used where appropriate for two purposes. The first is to show 
the functional breakdown of public authorities' spending: the second
is to provide information on the non-departmental enterprises which, 
together with the government sector or public authorites, comprise the 
public sector.





I. Growth of Public Authorities* Expenditure
Table 3.1 : Public Expenditure Growth in relation to the Growth
of Output, Prices and Population, I96O-I to 1968-9
Linear trend annual growth rates 
60-I to 64-5 6^-5 bo 68-9 60-I to 68-9
1 Total expenditure 
of public
authorities 16,8 9.^ IP.9
2 N.N.P. at current
prices 11.2 11.0 11.0
3 Index of wholesale
prices 6,2 8,0 8.0
b Total population n.a. n.a. 2.2
Sources
1 Calculated from C.S.O. unpublished data.
2 Calculated from data in C.S.O., Estimates of National Product,
1960-61 - 1969-70.
3 Calculated from Economic Survey, 1971-72.
^ Census of India, 1971* Provisional Population Tottals,
It is all too common, both among officials and, less excusably, 
among scholars, to confine an assessment of fiscal performance to a 
calculation of the increase in money expenditures or revenues in a 
given period. But such a calculation, on its own, says nothing 
Whatever about fiscal performance. The first thing that must be done 
is to relate changes in money expenditures, as in Table 3.1* to 
simultaneous changes in national output, the level of prices and 
population.
Total public expenditure at current prices grew over the period 
1960-1 to 1968-9 at almost 13 per cent a year compound. Since net 
national product at current prices grew by 11 per cent a year compound 
over the same period, a strong a priori presumption is established
if if
that the relative share of the public authorities in the economy 
expanded. (There are logical problems in measuring the public 
authorities’ relative share, which will be mentioned shortly). Also, 
since prices rose by about 8 per cent compound and population grew at 
2.2 per cent compound, the whole decade saw an increase in the average 
level of real public expenditure - althoiigh this says nothing about the 
distribution of the increment.
Looking at average annual growth rates can also be deceptive, 
because they can mask sharp changes in the tempo of growth. As Table 3.1 
makes clear, the growth of public expenditure was anything but steady 
and continuous throughout the decade. From a compound growth rate of 
nearly 17 per cent in the first half of the decade, the fall to a rate 
of 9-g- per cent in the second half makes a remarkable contrast. Given 
the relatively much more gentle deceleration of money net output and 
acceleration of inflation, and assuming steady population growth, two 
conclusions may be drawn. The expansion of the public authorities’ 
relative share in the economy and the rise in the average level of real 
public expenditure were both phenomena exclusively of the period before 
1964-5• After 1964-5, both of these changes were partially, but not 
completely reversed because public spending failed to keep pace with 
either money net output or with the combined effects of inflation and 
population growth.
There is no ideal measure of the government’s relative share in the 
economy. Public expenditure has two distinct economic effects: part
of it directly absorbs currently available resources, while part merely 
redistributes purchasing power in the non-government sector. The latter 
("non-exhaustive” spending or transfer payments) should not be included 
in public expenditure when expressed as a percentage of G.N.P., since 
transfer payments of all kinds are excluded in the calculation of G.N.P.
On the other hand, if the government’s share in the economy is measured
k3
by the ratio of only "exhaustive*' expenditure to GJ.P, all indirect 
influences of government on the disposition of resources are ignored. 
Both measures, G/GNP x  100 and N + G/GNP x 100 (where G is exhaustive 
and N is noil-exhaustive spending) are imperfect in logic. But in 
India, as in many poor countries, the transfer payments element in 
total public expenditure is relatively small, and it happens that the 
two measures show, subject to one qualification, the same changes over 
t ime.







^ x 100" 
GNP
1960-62 13.0 15.'^ 10.8
1962-6** 15.7 18.6 13.0
19 6 **-66 15.7 I S A  , 13.3
1966-68 13.8 17*5 12.8
1968-70 13.9 19.2 13.1
S our c e
C.S.O. Estimates of National Product, I96O-I to 1969-70.
* Note: T = total tax revenues of public authorities.
Table 3.2 shows the two measures so far discussed, plus a third, that 
of total tax revenues as a percentage of G.N.P. Measures (1) and (3) 
show a close similarity in the phasing of expansion and partial relative 
contraction. Measure (2), total expenditure as a percentage of G.N.P. 
shows two differences: (a) a slightly earlier peak of expansion and
(b) an apparent resumption in the expansion of the government sector 
reaching a new peak in 1968-70. The latter is the result of a huge 
increase in the government's net purchase of assets at this time, 
presumably reflecting the compensation paid for the nationalisation of
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fourteen domestic banks in I969.
Similar timing in the expansion and partial contraction of "real" 
public expenditure per head is also evident from the figures in Table 3.3. 
To get at these figures, the rather crude deflator of the wholesale price 
index was used, and population expansion was assumed to be steadjr and 
continuous. The results, which are admittedly only an approximation, 
show a rapid rise in real public spending per head to 64 rupees by 
1963-64, a peak which was not regained by 1968-69.
The observed fluctuations in the government’s share in the economy 
coincide with (a) the change from expanding national income per head to 
contraction and subsequent partial recovery and (b) the change from a 
structure of output increasingly favouring industrial to a structure 
shifting back again in favour of agriculture. Broadly speaking, the 
first half of the decade manifests rising income per head, some slight 
growth in the industrial sector's share in output, growth in the relative 
share of the government in the economy and rising real levels of public
Table 3*3 * Changes in Real Public Expenditure Per Head
(a) (b) (c)
Year






(N+G) x 100 
Price Index x 
(Rupees)
1960-61 2109 439.1 48
1961-62 2289 448.8 51
1962-63 2710 458.7 59
1963-64 2983 468.8 64
1964-63 2969 479.1 62
1965-66 3045 489.6 62
I966-67 2924 500.4 58
1967-68 2968 511.4 58
1968-69 3202 522.7 61
Sources
(a) Calculated from C.S.O, unpublished data and wholesale price index 
in Economic Survey, 1971-72.
(b) I96I population figure in I97I Census compounded at 2.2 per cent 
per annum.
^7
expenditure per head. In the second half of the decade, all these 
developments are reversed, then resume again too weakly to attain their
mid-decade peak levels.
That this set of statistical facts is not formally inconsistent
with Wagner’s law of expanding state activity should not be given much
significance. An increasing government share in national output has
1
been the secular experience of many now developed economies. But 
it would be wrong to conclude from this, taken in conjunction with the 
Indian evidence, that India since Independence has been undergoing 
some kind of inevitable universalistic "development" process which 
automatically expands the government share. The explanations offered 
by Wagner of the phenomenon which he correctly identified are 
iinsatisfactory, even in relation to the "developing" nations of his own 
time. Certainly one of the major expansionary forces behind public 
sector relative growth in advanced capitalist economies *■» growing social 
security systems redistributing income by public transfers - has been 
absent in India. Another expansionary force - the nationalization of 
private sector assets - has appeared only sporadically, and not, as 
Wagner predicted, as a response to increasing market failure promoted 
by economic growth. When poor, post-colonial economies, like India’s, 
show a Wagnerian trend in expenditures, the direction of causation is 
the exact opposite of that formulated by Wagner. The forces of output 
expansion and industrialization do not operate, through the demand side, 
to expand the government’s share. That share, on the contrary, is 
deliberately expanded by the government with the objective of 
stimulating the accumulation of productive capital.
II. Changing Composition of Public Expenditure
On the one hand, public spending is the sum of a set of programmes 
directed to different purposes, such as defence, education or
1 Bird (1970), p.79.
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agricultural development. On the other hand, it is the addition of a
set of inputs or resources (such as manpower, buildings or second-hand
assets) which are absorbed by the programmes in different combinations.
An analysis of public spending by programme is the "functional1
classification of expenditure, while an analysis by types of input is
the "economic1 classification. Although the two classifications are
conceptually distinct, they are not independent of each other, since
they are simply two facets of the same reality.
The unpublished C.S.O. data on which we have relied thus far does
not have an accompanying functional breakdown. Thus we are forced to
adopt the unsatisfactory alternative of using the functional breakdown
of other data which rests on a different conceptual basis. This is
taken from the Ministry of Finance's annual Economic Surveys. It
differs from the C.S.O, data in that
(i) it takes no direct account of spending by public authority
other than the Central and State Governments:
(ii) it includes in the category "development outlay" the Plan
expenditure of the railways and non-departmental undertakings
out of their own resources, as well as loans by the Central 
and State Governments to local bodies, non-departmental 
commercial undertakings (including Electricity Boards) and 
other parties.
At the same time, it differs from the Jtie serve Bank of India's statistics 
on Central and State government finances, in that, for example, it 
excludes transfers to the Special Development Fund through which P6L„ 480 
assistance is mediated. It follows that the aggregates of public 
expenditure given in the Economic Survey are not the same as those used 
heretofore, being both larger initially and showing a faster rate of 
growth, because of the wider definition implied by (ii) above. Further, 
as will become clear, the classification provided is not a complete 
functional classification. A number of important functional categories 
are separated out from non-development outlay, and Plan development
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Table 3.4 : Budgetary Transactions of Central and State Governments expressed
as Percentages of Total Outlay
60-1 61-2 62-3 63-4 64-5 65-6 66-7 67-8 68-9 69-70
DEVELOPMENT
SPENDING 67.4 66.7 63.7 59.3 61.8 62.1 55.6 57.fi 57.7 56.6
of
which 
(a) Plan 41.8 40,2 42.0 39.1 42.7 4o .9 35.2 32.4 34.8 29.5
of which
1 Agriculture and 
allied sectors 5.27 5.15 4.84 5.30 5.48 5.44 4.93 6.67 4.39
2 Irrigation and 
flood control 3.77 3.40 2.81 3.14 3.11 2.43 2,24 2.39 2.63
3 Power 4.96 5.42 6.00 6.43 6.47 6.57 6.07 5.70 6.39
4 Industry and 
minerals 6.94 7.60 8,00 7.95 8.76 8.37 7.32 7.24 5.80
5 Village and 
small scale 
industries 1.33 1.18 1.00 1.00 0.94 0.69 0.67 0.65 0.50
6 Transport and 
communication 10.55 11.13 10.73 10.64 8.46 6.90 6.10 6.27 5.52
7 Education and 
scientific 
research 2.76 2.97 2.87 3.38 3.52 1.68 1.84 2.18 1.36
8 Health and fam­
ily planning 1.93 1.92 1.49 1.59 1.73 0.94 1.13 1.29 l.o4
9 Other miscella- 
neous * 2.60 2.37 2.12 2.21 2.35 2.18 2.07 2.15 1.84
10 Adjustment +0.10 +0.8 -0o8 +1.0 0 0 0 +0.3 0
(b) Non-Plan 23.6 26.4 21.6 20.4 10.1 21.2 20.4 24.6 22.9 27.1
N ON-DEVELOPMENT 
SPENDING 32.6 33.3 56.3 4q ,5 38.2 ,37.0 44,4 43.0 42,3 43.4
of which
(c) Defence (net) 11.0 11.1 14.1 19.0 17.0 15.8 14.8 15.0 15.1 14.9
(d) Debt Service 4.5 4.8 5.2 7.1 7.4 7.5 8.5 8.9 8.7 8.8
(e) Tax collection 
charges 2.7 2.4 2.0 1.8 1.7 1.8 1.6 1.8 2,0 1.9
(f) Police 3*7 3.9 3.7 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.4 3.9 4.0 4.2
(g) Others ** 10.7 11.1 11.3 9.4 8.7 9.4 16.0 13.5 12.4 13.5
Source Economic Survey, for the years 1962-63, 1963-64, 1964-63, 1963-66, 
1967-'68,' "1966-69, 1969-70 and 1971-72: percentages calculated from
sundry tables of absolute values given therein#
Notes * includes water supply and sanitation; housing, urban and regional 
development; welfare of backward classes; social welfare, labour 
welfare and craftsmen training, etc:
includes general administration, pensions and privy purses, famine 
relief, food subsidy, grants and ioanS'to foreign countries and non- 
development al loans to other parties#
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outlay can be broken down into nine groups of development heads. But 
no sub-division of non-Plan development outlay appears to be possible, 
although one is clearly needed by development head for a comprehensive 
analysis. Finally, the breakdown of Plan development outlay is based 
on later figures, revising slightly downwards for the early years of 
the decade, a discrepancy reflected in the "adjustment" item in Table 3.^.
Despite the various deficiencies which have been mentioned, Table 3.^ 
is a pointer towards a number of tentative conclusions. The first is 
that, before 1965-66, while the economy was still expanding and the 
government’s share in its increasing, the growth rate of non-developmental 
spending was higher than that of developmental spending. At this time 
the major contributor to the higher growth rate of non-development spending 
was defence, the budget for which was roughly doubled in real terms.
From the viewpoint of the chosen development policy, the desirable 
situation would be just the opposite. Yet, on the other hand, it is 
not strictly possible to regard the additional resources devoted to defence 
as a diversion from other government programmes. To do so is to assume 
that the same total volume of resources would have been available for 
government spending in the absence of the strong additional demands from 
the defence services. This is not a safe assumption.
One can, however, examine the consequences of two opposite
assumptions. If defence spending had been held constant in real terms
in the first half of the decade, and the additional expenditure which
was in fact devoted to defence had been devoted instead to development
programmes, then (obviously) the government’s share in the economy would
have been exactly what it did in fact grow to, but the growth rate of
*
development expenditure would have exceeded the growth rate of non­
development spending. At the end of the period, the proportion of total 
government spending for development would have risen from 67 to 70, 
instead of falling to 62 per cent. Although a highly satisfactory
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outcome, it seems doubtful, on political grounds, whether the government 
would ever have mobilized the full increment of resources without the 
stimulus of a national emergency. The more likely case is to imagine 
defence spending constant in real terms, and the extra resources which 
were in fact mobilized for defence allowed to stay in the private sector. 
The consequences of this would have been a government share in the 
economy of about 17 per cent, against the actual 19 per cent in mid- 
decade; and an equiproportional growth of development and non-development 
spending. If it is now admitted that defence and development did to 
some extent compete for resources in the government’s hands, it is clear 
that the very rapid expansion of the defence budget must have prevented 
a rise in the ratio of development to non-development spending that 
would otherwise have occurred. This conclusion reflects quite well 
on the development orientation of government expenditure under the Third 
Plan. The emphasis was placed strongly on Plan development expenditure 
which grew faster than total spending despite the very rapid growth in 
defence pr ogr amrn e s .
By 1965-66, the growth of total public expenditure in real terms 
had slowed down considerably, falling to an average annual rate of only 
I2" Per cent between 196^-5 and 1968-9. In this situation, the problem 
of whether the extra resources the government was raising should be 
regarded as specialized, for political reasons,, to a particular spending 
programme, ceases to have its former importance. Once there are tight 
limits on the amount of overall real growth, one need no longer be so 
cautious about regarding changes in programme shares as a redistribution 
of available resources between competing programmes in response to 
changing government priorities.
The changes in programme priorities in the second half of the 1960s 
were, in fact, quite startling. Non-development continued to grow 
faster than development spending. But this was no longer due to the
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expansionist impulse of the defence programme. DefenceTs share in 
total spending fell from 17 per cent in 1964-65 to 15 per cent in 
1969-70, while defence's share in non-development spending fell from 
44 to 34 per cent between the same dates. This makes it easy to accept 
the view that, from the mid-sixties, "the constraints 011 developmental 
expenditure do not arise from increased defence s p e n d i n g " T h e  
burgeoning elements of non-development spending after 1965-66 were 
twofold. The most important was expenditure on famine relief measures 
and food stibsidies, the impact of which was felt particularly strongly 
in 1966-67 and 1967-68 following the monsoon failures of the previous 
two years. Less important, but also significant, was increased 
expenditure on police. Police spending rose as a percentage of total 
expenditure from 3.3 per cent in 1964-5 to 4,2 per cent in 1969-70, and 
as a percentage of non-development spending from 8,6 to 9*7 Ve r cent 
over the same period. It appears that the government's response to 
the internal economic crisis was a markedly "colonial" one - large-scale 
measures to alleviate immediate popular distress coupled with increased 
attention to its capabilities for maintaining internal "law and order".
Given the slow rate of overall expenditure growth in real terms 
and the faster growth of non-development than development spending, it 
is no surprise to discover that development spending itself remained 
virtually static in real terms, But whereas, during the Third Plan, 
Plan development spending grew faster than non-Plan, after 1965-66 the 
reverse happened. While development spending failed to grow in real 
terms, Plan development spending was held constant in money terms at a 
time of price inflation of an average of 6 per cent a year. Thus 
in real terms, Plan development spending suffered a marked decline, 
thereby releasing resources for non-Plan development spending.
It is not possible to present a complete picture of the effects 
of these changes on individual heads of development,, since the .Economic
1 Subrahmanyam (1973), pp.1155-8 .
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Survey provides an expenditure 'breakdown by development head only in 
respect of Plan development outlay. It must always be borne in mind 
that any curtailment in rlan development outlay may be partly, fully 
or more than fully compensated by an increase in non-Plan development 
outlay under the same development head. However, offsetting increases 
outside the Plan are more probable in relation to some heads of 
development than others. If the changing balance between Plan and 
non-Plan development spending is accompanied by a change in the balance 
between Centre and State government spending, it is quite probable that 
heads of development where a large slide of spending is the responsibility 
of the State governments would show growing shares of non-Plan spending 
to compensate for shrinking shares of Plan spending. The heads of 
development where State governments exercize a major responsibility 
are agriculture and allied sectors, irrigation and flood control, education 
and scientific research and health and family planning. Plan development 
outlay on each of these heads decreased as a percentage of total 
expenditure. But it is doubtful that development outlay (i.e. both 
Plan and non-Plan) on these heads as a percentage of total expenditure 
also decreased. It is much more likely that it stagnated in real 
terms but that an increasing proportion was administered outside the 
framework of the Plan.
The most dramatic decline in Plan development outlay as a percentage 
of total expenditure occurs in respect of transport and communications.
Plan development outlay under this head was 10|- per cent of total 
expenditure in 196^-5<, hut fell steadily to 5"2 Ve r cent in I969-VO.
The programmes involved - railways, post and telegraphs and civil 
aviation - are all Central government responsibilities, so that there 
is no possibility of compensating increases in non-Plan development 
outlay 011 .State government account, nor is there any reason for expecting 
them on Central government non-plan account. Although, given the
5^
defective nature of the evidence, no certainty is attainable, it seems 
probable that transport and communications was the head of development which 
experienced the severest effects of the restraint on development 
expenditure. Outlay under this head almost certainly contracted in 
money terms, so that, in real terms, its contraction was even greater.
As we shall see, this had very important repercussions 011 the growth 
and structure of Indian industrial output, and was at the heart of the 
breakdown of the policy of state accumulation.
Even for those programmes where development outlay was more or less 
maintained in real terms, the shifting of an increasing part of them 
outside the framework of the Plan was not a matter of merely administrative 
interest. Planning, if it has any virtues, does so precisely because 
of the comprehensiveness of its approach and the centralization of 
decis ion-making which it encourages. It is a sad commentary on the 
Fourth Five Year Plan, which was intended to restore Indian planning to 
its pre-1965-66 position, that in its first year of operation, 1969-70,
Plan development outlay constituted a markedly smaller part of total 
government expenditure than was the case in the three preceding years 
of "plan holiday". It proved much easier to begin plan holidays than 
to end them.
III. The Decline of Public Sector Capital Formation and Saving
If X'le now turn from the functional classification given in the 
Economic Survey to the economic classification of public expenditure 
on a national accouhts basis, as prepared by the C.S.O., the tentative 
conclusions already arrived at are strengthened. The distribution of 
expenditure during the Third Plan between government consumption, 
assorted varieties of transfer, gross fixed capital formation and other 
capital transactions is remarkably stable during this period of real 
expenditure growth, except for the sudden expansion of net purchases
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of commodities and services in 1963-64 resulting from rapid rearmament 
(see Table 3.5). After 1964-65, when the annual average rate of real 
expend it lire growth had fallen to about 1-g- per cent, considerably more 
dramatic changes occurred in the relative importance of the various
Table 3.5 : Public Authorities' Expenditure by economic category
expressed as percentages of the total
60-1 61-2 62-3 63-4 64-5 65-6 66-7 67-8 68-9 69—7(
1 Government 




employees 34.3 !— Co 31.6 30.5 31.9 32.4 33.1 34.8 36.8 35.2
lb Net purchase 
of goods and 
service 17.2 16.9 19.1 24.1 21.7 22.7 22.3 20.3 21.4 20.1
2 Interest on 
public 
debt 2.8 3.1 3.7 3.4 3.3 4.2 5.1 4.8 4.6 4.5
3 Subsidies A 4.7 5.0 4.3 3.9 4.6 9.0 7.0 5.4 4.8
4 Current 
transfers 8.2 8.4 6.9 6.0 6.3 6.5 7.0 7.5 8.2 8.4
5 Cross fixed 
capital 
formation 33.9 32.2 31.3 30.4 31.2 30.1 26.6 24.0 24.9 21.1
of which
5a Departmental 
enterprises 20.8 19.4 19.3 19.0 19.5 18,7 16.0 14.1 14.6 12.0
5b Administr­
ation 13.2 12.8 12.0 11.4 11.7 11.4 10.6 9.9 10.3 9.0
6 Changes in 
stocks 1.2 -1.2 1.5 0.1 1.1 o.l -2.6 0.9 -2.2 -0.7
7 Net purchases 
of assets -3.4 -0.3 -0.1 -0.2 —0 . 2 -1*5 -o04 0 -Ocl 5.6
8 Capital 
transfers 1.4 1.4 1.0 1.3 0.8 1 0 0 lo0 o„8 0.8 1.1
Sources
1960-1 to 1968-9: based on data in C,S.Oa Estimates of National Product 
1960-1 - I969-70; Tables 8 and 10.
1969-70: based on C.S.O. unpublished data.
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economic categories* The effects of the double monsoon failure are 
clearly visible in 1966-7 a*id 1967-8, when subsidies took 9 7 pez*
cent of total expenditure, compared with an average of 4 - 5 pe^ r cent 
under the Third Plan, In the last three years of the 1960s, compensation 
of government employees begins to take a larger share of the total than 
at any time in the previous seven years, the joint result of an over­
expanding bureaucracy and generous grants of additional dearness 
allowances. The cost to the exchequer of bank nationalization is 
evident in the transformation of net purchase of assets from a small 
negative item to a large positive one in 1969-70.
To make room for all these expanding items beneath a virtually static 
ceiling on real expenditure, the axe had to fall, and fall it did - on 
gross fixed capital formation. Even under the Third Plan, gross fixed 
capital formation had failed to grow quite as fast as total expenditure. 
But after 1969-66 hardly any growth at all was permitted, even in money 
terms, while, on the same basis, total expenditure grew by 9 per cent 
a year. Consequently, the share of expenditure devoted to gross fixed 
capital formation fell from 30 per cent in 1965-66 to 21 per cent in 
1969-70. Here is one more stark reflection of the official plan 
holiday between I966 and 1969* and the failure of the official resumption 
of planning in 1969-70 to reverse the trend of the previous three years.
It is vjorth noting that the check to gross fixed capital formation 
after 1965-66 was more harshly felt by departmental enterprises rather 
than government departments proper. This confirms the earlier 
indications that the transport industries, particularly railways, were 
the worst sufferers in the government investment famine. From the 
evidence both of the economic and the functional classification, it would 
appear that, at least after 1963-66, neither capital formation nor 
development expenditure nor Plan development expenditure was a priority 
in the government budget. On the contrary, "in effect, capital
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expenditure has been the residual component in total government sector 
1operations”.
Consequently, when the trends in public authorities1 capital 
formation are viewed in conjunction with trends in other relevant 
magnitudes (Table 3.6), the picture is one of movement in the opposite 
direction from that which is required if the government is to act as the 
engine of a capitalist industrialisation.
Table 5.6 : Public Authorities' Capital Formation in relation 
” to G.N.P. and total gross fixed Capital Formation




f  # C if •
(Rs! or!) 716 753 899 10^2 1167 1257 1223 1210 1258 1296





cost 5.1 5.1 5.7 5.8 5.5 5.7 4.8 4,1 4.1 3.8
(b) of 
total
g.f.c.f. 35.2 31.2 33.7 33.1 31.9 30.4 26.6 23.8 23.4 22.2
Note :■ * g.f.c.f. means gross fixed capital formation
Source : C oS<,0M  National Accounts Statistics 1960/61 - 1973/74« pp.6, 34
and 69.
It is clear that, after the end of the Third Plan, public authorities 
gross capital formation failed to keep pace either with the overall 
growth of the economy or with the growth of total gross fixed capital 
formation. The public authorities, of course, do not constitute the
1 Edwards (1969)* p.12.
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•whole of the public sector. But even when account is taken of the 
investment that was done by the non-departmental public enterprises,
Table 3.7 s Public Sector Capital Formation in relation to G.N.P, and
total gross fixed Capital Formation




(Rs. cr.) 1055 1107 1312 1562 1824 2046 204-7 2013 2111 2190





cost 7.5 7.5 8.3 8.7 8.6 9.4 8.1 6.8 6.9 6.3
(b) of 
total
g.f.c.f. 48.9 45.9 4-9.2 49.6 49.8 4-9.5 44.5 39*8 39.3 37.5
Note : * g.f.c.f, means gross fixed capital formation
Source: C.S.O., National Accounts .Statistics, 1960/61 - 1973/74, pp.34, 69.
the capital formation of the whole public sector shows the same failure 
to keep pace with G.N.P. and with total gross fixed capital formation.
Thus the Indian strategy of enlarging the role of the public sector in 
investment was allowed to falter. The government adopted a "Mexican” 
policy of letting the balance between public and private investment swing 
back in favour of the private sector.^*
There were two sources of pressure on the government to let this 
happen. One was the gradual slackening of the inflow of foreign aid to 
India after 1964. The other was the contraction of public saving in 
the late 1960s. As Table 3.8 shows, after 1964-5, the level of public 
savings underwent a substantial absolute decline at current prices, falling
1 Cf. Reynolds (1971), pp.538-9.
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Table 3,8 : Public Authorities' Saving in relation to G.N.P., 
total Saving, current Receipts and net Investment









2 G.N.P. at 
factor
cost 2.1 2.5 2.6 2.9 2.8 2.5 1.6 1.2 1.8 1.9
3 Total










g.f.c.f. ^1.6 ^8.6 ^5 .^  ^9«2 51.2 ii-3.1 33.^ 29.7 ^3.1 ^8.3
Source : C.S.O., National Accounts Statistics 1960/61 - 1973/7^, 
pp.2, 6, 66-7, 69.
from 598 Rs. crores in that year to 360 Rs. crores in 1967-8. Thus 
public savings between 196^-65 and 1967-68 fell dramatically as a share 
of national expenditure, of total national savings, of public authorites' 
net receipts and of public authorities' gross fixed capital formation.
In 1968-69 and 1969-70, these dowmvard falls were reversed, but In no 
case were the previous peak values (in 196^-65) regained. It may not 
be unreasonable to expect some diminution in the government's ability 
to finance its own investment from public savings, when that investment 
is being rapidly expanded. But in India in the late 1960ss a falling 
share of public savings in the finance of government investment is
6o
combined with a falling level of government investment in real terms.
In other words, despite the ’’plan holiday” and the severe cut back 
in investment which it entailed, the government's requirement from 
sources of investment finance not under its own control (i.e. domestic 
borrowing and foreign aid) increased both relatively and absolutely.
This picture is in no x^ ay materially altered by extending the 
discussion to the public sector as a whole. The performance of the 
non-departmental public enterprises in terms of profitability was 
extremely poor in the 1960s. As a result, the dividends which they 
were able to contribute to the national exchequer were, despite their 
upward trend, miniscule in comparison with the totals of public authorities' 
saving, as is shown in Table 3*9*
Table 3*9 • Public Enterprises' net trading Profits and Dividends 
contributed to the Exchequer
Public
(Rs. crores)




Loss (-)9.1 10.3 (-)21.6 (-)3^. 7 (-)26.9 (-)8.7
b Divi­
dends
Paid 2.1 2.8 3.9 P.8 7.^  10.2 11.7 12.7
Sources : Ministry of Finance, Bureau of Public Enterprises, A Handbook 
of Information on Public Enterprises 19701 pp.52 and 90.
For 1969-70, Ministry of Finance, Bureau of Public 
Enterprises, Annual Report on the Working of Industrial and 
Commercial Undertaking of the Central Government, 1969-70, 
pp.15, 29, 111 and 172.
The share of public sector capital formation that was financed 
by public sector saving (see Table 5*10) rose somewhat in the Third 
Plan period. It then plummeted to its nadir in 1967-68, and
subsequently by 1969-70 returned to the same value as that for 1960-61.
6l
Table 3*10 : Percentage of Public Sector Capital formation financed 
by Public Sector Saving








g.f.c.f. 29.2 32.8 31.1 34.5 ,33*5 28.9 19.9 17.6 24.7 29.4
Source : C.S.O., National Accounts Statistics I960/6I - 1973/74. pp.33-4.
This is hardly a dynamic performance.
Formally, public saving is the excess of current receipts (defined
as those receipts which leave the government's assets and liabilities
position unchanged) over current expenditure in the national accounts
sense. Thus a decline in public saving results from poor performance
in raising current receipts, failure to limit current expenditure, or
some combination of both of these factors. In India since 1965-66, both
factors have been at work, and so the problem is one of judging the
relative degree of emphasis to be placed on each.
The Indian performance in raising current revenue for the government
sector certainly cannot be characterised as uniformly poor. Between
1952 and 1962, the buoyancy of the Indian tax system was greater than
1that of any other country in Asia. One result of this was that,
until 1963-64, government current receipts steadily and appreciably 
increased as a percentage of national income (Table 3*11). The 
revenue motive was the dominant one in fiscal policy, "the Finance 
Ministers at the Centre and in the States often adopting a more or
1 Chelliah (1966), p.35*
62
Table 3. 13- : Government current Receipts in relation to National Income
60-1 61-2 62-3 63-4 64-3 63-6 67-7 67-8 68-9
1 Current 
receipts
(Rs. cr.) 1708 1930 2313 2860 3109 3^76 3876 4120 4458
2 1 as a 
percent­
age of
N.D.P. 12.8 13.8 15.4 16.6 13.4 16.7 16.1 14.4 13.4
Source : C.S.O., Estimates of National Product I960/6I - 1969/70  ^ pp.2 and
13.
less purely revenue approach to taxation","*' Since the increments to
revenue resulted largely from successive increases in tax rates and
extension and multiplication of tax bases, their side-effects, in terms
of economic impact, equity and administrative soundness were often
damaging to the tax system as a whole. Damage of this kind is very hard
to avoid in a tax system whose revenue productivity is being rapidly
expanded, but can be limited by a continuous effort at repair and reform.
Despite the quasi-llaldorian experiments of the late 1930s and subsequent
official reports of mixed value (by Chanda, Bhootalingam and Wanchoo), this
sort of. effort has been conspicuous by its absence in India. However,
if one leaves such considerations aside and adopts only the revenue criterion,
even after 1963-66 the government did succeed in keeping current receipts
more or less constant as a fraction of national income. As one
authority has remarked, "in view of the severity of the drought of 1965
and I966 and of its adverse effect on the level of domestic activity
and on the balance of payments,, the surprising feature is that there was
no significant decline in any of the major components of total tax 
2
revenue. This comment, however, loses its force as agriculture
1 Clielliah (1967), p,921.
2 Edwards (1969), p.11.
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gradually recovered by the end of the 1960s, and current receipts as 
a share in national income failed to resume its earlier upward climb.
The changing structure of current receipts (Table 3.12) is revealing
Table 3.12 : The Structure of Government Current Receipts
(Percentages)









income 10.9 11.4 10.7 12.1 9.8 9.9 9.5 9.5 11.1
a Operating 
surplus 3.6 6.5 6.0 6.3 4.2 4.2 3.6 2.6 3.2
of which: 
railways 2.3 3.0 2.9 3.3 1.8 1.7 1.3 0.5 1.0
b Income from 
property 3.3 4.9 4.7 5.8 5.6 5.7 5.9 6.9 7.9
of which:
interest
receipts 2.8 2.7 2.6 3.7 3.6 3.9 4.0 4 ..8 6.0
2 Direct 
taxes 24.6 24.0 24.8 24.7 24.6 22.3 21.5 20.8 20.3
a Corpor­
ation tax 6.5 8.1 9.6 9.6 10.1 8.8 8.6 7.5 7o2
b Land 
revenue 5.1 4.5 4.6 3.8 3.5 2.9 2.0 2.2 2,4
c Other 13.0 11.4 10.6 11.3 11.0 10.6 10.9 11.1 10.7
3 Indirect 
taxes 60.9 61,0 60.9 59.9 62.1 65.4 66 0 9 67.5 66.7
a Customs 10.0 10.9 10.7 11.7 12.8 15.5 15.1 12.4 10.0
b Excise 27.4 2 7.7 28,5 27.3 28.1 28.5 28.3 30.8 32.7
c Sales tax 9.6 9.5 9.3 9.6 10.3 10.9 11.8 12.8 13.0
d Stamps 2.3 2.3 2.0 1.9 2.0 1,9 1.8 2.1 1.9
e Other 11.6 10.6 10.4 9.4 9.9 806 9.9 9.4 9.1
4 Miscel­
laneous... 
receipts 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.3 3.5 2.4 2.1 2.2 1.9
Source : C.S. 0., Estimates of National Product I960/I - 1969/70, p.17.
for two reasons, one theoretical, the other practical. There is a theory 
of fiscal development, pioneered by Hinrichs, which argues that, as
6k
economic growth occurs, the share of (a) tax receipts in total receipts
and (b) indirect taxes in total taxes first of all increases, then reaches
a maximum value and begins to decline. The empirical basis of this
theory is an international cross-section comparison and a time-series
1analysis of Japanese public finances. If such a theory were accepted
as valid, it might also be taken to have policy implications. It 
might come to be believed that conforming to the "normal” tax structure 
for the existing level of income was a pre-condition for further income 
growth; or alternatively that the revenue structure need not be a central 
policy concern because income growth would "automatically" produce the 
required changes. It is therefore of interest to note that the Indian 
evidence on income growth and revenue structure changes conflicts with 
the evidence adduced by Hinrichs. During the period of economic growth, 
that is up to the end of the Third Plan, the tax receipts/total receipts 
ratio and the indirect taxes/total taxes ratio remained virtually 
constant. It is evident that the increase in these two ratios did not 
take place until 196*1/5 and after, once the economy was heading into a 
deep recession and partial recovery thereafter. Nor can this set of 
facts be described as the operation of the Hinrichs relationship with a 
lag. The rising share of taxes in receipts, and indirect taxes in tax 
revenue are both directly attributable to the recession itself - through 
its effect in diminishing the base of income and corporation taxes and 
depressing the government’s income from entrepreneurship and property. 
Similar arguments hold for Hinrichs1 proposition that indirect taxes on 
foreign trade contribute a decreasing share in indirect taxes as the 
economy grows. However plausible this may sound, the opposite was in 
fact true of India in the 1960s. The economic growth of the Third Plan 
sucked in imports of capital goods, components and raw materials over
1 Hinrichs (1966).
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high tariff walls, while the recession opened the Indian government 
to foreign pressure to devalue the rupee and lower tariff harriers,
1
which in turn produced a declining trend in the yield of customs duties.
Practical interest in the changing structure of current receipts 
arises because it highlights two sources of revenue which, despite its 
generally adequate performance in revenue-raising, were insufficiently 
exploited by the government. Moreover, both of these sources are, as 
we have seen in our earlier discussion of the rationale of state 
accumulation, particularly crucial to the success of a policy of 
government-promoted capital accumulation. The state capitalist can 
theoretically accumulate faster than the private capitalist because of 
his ability to tax the subsistence sector. Yet we find in India that 
land revenue has grown very little in absolute terms and forms a secularly 
dwindling proportion of current receipts. The basis on which land 
revenue is levied has remained unchanged for many decades, and cesses 
on land revenue have been sporadic and small. Further, the product of 
other forms of taxation of agricultural incomes is small and geographically 
skewed towards the plantation states of Assam, Kerala and Tamil Nadu. 
Meanwhile, agricultural incomes have by no means been stagnant. Without 
venturing here into the subject of agricultural taxation, it may be 
asserted that if all income and wealth were taxed without regard to 
sectoral source, at prevailing rates, a non-negligible addition to 
current revenues would be forthcoming. But the existing regime is not 
prepared to attempt such a reform.
IV. Stagnation of Public Enterprise Surpluses
The second source of revenue which is being exploited below its 
potential is the operating surpluses of the departmental public 
enterprises. This is particularly damaging to the policy of state
1 Lakdawala and Nambiar (1972), pp.39-^0,
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accumulation because these, and the surpluses of non-departmental 
enterprises, are theoretically the dynamic element in process of 
accumulation, if we leave aside the possibility of credit financed 
capital creation. At the beginning of the 1960s, the doctrine that 
public enterprises should be planned to operate on a no-profit, no-loss 
basis was being abandoned, and the respectability of a policy of planned 
public enterprise profits was established in official eyes. Yet by the 
end of the decade, the money contribution of public enterprises to 
current receipts was no higher than at the time of the Third Plan, 
despite considerable inflation in the interim. Yet the bulk of the 
investment in these enterprises is relatively recent. The public 
sector in India is not, like the public sector in several European 
countries, the inheritor of declining industries from which the private 
sector can 110 longer extract a profit.
Of course, one must beware of asserting that, even with newly
established ventures, a profit must be forthcoming if the investment is
to be worthwhile. The equating of prices with marginal variable costs,
the economist’s welfare maximizing rule, can under certain assumptions
produce public enterprise deficits. But since, in India, no attempt
is made to calculate marginal variable costs, and cross-subsidisation
within enterprises is endemic, it would be the purest accident if the
low and declining levels of surpluses turned out to be theoretically
1
justifiable 011 micro-economic resource allocation arguments. Yet if
the micro-economic calculus is ignored, as it is in India by and large, 
on the ground that it is irrelevant or unimportant, one is thrown back 
more strongly on to macro-economic considerations, which point to the 
need for increasing public enterprise surpluses, with the aim of raising 
the level of national saving, after allowing for any reduction of personal
1 Brest (I969), pp.70-4.
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and corporate saving as a result of higher prices charged to users of 
public enterprise goods and services.
It is possible to pinpoint some of the policies that have produced
the poor financial performance of the departmental public enterprises.
lor this purpose, a broad distinction can be made between those of the
states, of which the most important are irrigation and electricity
schemes and those of the Centre, of which the most important is the
railways. In irrigation and electricity, preference was given to large,
high cost projects, such as multi-purpose river schemes and extensive
rural electrification. These involved considerable managerial failures,
such as lengthy administrative delays, poor construction planning and
excessive stock holding. But in addition, and more seriously, there has
been either inability or unwillingness on the part of the authorities to
X
insist on a remotely economic level of user charges. Where this
situation is explicitly defended, it is on the basis of the need, in the 
interests of agricultural growth, to encourage the consumption of 
irrigation water and electricity. There may be other factors obstructing 
more widespread water application than the lack of a price incentive, 
however, and electricity can be consumed, for many purposes besides 
agricultural operations. further there is little empirical evidence to 
show the precise production- response to such measures. But the income
distribution consequences of such a policy are easier to predict. A 
deficit on irrigation and electricity schemes represent a transfer of 
income to the existing consumers, the rural rich, from those who will 
pay the subsidies from general revenue: since increments to general
revenue largely come from extra indirect taxes on articles of mass 
consumption, this kind of transfer in all probability makes the distribution 
of income more unequal.
1 Hone (1968b), pp. 1151-4-.
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The Central Government’s policies with respect to the railways
have been different. The large amount of investment since Independence
has been directed more to replacing and expanding the rolling stock than
towards lengthening the route milage, in other words towards capital
formation which should have been quick-yielding in revenue terms. Again,
there has been no reluctance to raise tariffs across the board at regular
intervals. But in spite of this, and the decision (difficult to defend
in economic terms) to reduce the required depreciation provision from
3.7 to 3.2 per cent of capital-at-charge in 1967-68, the railways were
able to contribute only Vg- per cent of their capital-at-charge to general
revenue in that year.^" Part of the railways' problem seems to arise
from the persistance, despite some modification, of the traditional rate
structure for different types of freight. High rated goods (high-value
freight moving in small consignments) are particularly vulnerable to
competition from road transport, while the goods for which road transport
2
is still unsuitable (low-value, bulk shipments) are low-rated. It
also seems that passenger traffic is subsidized to some extent from
3
freight receipts. It is not so obvious in the case of the railways 
that its pricing policies have the simple result that "public wealth makes 
an inadequate profit, and siibsidizes the earnings of private wealth
kinstead". There probably is an element of subsidy to private sector 
firms who are bulk users of industrial raw materials like iron and steel, 
coal, cement and petroleum, and (before their nationalization) to private 
traders in food grains. But, as noted, there is probably a subsidy to 
passengers, not all of whom will be engaged on business journeys.
Further, another contributory factor to the railways' poor financial
1 Anon (1969), pp.351-3.
2 Owen (1968), pp.38-^0.
3 Prest (I969), p.50. '
4 Mirrlees (1968), p,80
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performance has been its chronic inability to control its operating 
costs, which are swollen by its lavish employment of labour. A 
profitable price policy without better cost control would make consumers 
of railway services shoulder the cost of the railways' employment 
policy - not a bad tiling, perhaps, but the reverse of a subsidy to the 
earnings of private wealth.
The situation of the non-departmental enterprises is different again. 
Despite the vast variety of the economic tasks which they undertake, their 
aggregate performance in producing a reinvestible surplus is dominated 
by the performance of one industry - steel. The steel industry 
accounted for more than half of the total investment in the non- 
departmental enterprises to 1970, and its huge and persistent losses 
approximately balance (more or less, in bad years or good) the profits 
made by a number of more competently managed non~departmental enterprises. 
The failure here, then, is a failure of government entrepreneurship.
The problems of establishing and managing a complex of modern steel 
plants have over fifteen years outrun the entrepreneurial capabilities 
of the public sector. That is not to say that these r>roblems will 
never be solved, but it does hold out the prospect that a great deal 
of the initial investment will prove to be infructuous, given that 
steel plants do not have infinite lives.
Apart from the basic difficulty that in some sectors the state 
simply lacks capitalistic skills, it is also true that, to the extent 
that the public sector either subsidizes the earnings of private wealth 
or multiplies low productivity jobs, it abandons the greatest advantage 
of public ownership, that additional public profits may be a direct means 
of raising the level of aggregate saving. The exploitation of that 
advantage is crucial to the success of an industrialization strategy, 
given the difficulty of pursuing a strategy of rapid accumulation via
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agriculture when the instruments for returning any sizeable share in the 
additional agricultural incomes to the government are, for political 
and other reasons, as feeble. Yet in India, this opportunity was in 
the 1960s passed up. The poor financial performance of public 
enterprise was not simply the result of the post-1969 recession, though 
this naturally compounded their difficulties. It was evident to the 
Veixkatai'aman Committee on the state electricity industry which reported 
in 1964, and the Committee 011 Transport Policy and Coordination which 
reported in January, 1966.
Can the failure to increase public authorities' capital formation
even in money terms after 1965-66, which has been noted earlier, be
construed as a deliberate response to this poor performance? Did the
government deliberately begin to erode the public sector's leading role
in investment because the current returns were so poor, because they saw
no prospect of being able to improve them and because they anticipated
that the (taxable) returns on private sector investment would be better?
This question can be answered with reasonable confidence in the negative.
The government has remained optimistic that the financial performance
of the public enterprises can be improved in the near future by reforms
intended to promote a higher standard of management. In relation to the
non-departmental enterprises, recent reforms of this sort have included
the ending of secondment of I^A.S. officials as enterprise managers,
accounting write-offs of accumulated losses and experiments with the
device of sectoral public holding companies. As one authority
concludes, "the public sector has come to stay in India ... (T)he recent
hesitation in public sector investment is mainly due to budgetary
problems and lack of a long-term investment programme, rather than to
1lack of faith in the sector".
1 Medhora (1975), p.29.
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CHAPTER FOUR
PUBLIC EXPENDITURE AND THE 
INDUSTRIAL RECESSION
The examination of general trends in public expenditure and other 
public finance variables in the previous chapter showed the strong 
contrast between the first and the second half of the decade.
Broadly, the first five years might be characterized as years bf 
growth, and the second five years as years of recession. The event 
which marks the boundary between these two sub-periods is the onset of 
severe drought in 1965.
It is natural to raise the question whether the drought of 1965-67
is to be regarded as an exogenous factor which directly caused the
economic recession after 1965* 'which levels of public expenditure
were then adjusted, or i-jhether public expenditure played a more active
role in provoking the recession. The extent to which government policy
was itself responsible for provoking the recession was debated publicly
in India in the late 1960s. Positions on the.question have more
recently been taken by economists analysing the I966 devaluation of the 
1rupee. The early debate was inconclusive because of the non­
availability of relevant statistics (as will be argued at length in 
this chapter). The later foreign trade economists have also not gone 
very fully into the question, since to them it is of peripheral interest. 
With the later and more refined public expenditure statistics now 
available, it is opportune to re-open the debate. That is the aim of 
this chapter.
1 Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1975)t pp*ll6-l8; Nayyar (1976), pp.277-9*
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1, The Post-1963 Recession and Capital Goods
The severe effect of the 1965 drought on agricultural output, and 
especially the output of foodgrains, is shown in Table 4.1. The fall
Table 4.1 : Index numbers of agricultural Output (Base 100 = 1949-50)
Weight 196o~6l 1965-66 1969-70
I Foodgrains (66.9) 137*1 121.3 168.6
II Non-foodgrain output (33.1) 152.6 157*0 175*3
III Total Agricultural
Output (100.0) 142.2 133.1 170.8
■Source : Economic Survey. 1971-72. PP.7&-9* Table 1.4.
in the industrial growth rate was also dramatic, from an average of
9 per cent a year (1960-65) to a mere 3 per cent (1965-70). Both
industrial and the slower agricultural growth of the years since 1950
1
had demonstrated marked uneveness. Even so, the crisis of both 
sectors in the mid-sixties was of outstanding severity.
Over the previous fifteen years it had been usual to argue that 
bad harvests directly reduced industrial growth. The direct impact 
of harvest failure on industry could be traced through in a number of 
ways. Harvest failure restricted the supply and raised the prices of 
industry*s wage-good, i.e. foodgrains, and of industry*s agriculture- 
derived raw materials. The wage-good effect threatens a serious fall 
in real wages, which in turn may have one or several labour-reducing 
effects on industry - the physical performance of existing workers may 
be eroded, industrial unrest may escalate, and (in the absence of money 
illusion) recruitment will be discouraged. If, to avoid any of these 
consequences, industrialists raise money wages in the attempt to maintain 
constant real wages for their labour despite the rise in foodgrain prices,
1 Desai (1975)t P*16.
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they increase their money costs of production without there being any 
compensating increase in the prices of the goods sold by the industry 
to final demand. This is equivalent to an upward shift in the 
industrialist's variable cost curve. Such an upward shift would 
induce a profit-maximizing producer to reduce his output from his 
existing plant and prune his investment plans.
If the government tries to prevent the initial supply reduction 
and price rise of foodgrains by using imports to augment the lowered 
domestic supply, industrial growth is slowed down by another brake 
mechanism. Assuming that the overall supply of foreign exchange is 
limited, the purchase of imported foodgrains will reduce the foreign 
exchange available for the import of spare parts and components 
(the so-called "maintenance imports") required by industry to keep up 
its present level of production. So, whether by loss of labour, by 
a rise in money costs relative to money revenues, or by restriction 
of the supply of maintenance imports, bad harvests lead to a direct 
slackening of industrial production.
Bad harvests had a further impact on the demand side. They 
reduced the demand for the final goods of industry, assuming their 
prices remain unchanged. This is because they divert income towards 
those who market agricultural output, the bigger landlords and richer 
peasants, whose marginal propensity to consume industrial goods is 
less than those in the non-agricultural sector from whom the income is 
diverted.
It seemed obvious that the post-1965 recession should also be 
attributed to these direct mechanisms. However, an examination of the 
composition of industrial production, as in Table 4.2, suggests that 
an explanation in terms of these direct causal mechanisms is inadequate.
Industrial output that is sold to final demand can, subject to two
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qualifications, be split up into manufactured consumer goods and 
manufactured capital goods. The relevant index numbers are on rows 
11(a) and 11(c) in Table 4.2. From these index numbers, comparative 
growth rates can be calculated, as in Table 4.3. Before going on to 
draw conclusions from these comparative growth rates, the qualifications 
that limit their usefulness must be clearly stated. Some proportion
Table 4.2 : Index numbers of industrial Production (Base 100 = i960)
Industrial Category Weight I96I 1965 1970
I Mining and Quarrying (9.7) 105 132 149
II Manufacturing 
of which
(84.9) 109 134 175
a Consumer goods (32.6 ) 107 124 134
b Intermediate goods (35.9) 108 151 174
c Capital goods (11.0) 117 237 197
III Electricity generated (5.4) 116 191 334
IV All Industries (100.0) 102 154 181
Source : C.O.I. Economic Survey, 1971-72, pp.90-1, Table 1.1
which index numbers have been derived.




II a Manufactured consumer
goods 4.4 4.4 4,4
II c Manufactured capital
goods 18.8 (-) 2.8 7.0
IV All industries 9.0 3.1 6.1
Source : calculated from Table 4.2 above.
of the 13 per cent of industrial output arising from mining, quarrying 
and electricity generation is sold to final demand, but available 
information does not allow it to be estimated, nor its split between 
consumption and investment in each of the relevant years. In addition,
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the classification of manufacturing output by end use cannot be 
absolutely precise, since certain types of manufactures (e.g* tyres, 
desks, typewriters) are physically capable of being used interchangeably 
for intermediate investment or consumption purposes, The growth 
rates in Table 4.3, therefore, give only a rough approximation to the 
growth rates of all capital and consumer goods.
As one might expect, manufactured intermediate goods output grew 
at the same rates as total manufacturing output. But manufactured 
output sold to consumption and investment final demand grew at 
dramatically different rates from each other. Manufactures for
consumption grew at about per cent a year both before and after 1963:
their growth rate was apparently quite unaffected by the post-1963
recession. In the starkest contrast, manufactures for investment under
the Third Plan expanded at almost 20 per cent annually, but after 1965 
actually contracted at a rate of 3 per cent a year. The plain inference 
to be made from the official figures is that the post-1965 recession is 
exclusively a phenomenon of the capital goods industry, plus those 
intermediate industries (such as iron and steel castings) on which it 
draws for its inputs. Any explanation of the recession must explain 
this spectacular crisis of the capital goods industry, if it is to be 
plausible.
This diagnosis is supported obliquely by an analysis of industrial 
growth with respect to inter-sectoral linkages. From Table it
Table : Index numbers of industrial Output by linkage categories,
1962 - 70, (Base 100 = i960)
Weights 1962 1965 1970
I Agriculture-based 
industries (^5.7*0 108 120 135
II Transport-related 
industries (10.89) l*fO 185 170
III Other industries (^2.28) 13*t 175 228
IV All industries (100.0) 120 15i 181
Source : G.O.I, Economic Survey, 1971-72, from graph opposite p.*
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is evident that industries with forward linkage to the transport sector 
exhibit the same kind of erratic growth path as has been seen to be 
characteristic of manufactures for investment. After leading with 
rapid growth rates, transport-related industries after 1965 become a 
lagging sector, showing an absolute decline in output in 1970 over 
1965. Obviously, in spite of their similar weight in total industrial 
production, ^capital goods manufactures’* and ^transport-related 
industries” are far from identical categories. Yet it is reasonable 
to suggest that their area of overlap - the railway equipment, lorry and 
bus industries - is responsible for the similar behaviour of their 
growth rates, rather than the coincidental flagging of the two sets of 
industries that fall into only one category.
The other significant point which emerges from a comparison of 
Table 4.3 with Table 4.4 is that the flagging growth of agriculture-based 
industries after I963 is not reflected in the growth rate of manufactures 
for consumption. Thus the recession in the agriculture-based consumer 
industries such as textiles and food-processing (tea, sugar, vanspati 
etc.), was offset by accelerated growth of modern light manufactures, such 
as radios, bicycles and motor scooters. At worst, the effect of harvest 
failures in restricting the supply of agricultural raw materials 
prevented an acceleration in the growth rate of manufactures for 
consumption.
II. Public Expenditure and the Demand for Capital Goods
The fact that, in the industrial sector, the recession was largely 
a crisis of the capital goods industries (and those industries with 
forward linkages to them) is highly significant to the subject of this 
study. It is significant because the supply capacity of the Indian 
capital goods industries, as it existed in the mid-1960s, had to a great 
extent been created by the expanding programme of public sector
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investment over the previous decade. The obvious question is whether,
during the recession, the government was responsible for the starvation
of its own progeny* Further, one might enquire whether, if indeed it
was so responsible, this kind of economic infanticide could have been
avoided. If it were to seem inevitable for any reason, one would have
to conclude that the state accumulation policy is not feasible, even
in principle. On the other hand, it might appear to be the result
of an avoidable error in policy, in which case a clear definition of
the type of error involved may be useful to other countries who wish
to accumulate capital via the state.
Initially we must ask how far government expenditure policies
were responsible for either precipitating or prolonging the industrial
recession which India experienced in the late 1960s. In the public
debate which took place in I96&, the chief protagonist, Medhora, argues
that public expenditure was "tapering off" in the four years preced-
1
ing1967-68, and cites a variety of indicators to establish this. He 
selected four time series as his evidence:
(i) central and state government expenditure on revenue account 
(deflated by the index of wholesale prices) which showed an 
absolute decline in 196*f~3 over 1963-^:
(ii) central government exhaustive expenditure on commodities
and services at current prices, showing an absolute fall in 
1964-5 over 1963-4; anc* on wages and salaries at 1960-61 
prices, showing a small rise in 1964-5 over 1963-4;
(iii) central government gross fixed capital formation at current 
prices, showing significant absolute increases in 1964-5 
over 1963-4. It is stated that a "tapering off of outlay
on assets ... would also be true of state governments", although
no figures were given;
(iv) railway expenditure "at I96O-I prices", showing a slight
1 Medhora (1968a).
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fall in 1964-5 compared -with 1963-4.
G* Paul accepted these time series as the relevant basic data but 
disputed Medhora's interpretation of it. "To see what in fact has 
happened’*, Paul wrote, "the decline in government expenditure must be 
viewed against the decline in national income ... There is no evidence 
to show that a decline in the (governments) share set off recessionary 
tendencies if we accept 1966 as the year in which these tendencies 
became pronounced"
Although this exchange is helpful in setting out some of the basic 
issues, the position of neither participant is free from error. To 
make further progress towards settling the issue, it is necessary to 
spell out what these errors are. C.S.O. data on national income, which 
became available after Paul had written, makes it clear that he is not 
correct in claiming that no decline in the government's share of national 
income took place before 1966. These figures, reproduced in Table 4.3 
below, indicate a fall in this share from 12,4 to 11.7 pa** cent in 
1964-3* This mistake arises from his uncritical acceptance of the 
adequacy of Medhora's data. Paul can also be criticized for not making 
it clear that a government share which does not decline only rules out 
a decline in absolute magnitudes of public expenditure as long as 
national income is constant or rising. Medhora, however, is doubly 
in error when he stated, in a rejoinder to Paul, that it "is correct 
to say that the Government's share in the national income has not 
declined. But what industry is concerned with, is not the 
proportionate share of the Government in national income but the 
absolute amount of government purchases from it (which), as my figures 
show, has declined". As we have noted, there was some decline in 
the government share in 1964-5: but, if there had not been, it would
1 Paul (1968), p.1341.
2 Medhora (1968)
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have been impossible, at a time of economic growth, such as the years 
before 1965-6 were, for the absolute level of government expenditure to 
have fallen.
(5If the government's share is g, which equals / x 100, the 
relationships between changes in g, Y and G over time can be summarized 
in the simple matrix set out in Figure (a) below. From this it is 
clear that Medhora's case, of a constant g, and a fall in G, is only 
possible when national income is actually declining - although such a
Change in "Y"
Change in "g" Positive Zero Negative
Positive G rises G rises Indeterminate
Zero G rises G constant G falls
Negative Indeterminate G falls G falls
Figure (a)
decline was no part of his case, and, empirically, the opposite of the 
truth. This reasoning tells us that widespared absolute decreases in 
public expenditure are unlikely to have occurred, although, given the new 
evidence of a fall in g in 1964-51 110b impossible in some areas in that 
year.
The real weakness of Medhora's contribution lies in his basic 
statistics, which Paul accepted at their face value. Three criticisms 
may be made. First, changes in budgetary figures do not automatically 
reflect changes in public demand on resources, because they include 
accounting adjustments between different pockets of the public purse.
Only time series (ii) and (iii) are derived from an economic 
reclassification of expenditure. They would not be subject to this
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criticism* but they refer to expenditure of the central government only,. 
which is no more than half of total expenditure. Second, the deflation 
of expenditure seems to have been done on a highly arbitrary basis, some 
series being deflated by the wholesale price index and some not, without 
any apparent rhyme or reason. All series require deflation if the aim 
is to monitor changes in the volume of goods and services being absorbed 
by the government, Third, since the industrial crisis was predominantly 
a crisis of the capital goods industries, particular attention is required 
to government capital expenditure: the absence of any data on the state
governments or the non-departmental enterprises is a serious defect in 
the statistical basis of Medhora's case.
Table 4.5 focusses attention on the national accounts figures for 
the public sector between 1961-2 and 1968-9, rather than on budgetary 
figures which are, as they stand, misleading indicators of demand. Even 
these, however, do not resolve directly the question of the failure of 
public sector demand. The starting point is two sets of figures:
a Absolute figures of net domestic product at factor cost, valued 
at 1960-1 prices: 
b The share of the public sector as a whole, and the three major 
sub-units of the public sector, in net domestic product at current 
prices.
The source of these figures is C.S.O. (1971), Table 5, line 15 for a, 
and Table 7.1, line 5 for b. It is unlikely that the share of the 
public sector in national income at constant prices is exactly the 
same as the share of the public sector in national income at current 
prices. There was probably some divergence between the size and timing 
of price rises for goods and services bought by the public sector and of 
price rises for goods and services bought by the private sector. There 
are no adequate studies of this divergence, but, in their absence, it does
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Table 4.5 : Changes in Public Sector Product, 1961-2 to 1968-9
60-1 61-2 62-3 63-** 64-5 63-6 66-7 67-8 68-9
1 Net domestic 
product at
f c o s t
60-1 prices’ 13366 13859 1*U55 1^958 I606I 15173 15392 16842 17233
(Rs. cr.)
Percentage




in 1 , 
current
prices 10.6 11.3 12.2 12.4 11.7 13.2 12.7 12.1 13.6
3 Of which
a Government
admin. 5*5 5.9 6.2 6.2 6.0 6.6 6,4 6.2 6.9
b Departmental
ent. 3.9 4.1 4.2 4.3 3.8 4,3 4.0 3.6 3.9
c Non-
de par true ntal





prices 1419 1566 1727 1854 1879 2002 1955 2038 2344
5 Of which
a Government
admin. 735 818 878 927 964 1001 985 1044 1189
b Departmental
ent. 522 568 595 643 610 652 616 606 672
c Non-
departmental





product +10.4 +:10.3 +7.4 +^.4 +6.5 -2.3 +4.2 +15.0
(year-to-year) 
a Government
admin. +11.3 +7.3 +5.6 +4.0 +3.8 -1.6 +6.0 +13.9
b Departmental
ent, +8.8 +4.8 +8.1 -5.1 +6.9 -5.5 -1.6 +10.9
c Non­
department al
enterprises +11.1 +41.6 +11.4 +7.4 +14.4 +1.4 +9.3 +24.8
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not seem unreasonable to make the assumption that it was not particularly 
large. Using this assumption, one can estimate with reasonable 
approximation the absolute size of the public sector's year-by-year 
contribution to net domestic product by applying the public sector's 
current price share to the total product at I960-I prices. The results 
of this procedure is shown in lines 4 and 5 of the Table, while lines 6 
and 7 express the percentage change each year compared with the previous 
year.
These results confirm the expectation that absolute decreases in 
public expenditure are the exception rather than the rule. The trend 
in the years before the harvest failures is one of deceleration in 
public expenditure growth. In the three years 1962-3 to 1964-5* the 
rate of growth of public spending was always less than the previous year, 
though, taking public spending as a whole, no absolute falls are evident* 
The same trend is evident in spending by government administration as 
for total public sector spending.
As has been argued previously, the industrial recession was a 
problem pre-eminently of the capital goods sector, and particularly that 
part of the capital goods sector with forward linkages into transport.
In India, this means those industries supplying equipment to the railways 
(a public sector monopoly and a monopsony buyer) and the road transport 
industries, in which large state transport enterprises operate alongside 
private sector firms. Railways alone are the potential purchaser of 
one-third to one-half of capital goods output and are therefore an 
extremely important customer of the metal and engineering industries. 
Changes in real total public expenditure is thus too highly aggregative 
a concept to be fully relevant to an analysis of failing public demand 
for capital goods. It would be more relevant to examine (i) the outlay 
of departmental enterprises - for this is what the public sector 
transport industries are - and (ii) public sector expenditure on capital
goods - i.e. gross fixed capital formation in the public sector.
These categories overlap one another partially; and the area of overlap
(iii) the capital outlay of departmental enterprises is the most 
relevant indicator of the three. The relevance of (i) can be 
criticized on the grounds that public purchase of commodities for 
current consumption has only an indirect and significantly lagged 
effect on the demand for capital goods. The relevance of (ii) can be 
criticized on the ground that much of the physical capital formation 
done by government administrative departments consists of the 
construction of offices, houses and other buildings, which creates 
industrial demand only on the narrow front of cement, steel structurals 
and furniture. But neither of these limitations applies to indicator
(iii)•
Indicator (i), the change in estimated real product of departmental 
enterprises is given in Table 4.5, line 6 (b). Prior to 1965-6, this 
does not exhibit a steady slowing down in growth; instead year-to-year 
changes are erratic, but include an absolute decrease in level in 1964-5 
compared with the previous year. Indicators (ii) and (iii) are shown 
in Table 4.6, lines 3 6. Even using current price data, both
clearly show a gradual deceleration of growth, from 1962-3 to 1965-6.
The deceleration in real terms was even more pronounced, as the rate of 
change in the general level of prices was increasing at this period. 
Evidence of the quickening pace of inflation is given by the all-India 
wholesale price index, as set out in Table 4,7.
Thus the case for a "tapering off" in public sector demand some 
years before the serious harvest failures of 1965-6 and 1966-7 is 
established, both in terms of public expenditure in its widest sense and 
in the specially relevant area of departmental enterprises capital 
formation. But tapering off must be understood as a continuous
decline in a positive rate of growth, rather than (as Medhora at times
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Table 4.6 : Capital finance account of Public Authorities at current 
prices, I96O-6I to 1968-69




(Rs, cr.) 716 753 899 1042 II67 1237 1223 1210 1330
2 Annual
increment +37 +146 +143 +123 +90 -3b -13 +120
3 2 as a 




enterprises 4 38 453 53b 652 730 782 734 711 781
5 Annual
increment +15 +101 +98 +78 +52 -**8 -23 +70
6 5 as a 
percentage
and
+3.4 +22.3 +17*7 +12, 0 +7*1 -6.1 -3.1 +9.8
7 G.F.C.F. of
administrative
departments 278 300 345 390 437 475 489 499 549
8 Annual
increment +22 +45 +45 +h7 +38 +14 +10 +50
9 8 as a 
percentage +7*9 +15.0 +13.0 +12.0 +8.7 +2.9 +2.0 +10.0
Source : C.S.0. Estimates of Rational :Product, 1960-61 - 1969-70,
Table 10, p#,20.










1961-2 100 100 100 100
1962 98.1 103.5 102.4 104.2 +4.2
1963 98.6 107.2 104.2 108,0 +3.6
1964 111.7 110.8 107.5 119.3 +10.5
I965 127.7 116.1 115.3 129.1 +8.2
1966 151.8 124.1 125.5 144.5 •til, 9
1967 161.1 131.1 130,9 166.2 +15.0
1968 152.7 132.3 132.7 1653' -0.6











claims) falls below previously attained levels. This deceleration 
is consistent with (a) continuing economic growth and (b) a rising 
share of the public sector in national income (except for 196^-5)* 
Between 1961-2 and 196^-5 , the growth of the public sector was slowing 
down, while the growth of national income (both in real terms) was 
speeding up, with the result that the public sector share in the 
economy shrank in 196^-5.
On the basis of these results, it would seem that a different
evaluation of the government's fiscal policy from that offered by
Professors Bhagwati and Srinivasan is called for. Bhagwati and
Srdnivasan conclude that "both the deceleration in total ^/""governments
outlays and the compositional shift away from capital expenditure^/ •**
were to be traced to two causes; one exogenous and major and the other
endogenous and only minor ..." In their view, nthe exogenous and
1principal factor was ... the agricultural drought11. They deduce
from economic policy statements that the government acted as it did 
because it "was afraid that any sustenance of the trend expansion in 
outlays would accentuate the rise in food prices that followed from 
the drought." However, because the issue is for them a subsidiary 
one in the analysis of the 1966 devaluation, these conclusions are 
reached from a brief inspection of figures on the overall budgetary 
deficit and the money supply with the public in 1965-6 and several 
subsequent years. However, an analysis of the relevant series of 
public expenditure for the years before 1965-6 as well as after 1965-6 
shows that the demand generated by the public sector was slackening 
off for some years before the dramatic harvest failures of the mid­
sixties. The arrival of the drought, therefore, can only have 
persuaded the government to re-inforce a government-induced deflation
1 Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1975)» p.117.
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which had already by that time begun.
Thus, to the two direct mechanisms by which bad harvests undermine 
industrial growth, a third and indirect one must be added. It is the 
deflationary reaction of governments concerned about the rate of price 
rises. But the important point is that this deflationary reaction was 
superimposed on a drift into deflation which is discernible in government 
expenditure policies in the last few years of the Third Plan.
If the public expenditure figures showed that the government was 
merely reacting rationally to external circumstances beyond its control, 
confidence in its ability to pursue a policy of state accumulation 
would not be weakened. Most governments have, at one time or another, 
to postpone or modify their plans because of unforeseen natural adversity. 
But that interpretation seems, in the light of the foregoing analysis, 
excessively flattering to the capabilities of the government. That a 
government whose primary economic objective wqs the building up of a 
nraodernMindustrial sector should allow its own capital goods purchasing 
programme to lose its growth momentum, and then to fall into absolute 
decline, demonstrates, at the least, a certain curious absent-mindedness.
Of course, during the Third Plan itself, certain adverse external 
circumstances occurred, which might be pleaded in mitigation. The 
timing of the Sino-Indian border war for the middle of the Third Plan 
was obviously fortuitous. The concomitant foreign exchange crisis was 
partly a consequence of the war, and partly a result of inadequate 
management by the government of the foreign exchange situation.
However, having said that, one must note the failure to set or keep to 
year-by-year targets for the realisation of the total Plan targets.
The phasing and sequence of expansion are of crucial significance for 
the achievement of balanced growth. Where, as in India, there are 
potential bottle-necks 'like marketed food grains and foreign exchange' 
which could cripple economic growth, where the private sector is
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inefficient and unresponsive to certain kinds of profitable opportunity, 
and where public investment is the chosen engine of expansion, the 
timing of public outlays as between the earlier or later years of the 
Plan cannot be treated as a matter of indifference, as it was in the 
Indian Third Plan. The imbalances that arise do not act as signals 
and incentives to private entrepreneurship, a la Hirschman. Instead, 
the economy simply loses the momentum of growth, and the task of
recapturing that momentum is made harder.
Even after the drought had begun, the government actbd hesitantly 
and with a poor sense of timing In its management of its own demands 
on the economy. Perhaps unavoidably, it could not cut its demand 
sufficiently at the onset of the crisis in 1965-6 , so that its share 
in national income jumped to 13.2 per cent In that year compared with 
11.7 per cent in the previous year. In 1966-7, a small rise in national 
income was accompanied by an absolute decline in public expenditure.
In 1967-8, a major recovery of 9 per cent in national income was matched 
by an increase of only ^ per cent in public expenditure. In 1968-9 *
the further small growth (by 2 per cent) of national income was matched
by a very large (15 per cent) growth in public spending. Thus the 
share of the public authorities in these three years fluctuated from 
12.7, to 12,1 , to 13.6 per cent. The government was not able either 
to hold the public authorities1 share constant or to expand it steadily. 
Part of the difficulty may have resulted from the financial calendar 
which is used, A financial year which runs from April to March is 
appropriate to agricultural economies under European climatic conditions, 
but not an agricultural economy, like India's, in which the short-run 
performance of agriculture is determined by the adequacy of the July- 
September monsoon. A Diwali budget for a financial year running from 
November to October might improve the chances of achieving particular
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1
objectives concerning the public sector share in national income*
The overall conclusions to be derived' from this chapter can be
summed up as follows* The gradual slackening of public sector
demand for some years before the dramatic harvest failures of the
mid-sixties indicates that the industrial recession was not merely a
consequence of that particular act of God. Nor was the stagnation
of public investment merely a reaction to the sudden, swift deterioration
of the agricultural situation. This makes it easier to explain why
the recession was not automatically succeeded by recovery once the
better harvests of the late 1960s were realized. It is too sweeping
to claim that "the widespread belief that India can stimulate industrial
growth by emphasizing the agricultural sector ... represents a
2
misunderstanding of the processes of Indian growth". But it is
true that only about one-third of industrial output is sold to the
agricultural sector, and that high agricultural output can be achieved
"through the activities of a limited part of the Indian agricultural 
3
establishment". Thus short-run industrial recovery requires a 
government decision, at the appropriate time, to make a new start on 
the continuous expansion of its own demand for the output of those 
capital goods industries which its own past investments have created.
As we have also already seen, by the end of the 1960s, no new start 
of this kind had been made.
1 A.R.C. (1968a), p.4; cf. Raj (1967), P.5S3.
2 Hone (1968a), pp.1^9-57.
3 Malenbaum (1971), p*17^«
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE DEGREE OF PUBLIC EXPENDITURE 
CENTRALIZATION
I, Changes in Public Expenditure Centralization
As long as attention focusses on the Indian national economy,
"the government" tends to be thought of as a homogeneous institution
with a single set of objectives and a single set of policy instruments
for their realization, »The assumption of a homogeneous government
is a considerable simplification even for states, like the United
Kingdom, where government is highly centralized. But for India,
where a geographically fragmented civil society compelled the adoption
of federal government as colonial rule was brought to an end, to
imagine that government is homogeneous is wholly inappropriate, A
study of India’s state accumulation policy, therefore, which failed
to come to terms with the different kinds of governments which operate
in a federation would have rather little to recommend it.
This elementary proposition needs emphasis only because the
majority of economists who have written about India have a marked
preference both for the use of nationwide data and for the careful
1avoidance of any explicit consideration of politics. Because of 
the numerous data problems involved in making a worthwhile state-level 
analysis, and because the subject of public expenditure falls in the 
curious no-man1s-land between economics and politics as they are 
conventionally treated, public spending under a federal government 
is a subject where beaten paths are few, and not always very reliable.
1 Franda (1970), pp,206-7.
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Perhaps the most thorough recent study of Indian states1 finances has
been described by its author himself as "an exercize which makes one
familiar with all the landmarks . but which is obviously inadequate
for those keen to go into details"
It is indeed vital to go into details. If there is one theme
which recurs in the more critical recent contributions to the debate
on the "determinants" of public expenditure, it is the need to
disaggregate public spending data by level of government, as well as
2
by economic category and function,v In what follows, the data 
has been disaggregated as far as this can be done. Data difficulties 
have been described, to allow the reader to make his own judgements of 
its reliability. Overall, the aim is to set out fully what seems to 
be the fiscal facts, and then to assess alternative interpretations of 
them.
It should be emphasized at the outset that we are not concerned
here with public finance in the context of regional economics. In the
first place that would require a prolonged discussion of the criteria
for defining economic regions. When the Planning Commission attempted
a regional division of India, based on topography, soils, climate,
geologic; formations, land resources, irrigation and cropping patterns
and availability of mineral resources, they produced a map quite
different from the map of state-wise political divisions. In only
four instances (Assam, West Bengal, Gujarat and Punjab) did the
Planning Commission's proposed economic regions coincide or nearly
3
coincide, with state boundaries. Of course, one might quarrel with
the chosen criteria, arguing that greater weight should have been given 
to indicators of human, as opposed to indicators of physical geography.
1 Venlcataraman (19&8), p.216.
2 E.g. Bird (1970), pp.192-3.
3 Planning Commission (196^), Map 1.
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But even so, it remains doubtful if a case could be made for regarding
the states as economic regions* The present writer has argued for
the weakiproposition that statewise analysis is likely to be a better
guide to regional differences than zonal analysis, that is, breakdown
by groups of three or four states.“* But this argument, though
plausible, cannot be proved as a general proposition, since it is quite
possible to construct imaginary cases which show the opposite. Whether
it holds good in the specific case of India can only be known by
actually comparing the coefficients of variation of key indicators for
both statewise and regionwise data, and then for zonal and regionwise
data. This wotild involve the use of district-by-district figures of
the chosen indicators for the whole of India, Their absence is
probably the reason why such an elaborate exercize never seems to have
been done and why economists helplessly continue to identify 11 statewise" 
2
and "regional".
But, even if the states are rather arbitrarily accepted as
surrogate regions, a second problem remains. To measure the statewise
distribution of total public expenditure requires a measure of the
statewise distribution of central government spending. In part this
is possible: for example, it is clear that central Plan outlay on
industry has been concentrated in Bihar, -Orissa, Madhya Pradesh and 
3West Bengal. But to get much beyond this, it is necessary to make
assumptions such as that central Plan outlay on agriculture and social
services are shared by states according to population, and that non-
hPlan expenditure has no spatial dimension at all. To assume that 
expenditure has no spatial dimension is the same as assuming that it 
is purchasing pure public goods. But both the proponents and the
1 Toye (1973), p.262.
2 Lakdawala, Alagh and Sarma (197*0, PP**0 65.
3 Nath (1970), pp.247-59.
k Gupta (1973), p.2**7; cf. Zahir (1972), p.1^8.
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critics of public goods theory agree on its very limited empirical 
1significance. Further, the production of even pure public goods, 
as opposed to their consumption, does have a spatial significance, 
through secondary effects on incomes in the area where production is 
located.
No fresh attempt has been made here to attack the twin problems 
of the definition of regions and the distribution by regions of central 
government spending, because they are not relevant to our central 
theme. That theme is the spending behaviour of the different 
governments that coexist in the Indian federal scheme, during the 
period i960 to 1970. The related question of the impact of their 
combined spending operations on the different regions of the country 
is one which, for the reasons indicated, cannot be taken up at this 
point.
Once the discussion is limited in this way, there remain two 
different perspectives from which the role of state governments in a 
federation may be viewed. Firstly, they may be seen as a group of 
roughly similar units jointly engaged in some form of interaction with 
the federal (central) government. Secondly, individual states may 
be seen in relation to other individual states, so that the contrasts 
that exist within the framework of rough similarity are identified. 
These two different perspectives, when applied to the study of public 
expenditure, raise two quite distinct questions. The first is the 
question of the degree of expenditure centralization, that is, whether 
the spending of the central government has grown relative to that of 
the states as a group, or vice versa. The second is the question 
of differences between states in the level and growth of their
1 Head (1973), p.21; Margolis (195*0» p.185.
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expenditure, To the first of these two questions we now turn. The 
second is examined in the following chapter.
It is a common textbook proposition that economic growth is
accompanied by an expenditure "concentration process", which increases
n
the central government's share in total public expenditure. This 
is really a vulgarisation of a theory developed by Peacock and Wiseman 
from an examination of long-run expenditure trends in the U.K. It 
supposes that improvements in transport and communication during economic 
growth operate both to create a potential demand for more uniform 
standards of public provision and to alter the supply conditions for 
the provision of collective goods by creating potential economies of 
scale. These potentials are not realized until "catastrophes" like 
major wars oE depressions change the political landscape so drastically
athat local pressures for autonomy can be overridden.
However one may judge this theory as an explanation of expenditure 
centralization in the U.K., the question here is its relevance to India. 
Its fundamental assumption seems to be that the process of expenditure 
concentration arises from the transfer of responsibilities from the lower 
to the higher level of government. The theory is an elaboration of the 
mechanism whereby such transfers occur. Of course, one may also doubt 
the relevance of the details of this mechanism. Why is evidence of
economies of scale in government activities so hard to find in today's
3
poor countries? Is the defence of local autonomy in the provision 
of public services really an important political value for them? But 
the prior question, if the Peacock and Wiseman theory is to be 
accepted, is surely, "do such upward transfers of responsibility actually
1 E.g. Burkehead and Miner (1971), p.255.
2 Peacock and Wiseman (1967), pp.29-50.
5 Gandhi (1970), p.158.
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talce place?n
K.N. Reddy has recently attempted to explore the fruitfulness of
the total Peacock and Wiseman approach to public expenditure in the
Indian context. Alas, his treatment of the question of expenditure
centralization is cavalier to a degree. He is content merely to
assert that "the change of responsibility of expenditures (sic) or what
Peacock and Wiseman call "concentration process" has been taking place 
mm Xover the period ^ l872-1968_7"• Since in the period of his study, 
expenditure was almost entirely centralized before 1922, that is 
obviously not so. Even if one uses his own statistics for the period 
after 19371 when the present federal system was born, they show no 
concentration process at work. (The appropriate data are set out in 
Table 5»1»)
Table 5.1 : Percentage of Government spending by States (Reddy)
Year 1938 1948 1938 19&8
States1 Share (%) 30*1 46.0 48.3 30.3
Source : calculated from Reddy (1972), pp,l80-l, Table A-4.
These figures would settle the whole issue if they could be
trusted for the purpose of making expenditure centralization comparisons.
But unfortunately, they will not do, for three reasons:
(i) it is unlikely that double-counting has been avoided, since
central government expenditure includes grants to state
governments, although the expenditure thereby made possible will
2
already be included on state government account;
(ii) expenditure by local authorities below state government level
1 Reddy (1972), p.10.
2 Reddy (1972), pp.l8l-2.
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is omitted, so that changes in the extent of fiscal devolution to
local authorities may offset the measured changes in expenditure 
1
centralizati on;
(iii) no explicit recognition is given to the problem of defining "the
states", although they have undergone a number of reorganizations.
The data used here is such that it can overcome the deficiencies 
mentioned in the previous paragraph. The C.S.O. public expenditure 
reclassification permits the separate identification of intergovermental 
transfers and their elimination to avoid double-counting. In addition, 
the data covers all kinds of non-commercial public authorities, and not 
merely the central and state governments. Tims the spending of 
municipal authorities and panchayati raj bodies can be aggregated with 
that of the state government, and Union Territories spending aggregated 
with that of the central government. Finally, because the data can 
be disaggregated by individual states, one can be absolutely clear which 
states are included in any particular "all-states" totals, which is a 
pre-condition of handling the problems raised by changing state 
boundaries. On the other hand, the use of expenditure data organized 
according to national accounts conventions for measuring expenditure 
centralization does involve certain problems of interpretation. These 
problems are discussed in Appendix C.
If one simply compares the measured centralization ratios for the 
two five-year periods I96O-5 and 1965-70, it appears that the decade 
witnessed a certain degree of expenditure decentralization. The 
states' share rises from 51 per cent to 55 per cent (see Table 5.2).
But the year-by-year figures show that the five-year averages do not 
summarize a steady tendency towards decentralization. On the contrary, 
it shows that at the beginning and the end of the decade, the
1 Heddy (1972), pp.14-15.
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Table 5 mZ : All States* expenditure as a percentage of total Public 
Authorities* expenditure, 1960-70
All States'
Annual basis 56 57 52 46 48 51 48 52 56 57
Source : C.S.O. Unpublished data.
centralization ratio was about the same, while a temporary, but marked, 
shift toward expenditure concentration occurred in the years around 
1963-4.
Changes in expenditure concentration can arise because of unbalanced 
expansion of spending as between the programmes for which different 
levels of government are responsible. But a major drawback itfith the 
C.S.O. data on which Table 5.2 is based is that it cannot supply a 
breakdown of expenditure by function and programme. In order to 
appreciate the reasons for the brief burst of expenditure centralization 
in the early 1960s, it is necessary to have recourse to data compiled 
by the Reserve Bank of India. It should be emphasized that there are 
many underlying conceptual differences between spending figures on a 
national accounts basis and on the basis used by the R.B.I. They are 
too numerous and technical even to summarize here. It may be 
mentioned, though, that the R.B.I, basis will understate the state 
governments' share in expenditure because it excludes the self-financed 
spending. As Table 5»3 shows, however, despite the conceptual
differences, the R.B.I. data does confirm, in broad terms, the changes 
in expenditure centralization which have already been noted from 
Table 5*2. Thus some reliance can be placed on the changes in the
total 6q-1 61-2 62-3 63-4 64-5 65-6 66-7 67-8 68-9 69-70
5-year average
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Table 5.3 : Central and State Government Expenditure by Programmes
(Percentages to total expenditure)
1960-1 1963-6 1969-70
I Central Government 
A Revenue Account 
a Development* 
of which:
(i) Education and scientific depts 
(ii) Medical and public health 
(iii) Agriculture and allied services
b Non-development
(i) Collection of taxes, etc.
(ii) Administrative services 
of which: ( ) general
(iii) Defence (nit^ P°llce
(iv) Debt services 
(v) Other
B Capital Account 
a Development 
(i) Railways 
(ii) Post and telegraph 
(iii) Industrial development
(iv) Irrigation and m-p. schemes 




(ii) Currency, mint, printing 
(iii) State trading (net)
(iv) Other
II State Governments 
A Revenue Account 
a Development 
(i) Education 
(ii) Medical and public health 
(iii) Agriculture and allied services
(iv) Rural and community development 
(v) Civil works
(vi) Industries
(vii) Irrigation (non-commercial) 
(viii) Other
b Non-development
(i) Collection of taxes, etc.
(ii) Civil administration
(iii) Debt services
(iv) Famine and food subsidy
(v) Other
B Capital Account 
a Development
(i) M-p, river valley schemes
























































(iii) Agricultural improvement 0.1 0,3
(iv) Electricity schemes 1.0 (-)0.2 0*6
(v) Road transport 0.2 0.1 0.1
(vi) Building, roads, -waterworks *+.6 2.7 1.9
(vii) Industrial development 0.6 1.0 1.0
(viii) Other 0.1 0.1 0.2
b Non-development l.Q (-)!.** 0.1
(i) State trading 0.4" (-)1.3 0.0
(ii) Zaraindari compensation 0.6 0.1 0.1
Notes
* Excluding grants to state and Union territory governments 
Excluding capital grants for development purposes.
Sources : Reserve Bank of India, Report on Currency and Finance 
for 1967-68 and 1970-71.
R.B.I. data's functional categories.
The reasons for the shift towards expenditure concentration in 
the years around 1963-4 may thus be fairly readily inferred. The most 
important is the very rapid expansion of the central defence budget 
during and immediately after .the Sino-Indian border war of 1962-3*
While this happened, the central government maintained the momentum of 
its capital development programmes, in the sense of ensuring them a 
constant proportion of the growing total of public expenditure. In 
particular, the railways were permitted to go ahead with a large investment 
programme. Obviously, in this situation some restraint was required 
to prevent other programmes from growing as fast as total expenditure.
The restraint was felt partly, but not entirely by the state governments. 
The central government exercized an effective curb on the growth of its 
development spending on revenue account, but apart from that, room to 
manoeuvre was created by restraining state expenditure on capital account. 
To the extent that capital spending was squeezed to allow a very rapid 
rise in defence spending without inflicting excessive damage on the 
centre's capital development programme, the ratio of expenditure 
centralization necessarily increased.
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It may now be asked whether all this does not vindicate Peacock
and Wiseman's account of the determination of the centralization
ratio. After all, the period i960-5 was a period of economic growth,
1
defined as annual increases in output per head at constant prices.
Further, we have just shown that the centralization ratio did increase
at this time, as the direct result of a "catastrophe1’, the Sino-
Indian border war. But this is not enough to establish that, for the
situation with which we are concerned, the Peacock and Wiseman
explanation is the right one. At its roots lies, as has been noted,
the idea that centralization occurs because of a persistent shifting
of expenditure responsibilities from lower to higher levels of
government in response to economic pressures. By contrast, what
happened in India in the early 1960s was an increase in the
centralization ratio arising from the (temporarily) more active
prosecution of certain existing central government responsibilities
(defence, infra-structural investment). There is no evidence that
the experienced economic growth led to demands for more uniform
provision of public services or made available economies of scale in
their supply; and not much evidence, apart from a great deal of
nationalistic rhetoric, that the catastrophe of war weakened the
political defences of local autonomy. At the same time, however,
it should be made clear that we are not claiming that the Peacock and
Wiseman theory can be refuted with Indian data. It is a theory of
the determination of centralization ratios in the long run. There
is evidence, for some developed countries at any rate, that
centralization ratios have different long-run and short-run 
2
determinants. Since the existing Indian federal system dates from 
1956, or 1937 at the earliest, the point is that long-run theories,
1 C.S.O. (1971), Table 1, line *t.
2 Pryor (1968), pp.72-3.
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like that of Peacock and Wiseman, are simply inappropriate for 
interpreting Indian experience. In future they might prove to have 
some validity, but the time to test them has not yet come.
Again, long-run theories which assume continuous economic growth 
are no guide in interpreting the short-run where discontinuities in 
economic growth loom large. Their implication is presumably that, 
in the absence of economic growth, the centralization ratio will remain 
constant. Yet it has already been shown that during the period of 
recession, 1965-70, when output per head at constant prices fluctuated 
about the level already attained, a process of expenditure 
decentralization set in, which reduced the centralization re^ tio, by 
1969-70, to its value before the Sino-Indian border war. How is 
that to be explained? The discussion will proceed by examining the 
merits of two different lines of argument, the economic and the 
political.
II. Possible Explanations Considered
The dominant economic feature of the late 1960s were the twin 
harvest failures of 1965-6 and 1966-7* There are two major ways in 
which an economic emergency of this kind could be expected to affect 
public expenditure. In the first place, it is usual in a federation 
(and to this India is no exception) that, to the extent to which income 
distribution is pursued at all as a deliberate public policy, the 
responsibility for it lies more with the higher-level than with the 
lower level of government. One might, arguably, attempt to justify 
this state of affairs by regarding relief of particular stricken areas 
as a form of public good with significant spill-over benefits.^ Or 
one could simply explain it in terms of the residual nature of the 
central government's power and responsibilities, and its potential
1 Cf. Head (1973), PP.38-9.
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command of resources on a national scale. Government income 
redistribution through public expenditure is reflected in the economic 
category known as "non-exhaustive current spending",'1* As is clear 
from Table 3.4, which gives a broad breakdown of centre and states'
Table 5.4 : Centre and States' Expenditure by Economic Category
(Percentages of total expenditure)
60-1 61-2 62-3 63-4 64-3 63-6 66-7 67-8 68-9 69-70
I Centre* 44.0 42.7 47.8 53.4 52.4 48.9 51.5 48.0 J4.2 43.4
of which: -
a current 
exhaustive 19.8 20.0 22.6 29.1 27.0 26.8 26.3 26.0 27.7 23.8
b current non- 
exhaustive 8.6 8.7 9.1 7.8 7.7 8.9 14.3 12.1 10.3 10.1
c capital 15*6 l4.0 16.1 16.3 17.7 13.2 10.9 9.9 6.2 7.5
II States** 56.0 57.2 52.2 46,6 47.6 51.2 48.5 52.0 55.8 56.6
of which:
a current 
exhaustive 31.7 31.6 28.1 25.5 26.6 28.3 28.0 29.1 32.2 32.9
b current non- 
exhaust ive 6.7 7.4 . 6.4 5.9 5.8 6.4 6.8 7.2 8.2 8.6
c capital 17.6 18.2 17.7 15.2 15.2 16.3 13.7 15.7 15.4 14.9
Notes
* "Centre11 includes both central government and Union Territories
** "States" includes both state governments and sub-state level local 
authorities
Source : Unpublished C.S.O. data.
spending by economic category, Indian current non-exhaustive spending 
is more highly centralized than either capital spending or current 
exhaustive spending. It might well be expected that, in an emergency 
such as the double harvest failure, the switch of expenditure towards 
income redistribution might lead to the greater centralization of
1 Bator (1962), p.17.
102
public expenditure as a whole. Just such an effect seems to be 
visible in 1966-7.
But the "income redistribution effect" on the overall expenditure
centralization ratio was short-lived, and overwhelmed by another - the
rapid decrease in the centralization ratio of capital expenditure,
particularly after 1966-7. The second way in which a major economic
emergency like the double harvest failure could be expected to affect
public expenditure is by changing the balance desired by the governments
between consumption and capital formation. For the economy as a whole,
when consumption levels fall temporarily below the norm, it is rational
to find future consumption (made possible by investment at the time of
crisis) less attractive than it was previously judged. In the private
sector, slackening demand may be a sufficient deterrent to investment,
but in the public sector some re-ordering of priorities away from
investment will-be probably required. The corrollaries of this
argument are (i) that, once consumption levels have been restored, the
balance of advantage swings back again to favour investment and (ii) that,
within the temporarily reduced volume of investments, it is desirable
to discriminate in favour of quick-yielding forms and against forms
with long gestation lags. There is no lack of evidence that, in India
of the late sixties, the government did find it increasingly difficult
to resist the clamour for increased government employment and rises
1
in dearness allowance for those already in government jobs. But 
the point which should be made in the present context is that a temporary 
shift away from investment does not necessarily affect the degree of 
expenditure centralization - except on the assumptions that central 
capital projects are mainly slow-yielding, that states* capital projects 
are quick-yielding and that the governments concerned are in fact acting




But several aspects of Table 5«^ throw doubt on these assumptions. 
Although the central government began to cut back its capital programme 
in real terms in 1965-6 , the big shift in the capital/consumption mix 
did not come until 1966-7 . However, this shift was not the occasion 
for a dramatic change in the centralization of capital expenditure.
A gradual decentralization of capital spending had begun in 196^-5, 
which continued through the period of acute crisis and its aftermath. 
Even if the states had had a near-monopoly of quick-yielding projects, 
the evidence does not really support the hypothesis of an emergency 
policy of discriminating rationally in their favour. The cutback in 
real public investment was in no way reversed in the years following the 
double monsoon failure which witnessed, as could have been predicted, an 
agricultural recovery culminating in the excellent harvests of 1969-70 
and 1970-1. In 1968-9 and 1969-70, capital spending formed a lower 
proportion of total expenditure than at any other time in the 1960s. 
This, in itself, is an interesting insight on the official resumption 
of planning in I969-7O. It is, moreover, in the post-harvest^failure 
years that capital spending continues to be further decentralized.
The continuation of this process is the major influence causing the 
concentration ratio of total expenditure to return to the level at which 
it started the decade. For these reasons, it seems appropriate to 
reject the view that expenditure decentralization was a consequence of 
sensible short-term adjustments imposed by the double monsoon failure.
Of course, one can rehearse more general economic arguments to 
justify a policy of persisting in reduced capital investment once the 
immediate crisis was over. These are arguments about the growth- 
promoting tendencies of certain expenditures conventionally called 
nconsumption”; or about the redistributive effects of certain public
1 Myrdal (1968), pp.1533-51.
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consumption expenditure which can compensate for a weak tax and transfer
1 2 system. The Planning Commission did endorse such arguments. But
such generalities do not necessarily provide a valid defence for the
specific forms of additional consumption that actually occurred. Nor,
even if accepted as such, would they justify or explain the fact that
the cut-back on capital spending fell almost exclusively on central
government account, even alloviing for the complementary capital used in
state health and education programmes.
The timing of the move towards expenditure decentralization, coming 
as it did most markedly in I968-9 a&d 1969-70, might be taken as an 
indication that we should be concerned more with the examination of 
political forces than with economic policy more narrowly conceived. It 
might be argued that the electoral defeat of Congress in eight states in 
February, 1967, strengthened the states' political position as a group 
and weakened the political position of the centre. Thus at a time of 
overall limits on real expenditure growth, the states were able to 
maintain the growth momentum of their own spending programme and force 
the centre, against its will, to sacrifice the most expendable part of 
its programmes - the capital element.
The appealing simplicity of this viewpoint is, in fact, its major
deficiency. The underlying premise is that anti-Congressism after
1967 provided the states with an increment to their political influence
over the centre. Some observers have gone so far in their denial of
this premise as to assert that the centre actually found it easier to have
its way with the non-Congress state governments than with the Congress
3
state governments of the time. It is suggested that non-Congress states 
were on their best behaviour in relation to the centre, to avoid giving
1 Margolis (195*0 * pp. 186-7.
2 Planning Commission (1970), p.35«
3 Kothari (1970), p.121.
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any opening for similar treatment to that meted out to the Communist 
government in Kerala in 1959; while the Congress states continued to 
manipulate the central government via influence in the Congress party 
hierarchy* But it is not necessary to turn the thesis on its head in 
order to rebut it, A less aggressively contrary rebuttal can also be 
advanced.
The elections in both Centre and States held in February, 1967,
did show a continuation of the decline, in Congress popularity which had
started in 1957* For the first time (apcvrfc from the brief Kerala
interlude at the end of the 1950s), Congress failed to form all the
State Governments. In five States, Congress governments were replaced
immediately, and subsequently, as a result of defections, Congress
1governments were swept away in three more States. The Congress
'‘syndicate’' leaders - Kamaraj, S.K. Patil and Atulya Ghosh - all suffered
personal electoral defeats. The damage to Congress was done by
regionally-based parties - the D.M.K. in Madras, Communists of varied
affiliations in Kerala, Swatantra in Gujarat, Orissa and Rajasthan and
Jan Sangh in Delhi. These results produced a groundswell of gloomy
foreboding claiming that the forecasts of the centrifugal effects of the
2creation of linguistic states were not practically vindicated.
The 1967 Elections did mark a stage in the development of Indian 
politics. There is some evidence to suggest that the uvote-banks" of 
influential local men x^ ere less reliable than they had been in the past, 
and that the electorate voted somewhat more in response to its conception 
of political issues. However, there was nothing in the results to 
bear out two widely adopted conclusions - namely, that the dominance of 
the Congress was irretrievably broken or that a unique structural shift 
had occurred in Centre-State relations. The first point was seen almost
1 Kothari (1970), p.183.
2 Cf, Harrison (i960), p.7; 536.
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immediately by the more acute Indian observers. Congress losses in 
terms of popular votes were relatively small. The opposition parties 
had gained so many additional seats because of their improved skill in 
avoiding vote-splitting, by the taatic of careful electoral alliances 
among themselves. This tactic worked in Madras, where D.M.K. allied 
with Swatantra; in Gujarat, where Swatantra and Jan Sangh cooperated; 
and in Kerala and West Bengal, where heterogeneous united front 
coalitions had been formed solely to promote anti-Congressisra. It was 
aided by internal dissidence within Congress, particularly in Orissa and 
West Bengal.^ The clear implication was that Congress could recover 
its position if (a) it could improve its own electoral tactics, (b) it 
could resolve some of its internal rifts and (c) it could capitalize 
on the economic discontent which was the major issue underlying its 
I967 loss of popularity. This implication was emphasized by the 
February, 1969 mid-term poll in Punjab and West Bengal.
The prediction that anti-Congressism could develop a new, anti­
centre coalition was unrealistic from the start. That each non-Congress 
government had a different and regionally limited political base 
militated against such a development. So did their high degree of
fragility, which did not decrease even after clumsy Congress power-
ploys to topple some of them. After a mere year, only the anti-Congress 
ministries in Kerala, Madras and Orissa survived in reasonably good 
shape. The anti-Congressism of the D.M.K, in Madras (Tamil Nadu) 
was itself, nevertheless, a very short-lived phenomenon. Despite its 
history of demands for separation, its last show of strength against the 
Congress Centre was a ’’rebellion day” in I968, pressing demands for a 
steel plant at Salem and the expansion of Tuticorin harbour. By 1971?
the D.M.K, was ready to enter an electoral alliance with Mrs Gandhi's
1 Desai (1967), pp.^75-6; Siddhartan (1967), p,1088.
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Congress. More important than fragility was the fact that the 
line of division between Congress and non-Congress States cut across 
a number of other lines of division between the States which continued 
to maintain their diffractive force. Thus both Congress and non- 
Congress States, as groups, remained internally divided on food and 
language policy. On food policy, for example, no cooperation was 
possible between foodgrain surplus Madras and foodgrain deficit 
Kerala. One of the first acts of the new D.M.K, government was to 
unforce the prohibition on smuggling foodgrains into Kerala where they 
could be sold at a premium. When the so-called three language formula , 
for education became an issue, Madras and West Bengal allied in the 
anti-Hindi camp; but among their opponents were the non-Congress Hindi 
states of U.P. and Bihar. When the future of economic planning was 
at issue in the National Development Council in I968, the non-Congress 
states were divided by ideology: Kerala called for a more vigorous
and socialistic approach to planning, while Orissa advocated its complete 
abandonment. The issues which united the non-Congress states were
(a) specific Central proposals for State resource mobilization and
(b) parity between Centre and States in the granting of additional 
dearness allowance to government employees - but these issues united 
all States, regardless of whether they had Congress or non-Congress 
ministries. For all these reasons, the anti-Congressism of post-1967 
was not, despite much opinion to the contrary, a watershed in Centre- 
State relations.
Post-1967 anti-Congressism probably had some impact in persuading, 
the Gentre to provide the bulk of its Plan financial assistance to 
the States in a more flexible form. The amount of central assistance 
for State plans was fixed for the entire period of the Fourth Plan; 
the criteria for its distribution were approved by Chief Ministers and 
the central government through the N.D.C., the size of State annual
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plans vjas thus made to depend solely (in theory) on the resource- 
raising efforts of the State governments themselves; the scope of 
"centrally-sponsored schemes" and the Article 282 "plan grants" which 
financed them was drastically reduced. But this modification was also 
prompted in part by a style of economic policy which, after 1966, 
favoured some dismantling of the apparatus of detailed bureaucratic 
intervention in economic life.
The thesis of growing states political power is only the most 
obvious political approach to the problem of expenditure decentralization. 
Alternatively, one could argue that the importance of the 1967 election 
was less for its impact on the states, than on the centre itself. The 
first general election since Nehru's death x^ as indecisive, in the sense 
that Congress•performance was neither good enough, nor bad enough, to 
precipitate outright bids to alter the power balance of the central 
leadership group. It accordingly signalled a continuation of 
"syndicate raj", the rule of the Congress bosses of the inter-regnum, 
unchallenged by a new Prime Minister vmo still bided her time, The 
energies of the central leadership became more consumed than ever with 
personal conflicts, intrigues, and faction-fighting. The "leadership" 
could spare very little time even for putting together its occasional 
incoherent compromises on major policy disputes. This is the classic 
scenario for the collapse of planning, which, almost by definition, 
requires complete inter-departmental policy coordination at the highest 
level; and for the transfer of effective economic policy-making to an 
independent and "orthodox" Finance Ministry.
Terming the Finance Ministry "orthodox" is not intended as praise 
or dispraise, merely as a description. It means that the higher ranks 
held and expressed opinions consistent with safeguarding the economic 
and social system as it presently exists. It implies a bias towards 
conservatism and against planning as a method of inducing large-scale
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change in the economic and social structure. When a political leadership 
is fragmented and turns in upon itself in an attempt to resolve its own 
internal conflicts, orthodoxy emerges as an independent force. 
Personalities, which seem to loom so large, are in fact at a discount.
That the Finance Ministry happened, as a result of post-election 
manoeuvring, to have fallen to Morarji Desai, the leading right-wing 
Congressman, served only as an incidental dramatisation.
The orthodox economic view was dominated by a fear of the consequences 
of a declining net inflow of foreign resources, after growth had become 
critically dependent on such an inflow. The response to this fear was 
a new package of economic policies. Private foreign investment was 
encouraged as a potential substitute for declining government-to- 
government flows. Domestic private investment was relied upon to ease 
the recession in industry, presumably on the assumption that it would 
have the same demand effects as public investment, but a smaller balance 
of payments cost. An attempt was made to insure against future monsoon 
failures by directing complementary, high-technology inputs to already 
irrigated areas, despite the consequential narrowing in the geographical 
and social base of agricultural progress. Finally, a.tld most important 
in the present context, it was preferred to accumulate foreign exchange 
reserves, rather than use them to res^ m^e the expansion of large 
centrally-financed development projects on the scale envisaged by the 
perspective planners at the time of the Third Plan. Formally, the 
"plan holiday” which began in 1966 ended with the start of the Fourth 
Plan in 1969-70. Even though the Fourth PlanTs investment targets were 
relatively modest by past standards, it was apparent that the flow 
of large development projects was much easier to stop than to re-start. 
Public investment was below target, even in money terms, for the first 
two years of the Plan, while circumstances were most favourable. Then 
the costs of the Bangladesh war of 1971-2, followed by the drought of
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1972-3 ensured that 110 recovery could be made from the tardy start.
Thus despite the existence of the Fourth Plan, the general situation 
was that the "plan holiday11 after 1966 was not seriously interrupted.
Whether this set of economic policies, engendered by the "orthodox" 
fear of foreign resource scarcity is defensible, in whole or part, is such 
an all-embracing question that it would be senseless to imply that 
justice could be done to it in a digression here. Our concern is with 
establishing the following propositions. (1) Expenditure 
decentralization between 19&5 and 1970 resulted from, the central 
government's action of allowing its capital expenditure programme to 
decline in money, and a fortiori, in real terms, while no similar degree 
of restraint was applied to, or observed in, the capital programmes of 
the states. (2) This action was taken deliberately as part of a wider 
set of central government economic policies adopted in response to an 
anticipated levelling off of net foreign aid flows, combined with poor 
resource mobilization domestically. (3) The political roots of 
this action are the conditions which allowed the economic orthodoxy of 
the Finance Ministry to dominate policy making, rather than the events 
which allegedly strengthened the bargaining position of the states vis a 
vis the central government.
Ill
CHAPTER SIX
THE GROWTH OF STATE GOVERNMENTS' SPENDING
I. Inter-state Differences in Public Expenditure Growth
When the states are thought of as a group, which is then contrasted 
with the centre, they are given a broad similarity defined by their 
relationship to the centre. Each state is taken as a geographically 
limited sub-jurisdiction, receiving some central financial assistance, 
and charged with certain constitutional expenditure responsibilities 
and taxation powers. This is perfectly correct as far as it goes.
But it obviously does not give a complete picture. State governments 
in a federation combine juridical similarity with pronounced economic 
and political dissimilarity.
India is a federation by disaggregation. Its federal scheme emerged
by a process of devolution of central government powers on states
(provinces), which was linked with the transition from a colonial to a
post-colonial regime. Under the British, it is clear that a strong
element of political calculation in the face of nationalist pressure
prompted the tvjin moves towards quasi-democracy and federalism. But
why, at Independence, the federal provisions of British legislation
were adopted so swiftly and with so little contest is not at all clear
1
from the history of constitution-?making. There seems simply to have 
been general agreement that the size and diversity of India, and the 
fragmented nature of its civil polity, would have been incompatible 
with a unitary regime. In other words, economic and political 
dissimilarities between the units of the federation were the causes
1 Austin (1966), pp.188-9^.
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of the adoption of the federal form of government, given the prior 
decision in favour of a formal parliamentary democracy*
The dissimilarities between states which are normally held to 
justify a genuine decentralization of expenditure and taxation decisions 
are differences in income per head, population density and political 
preferences.^ But, from a positive standpoint, the same three 
variables are frequently cited as the major influences on public 
expenditure. If the positive hypotheses are correct, therefore, one 
would expect that, in an economically rational federation, inter­
state variations in levels and growth of public spending would be 
significantly different from zero.
In what follows, an attempt is made first to overcome the 
statistical problems of comparing states* expenditure levels and rates 
of growth. Secondly, the question is examined of how far these measured 
differences in levels and rates of expenditure growth can in fact be 
ascribed to differences in the two classic economic ’’determinants*' of 
public expenditure, income per head and population density.
If expenditure by individual state governments is to be compared, the 
basic principle is that like must be compared with like. This requires, 
initially, that in preparing the expenditure figures at current prices, 
consistency of definition and classification between states is ensured.
In fact, the budgetary conventions in use in different states differ, 
but a basic uniformity is achieved, in the data used here, by the 
re-classification of state budgetary documents according to national 
accounts conventions by the C.S.O. The C.S.O., however, while 
allocating local authority expenditure by states in 1965-6 and after, 
gives only a global figure for it between I960-I and 196^-5* For 
comparability, some method has to be adopted to distribute these global
1 Head (1973), p.25.
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sums by states in the period 1960-3 . l*he distribution was made by
applying the 1963-6 distribution to all the earlier years. There is
bound to be an arbitrary element in such an allocation since
"democratic decentralization" must have proceeded in different states
at different speeds. The element of error was accepted as preferable
to a thoroughgoing exclusion of all local authority spending, which
would have involved the arbitrariness arising from the differing
extents to which state governments devolved their functions on lower- 
1level bodies.
But the most important problem of ensuring comparability still 
remains. Too many writers on Indian public expenditure seem to have 
followed Miss Prism1s advice that one "may neglect the chapter on the 
Fall of the Rupee - it is too sensational". Too often the problem 
posed by the persistence of inflation has either been ignored, or else 
acknowledged only to be brushed aside. It seems that, in the 1960s, 
the purchasing power of the rupee fell to between two-thirds and one- 
half of its initial value, (Table 6.1), But if government spending
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Source ; Economic Survey. 1971-72. Tables 5*1 and 3.3
doubles while the purchasing power of the currency falls by one-half,
1 Maxwell (I969), pp.2-3.
2 Gupta (1970), pp.303-8; Venkataraman (1968), pp.138-9.
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the volume of goods and services absorbed by government will not change.
If it is further assumed, as is conventional, that the volume of inputs 
absorbed by government is directly correlated with the volume of outputs 
produced by government, neither will the volume of government output 
change. Thus if one wants to eliminate the effects of a general 
inflation of prices, inputs absorbed by government must be valued at a 
single set of prices in all years, in the form of a time series ”at 
constant prices”. Theoretically, a further complication arises when, 
during a general inflation, the relative prices of labour and capital 
goods also change. This is ignored here, for reasons explained in 
Appendix D. Data limitations are serious enough for the task of 
producing a reliable constant prices series of government expenditure 
at the national level. For inter-state comparisons at constant prices, 
it is necessary to estimate the geographical differences in the rate of 
general inflation. Again, the precise methods used are discussed in 
Appendix D.
To arrive at the estimated growth rates of government expenditure 
at constant prices, set out in Table 6.2, involved the following steps:
(1) Allocation of a global figure of local authority spending by 
states between I96O-I and 1964-5, according to the distribution 
which actually prevailed in 1965-6 ;
(2) Deflation of current price figures to figures at I960-I prices 
by the methods discussed in Appendix D;
(3) Calculation of a trend line for each constant price time series, 
by the method of ordinary least squares;
(4) Expression of the difference between the first-year and last- 
year trend values as an annual average rate of compound growth.
The growth rates in Table 6.2 are thus intended to show expenditure 
growth by states with the price change element removed.
But, apart from prices, there is another influence which contributes
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Table 6.2 : Annual Compound Growth Rates of Government Expenditure at 
I96O-I Prices by States, I960-I97O
Note : the four asterisked states are not strictly comparable with the 
others, because of problems of deflation. See Appendix D.
Source : calculated from C.S.O. unpublished data.
to expenditure growth rates, and for which due allowance must be made.
When population is growing rapidly, an appreciable portion of the growth
in the real volume of government spending is diverted to the "widening”
rather than the "deepening" of collective provision. In other words,
even when government spending is growing at constant prices, some part
of that growth will be used to extend the existing standard of public
facilities to an increasing population, rather than improving on that
standard. The question is how to allow for the element of expenditure
widening under the influence of population growth. Clearly there can
be no well-founded presumption that expenditure widening is inevitably
given priority over expenditure deepening: this is precisely the kind
1of distributional issue about which so little is known. Nor is it 
always true that, if one percent population growth is accompanied by

































1 O'Connor (1969), p.377.
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one percent real expenditure growth, existing standards of public 
facilities will remain unchanged. IPor example, population growth 
accompanied by a changing age structure of the population would upset 
such a neat assumption. However, although one can state quite clearly 
what some of its limitations might be, there is no better rule of 
thumb that can be adopted - given our ignorance of distribution and 
age structure - than to assume that every percentage point of population 
growth requires an extra percentage point of real expenditure just to 
preserve existing expenditure standards intact. To measure the rate 
of expenditure deepening, the rate of population growth is then simply 
deducted from the growth rate of real government expenditure, to give 
a figure that approximates closely the annual growth rate of real 
expenditure per head. The results of applying this rule of thumb 
are given in Table 6.3.
Table 6.3 : Statewise Growth Rates of Population and Real Government 
Expenditure per Head, 1960-1970
(1) (2)
Annual Compound Rate Annual Compound Growth Rate 
State of Population Growth of Real Expenditure Per Head
<%) (%)




Jammu and Kashmir 2.62 5.1
Kerala 2.3** 2.8
Madhya Pradesh 2.55 (-)0.6
Maharashtra 2.A2 **.9
Mysore 2.1? jL 1 1
Orissa 2.26 1.7
Punjab and Haryana 2.3** (-01.2
Rajasthan 2.A8 2.2
Tamil Nadu 2.01 3.1
Uttar Pradesh 1.82 0.5
West Bengal 2.A3 1.6
Sfources : Col (1): Census of India, 19711 Paper 1 of 1971 ~ Supplement,
Statement 1, from which growth rates are derived.
Col (2): Data in Table 6, minus figures in Col (1).
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As is clear from the figures in column (2) of Table 6,3, even after 
allowance is made for differences between states in the rate of price 
inflation and in the rate of population growth, substantial underlying 
differences remain between them in their rates of public expenditure 
growth. At one end of the scale, states like Punjab and Haryana,
Madhya Pradesh, Bihar and Andhra Pradesh did not (for one reason or 
another - one must not prejudge the question of causes) manage to 
prevent an erosion of their average standard of collective provision for 
consumption and investment in the face of continued population pressure. 
At the other end of the scale, states like Jammu and Kashmir and 
Maharashtra not only prevented such erosion, but improved their average 
level of collective provision at around 3 cent compound over the 
decade•
Wide variations in growth rates of real spending per head are, in 
logic, perfectly consistent with (a) small statewise variations in levels 
of expenditures per head and (b) a diminution in inter-state differences 
in expenditure levels, as these levels converge to a mean value.
However, in fact, the statewise differences in expenditure levels were 
large in I960-I, and the differing expenditure growth rates reflect the 
process of their further enlargement. The relevant figures are set 
out in Table 6.4* The coefficient of variation, i.e. the standard 
deviation of the observations expressed as a percentage of their 
mean, was large in I96O-I and even larger by 1969-70# The I960-I
figure of 44,9 per cent is artificially high because of the inclusion 
of one extreme observation (for U.P.): but on any reasonable
calculation the true figure was at least 23 per cent, and the more the 
estimate of initial disparity is decreased, the more die estimate 
of the growth of inter-state disparity over the decade is thereby 
increased. Again, on any reasonable calculation, inclusion of a "true" 
figure for U.P. would not affect the ranking of the states in Table 6.4,
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Table 6.*+ : Government Spending per Head by State at 1960-61 Prices
(1) (2)
Rupees at 1960-61 Prices 
State 1960-61 1969-70




Jammu and Kashmir 59.3 86.1
Kerala 30.*+ 36.*+




Punjab and Haryana 35.6 3^.8
Rajasthan 31.3 *+3.8
Tamil Nadu 30.9 ^0.6
Uttar Pradesh 8.3* 19-7
West Bengal 32.3 36.9
All-India mean 26.9 3*+.5
Standard Deviation 12.1 16.9
Coefficient of Variation *+*+.9 *+9.0
Note : * In 1960-61, U.P. experienced unusually large receipts for netting 
off against capital expenditure, so that this figure very 
substantially underestimates the normal level of spending.
Source : calculated from C.S.O, unpublished data.
column (1). If this ranking is compared with that of states1 real 
expenditure growth rates per head (given in Table 6.3, column (2)), 
it is clear that they are correlated. The coefficient of rank correlation 
equals 0.3751 which is significant at the 0.05 confidence level. Thus 
there is a significant tendency for states with high initial spending 
levels to show high growth rates of spending, and for initially low 
level states to have low growth rates. This means that the differences 
between spending levels must have grown over the period. Thus, while 
there is room for some doubt about the precise degree of initial 
differentiation, the evidence is that it was considerable, and that the
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direction of change in the 1960s was towards even greater differenti­
ation.
IX. Factors related to Public Spending Growth in the States
There is nothing particularly surprising in such findings. They 
are what lAjould be expected in a federation founded upon considerable 
economic and political dissimilarjjby between its units, if public 
expenditure is indeed importantly influenced by such variables as 
income per head and population density. Political dissimilarity 
between states is an important assumption for the following reason.
To the extent that inter-state rivalry is overlaid by the development 
of a truly national outlook, it is possible for the centre to undertake 
more extensive income redistribution between states. If and when this 
happens, one would expect the classic economic determinants to weaken 
in their influence on public expenditure: they would need to be
supplemented by consideration of the effect of central transfers.
But it seems doubtful that this stage has yet been reached in India, 
Central transfers are, of course, a sizeable proportion of the finance 
for state expenditure. But in their distribution there is little bias 
in favour of the poorer states. Nor does it seem that the tax 
system is sufficiently progressive to cause very much redistribution in 
the process of raising the necessary central revenues.**" If these 
arguments are correct, attention may be directed, in the first 
instance, to examining the relationships between public expenditure and, 
on the one hand, state incomes and, on the other, state population 
density.
A cross-section comparison for I96O-I shows a statistically signi-
1 Hicks (1968), pp.227-8; Sundrum (1972), p.1031.
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ficant (r1 = 0,63) association between average public spending and 
average income. This tells us only that, in most states, the size 
of the state government sector hovers around the all-India mean of 
9-10 per cent of state income. The main exception is Jammu and Kashmir, 
a poor state enjoying a level of state government spending per head out 
of all proportion to its own resources because of the centre’s strategic 
concern for its political loyalty.^ However, what must be asked is
whether the growth of real public spending per head in the 1960s was 
associated with growth in real income per head.
This question confronts us squarely with one of the greatest
impediments to economic analysis at the level of the state. As far as
one can ascertain, comparable time series of state incomes at constant
prices do not exist for 1960-70. The only comparable published time
series of states incomes, prepared by the C.S.O., covers only the
2years I96O-I to 196^-5 and are at current prices. The states
themselves prepare estimates of state income, which are at constant 
prices and which (with a few trivial exceptions) cover all of the 
relevant years. But one must remain sceptical of their comparability 
even when they are apparently following a standard methodology - which 
four states in any case have not adopted. This must make any 
conclusions derived from their use highly tentative, and subject to 
revision - perhaps radical revision - as soon as better data becomes 
available.
If one calculates growth rates of average real income from the 
states' own estimates and then compares them with the growth rates of 
average real expenditure (Table 6.3, column 2), a curious state of 
affairs is revealed. For twelve of the fifteen states, i.e. all except
1 Anon (1968), pp.832-3.
2 Finance Commission (1969)1 pp.127-8, Tables k and 5.
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Maharashtra, Mysore and Punjab-Haryana, a very close association exists 
between.the two sets of growth rates (r* =; 0.?8, significant at 0.01
confidence level). But when the three excluded states are
included, the correlation coefficient falls to 0.22, which is 
statistically insignificant. The behaviour of the government 
sector in the three maverick states appears to stand in dramatic 
contrast to the general rule. On the one hand, Maharashtra achieved 
substantial expenditure deepening despite constant average real 
income, while on the other hand Punjab and Haryana, and to a lesser 
extent Mysore, achieved 110 expenditure deepening despite having the 
fastest rates of average real income growth in India.
Naturally, it would be convenient if some special explanations 
could be offered for this maverick behaviour. In the case of
Punjab and Haryana such an explanation might not be too difficult to
construct. The splitting of the state in 1966 obviously caused, some 
dislocation of expenditure programmes in the years immediately before 
and after the split. Further, vigorous agricultural entrepreneurship, 
combined with the irrigation infrastructure resulting from large- 
scale government investment in previous decades, created the 
conditions for rapid agricultural growth in the late 1960s, despite the 
sluggish growth of public expenditure at the state level. For 
Maharashtra, it might be suggested that public spending has been 
heavily concentrated on the provision of high-quality urban services 
for metropolitan Bombay, and that Mmetropolitan parasitism" accounts 
for the observed lack of relation between public expenditure growth 
and statewide income growth. It is not clear, however, that an 
explanation in terms of special circumstances could be constructed 
equally well for Mysore,
One wonders whether the situation would be further illuminated
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by breaking down state income Dr public expenditure into their
components, to see whether these would reveal what it is that made
the exceptional states exceptional. It would not seem that a
breakdown of state income would be very revealing. Broadly
speaking, states which experienced economic growth in the period
grew, or failed to grow, in all major categories of production -
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foodgrains, cash crops and industrial activities. As for a 
breakdown of public expenditure, although detailed economic-cum- 
functional classifications have been prepared for six states (see 
Appendix B), such information is not available for any of the three 
exceptional states. There is no way of establishing statistically 
whether they deviate in some way from the '’normal1 distribution 
of outlays.
It may be that the answer to the problem is simply that the 
state income data is unreliable. But assuming the contrary, as 
one must until better data is available, the question arises whether 
an explanation is to be found by considering the other classic 
determinant of public expenditure, population density. For 
convenience, the degree of urbanization is taken as a proxy for 
population density. It is frequently asserted, rather loosely, 
that urbanization accompanies rising income levels, both being
2envisaged as twin, but indivisible, aspects of economic development. 
If this were strictly true, it would evidently be gratuitous to
1 Mitra (1970), pp.21-6.
2 E.g. Thorn (1967), Burkehead and Miner (1971), p*5.
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seek in urbanization an alternative influence on public 
expenditure growth. But in the India of the 1960s it was not 
true by any means: among the most rapidly urbanizing states were
Orissa, Madhya Pradesh and Bihar, where average real income was 
virtually constant. However, when states are ranked both by rate 
of change of urbanization and by growth of real expenditure per head, 
the correlation is only weakly positive, and not statistically 
significant. Once again, the experience of three states (Bihar,
M.P, and Orissa) strongly contradicted the generalization which was 
satisfactory for the other twelve. Thus the urbanization hypothesis, 
no more than the state income hypothesis, provides on its own a 
complete explanation of statewise public expenditure growth. But 
at the same time both appear to be partially sound. Is there then 
some way of combining them, so that their merits are complementary 
and their defects eliminated?
It is possible to propose a solution along the following lines.
The states may be separated into two groups, the more urbanized and 
the less urbanized, according to the degree of urbanization which 
prevailed, in I96O-6I. The urbanization hypothesis can then be 
tested against expenditure data for the more urban states, and the 
average real income hypothesis can be tested against data for the 
less urban states. The relevant figures are set out in Tables 6*5 
and 6.6.
What are the results of separating the states into two groups according
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Table 6.5 : Growth of Real Government Spending per Head and of Urban 
Population in the more Urban States, 1960-70
Percentage of Growth c£. real Rank 
urbanization govt, spending by Col. 
I96O-6I per head (2)
1960-70_______
Growth of Rank 
urban by
population Col (4) 
1961-71
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1 Andhra Pradesh 17.44 0*1 7 +33.81 6
2 Gujarat 25.77 2,5 4 +41.20 2
3 J. and Kashmir 16,66 5.1 1 +42.04 1
4 Maharashtra 28.22 4.9 2 +40.68 3
5 Mysore 22.33 1.1 6 +35.09 5
6 Punjab and H. 28.53 (-)1.2 8 +28,53 7
7 Tamil Nadu 26.69 3.1 3 +38.44 4
8 West Bengal 24.45 1,6 5 +27.95 8
Source : Cols (1) and (4): Census of India , 1971: Paper 1 of 1971 -
Supplement , Table A, p.49, Columns £ and 10 respectively.
Table 6.6 : Growth of Real Government spending per Head and of average 
Real Income in the less Urban States, 1960-70
Percentage of Growth of real Rank Growth 
urbanization govt, spending by Col. rate of 
I96Q-6I per head (2 )____ real in-






(1 ) (2 ) (3) (4) (5)
1 Assam 7.37 3.6 1 1.31 1
2 Bihar 8.43 (-)0.3 6 (-00.38 6
3 Kerala 15.11 2.8 2 1.08 3
4 Madhya Pradesh 14.29 <-)0.6 7 (-)o.3o 5
5 Orissa 6.32 1.7 4 (-)0.75 7
6 Rajasthan 16.28 2.2 3 1.25 2
7 Uttar Pradesh 12.85 0.5 5 0.02 4
Sources : Col (1): as for Table 6.5, c olumn (1)
Col (4): unpublishe d estimates by State Statistical Bureaux.
to their initial level of urbanization? In the more urban states, the 
growth of real government spending per head was closely associated with 
the growth rate of the urban population. The coefficient of rank 
correlation equals 0,78, which is significant at the 0.05 confidence
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level. In the less urban states, the association between expenditure 
growth and growth of average real income was not quite so close. In 
this case the rank correlation coefficient was 0.72, which is 
significant only at the 0.10 confidence level. The interpretation of 
this result is particularly difficult because no less than three of 
the seven less urban states were using non-standard methodologies in 
preparing their state income estimates (Assam, Madhya Pradesh and 
Rajasthan). Whether truly comparable state income data would improve 
the closeness of the association, or worsen it, can only be a matter 
for conjecture at this stage.
Before proceeding any further with the argument, it is appropriate 
to point out the limitations of empirical associations of the kind we 
have been trying to identify. To be reasonably sure that no relevant 
variable has been ignored would require a very elaborate factor analysis 
of a kind which cannot be attempted here. Further, even when 
covariation between public expenditure growth and all the other major 
relevant variables has been established, the direction of the causal 
links remains a matter of judgement, and often of dispute. Even when 
the direction of the causal links seems to be clear, the question 
arises of how the independent variables operate on the dependent 
variable. This requires an attempt to separate out influences on the
demand side from those on the supply side, and the different influences
that can operate in opposing directions either on demand, or on supply.
Nevertheless it might be useful, as a contribution to debate, to
speculate what economic mechanisms might be at work, on the assumption 
that the foregoing results have some statistical validity. Taking 
urbanization first, is it a consequence or cause of public expenditure 
growth? In India, the pattern of migration in the 1950s was for migrants 
to move to states that were in the process of rapid urbanization, rather 
than to states which were already highly urbanized.^- This suggests
1 Greenwood (1971).
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that the growth of urban population in the more urban states is not 
a consequence of their attraction - because of higher average levels of 
public expenditure - for migrants from other states. There is still 
the very real possibility that internal migration is in response to 
the higher levels of collective provision in the urban areas, however, 
or that the pattern of inter-state migration altered in the 1960s.
If urbanization is also a cause of public expenditure growth, by what 
channels does it exert its influence? Urbanization is normally 
assumed to reduce the unit costs of public services: but for
urbanization to stimulate public spending there must obviously be other 
influences as well. Urbanization will increase the demand for public 
services in a number of ways. It will increase the number of people 
who can be organized at low cost to press mass claims to better health, 
education and welfare services. If income distribution is highly 
unequal, it will increase demand for government services, such as 
police, para-military and fire services, whose task is the protection 
of property. In addition, urbanization operates on the supply side 
by relaxing the taxable capacity constraint on public expenditure*
This is partly a reflection of the fact that urbanization increases the 
product of indirect taxes by promoting monetization: and partly a
reflection of the chronic inability to tax agricultural incomes 
directly in India. The correlation between state tax revenues (as a 
percentage of state income) and the level of urbanization in India has 
been established with cross-section data.**" We are speculating here 
that this relationship also holds good for the more urban states 
over time.
The relationship between public expenditure and state income is 
•probably even more complicated. It must surely be one of mutual 
interaction, in the manner of Myrdal's "circles of cumulative
1 Nambiar and Qovinda Rao (I972), p.1037, Table 1.
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causation”. The richer states can afford better public provision, 
which promotes economic growth; which, in turn, leads to demands for 
further improvements that (because of growth) can now be supplied; and 
so on. Meanwhile the poorer states cannot afford the public 
expenditure they would need to break out of their existing position.
Of course, if taken literally, the excessive determinism of such an 
argument renders it absurd. The scope for growth-promoting government 
activity is not infinite, and long before the theoretical limits are 
approached, the practical difficulties of project choice may well 
prove overwhelming. Similarly, it is doubtful if any cumulative 
circles are so vicious that under no historical circumstances could they 
be broken. Yet, applied to a medium-term situation, when the social 
and institutional framework is stable, the cumulative causation 
argument has some merit. There is evidence that the faster growth 
states devote a larger proportion of their budgets to economic 
expenditures, rather than to general or social services, which could 
be taken as an indication of the existence of 'virtuous1 and 'vicious' 
circles. As for the manner in which economic growth influences public 
expenditure, it may be conjectured that the effect is strong on the 
side of supply and weak on the side of demand. At very low levels of 
income demand would presumably be little changed by a marginal increment 
to income: the income increase would raise public spending by relaxing
the taxable capacity constraints.
To combine these two sets of arguments in a manner consistent with 
our empirical results, it is necessary to postulate an asymmetry in the 
effects of income growth and urbanization according to the level of 
urbanization. In less urban states, urbanization cannot have the 
demand and supply increasing effects on public spending which have been 
mentioned, while in the more urban states, further urbanization rather
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than further income growth must be assumed to be the hey to the 
creation of additional fiscal capacity. It is difficult to suggest 
from a priori reasoning, why this should be so. One would need to 
have much more information about the nature of the urbanization process 
in the two groups of states. Was it, for the less urban states, a 
distress phenomenon - the flight to the towns of impoverished agricultural 
workers when starvation was imminent? Was it, for the more urban 
states, by contrast, a process more attributable to natural increase 
of the urban population plus the inflow from the rural hinterland of a 
more enterprising and prosperous type of migrant? For the moment, 
these questions must remain unanswered.
Attempts to construct an explanation must, however, take account 
of one important negative point. The grouping of the states into 
more and less urban does not produce a division which is the same as 
that given by two other dichotomies familiar in the literature on the 
Indian states - the more and the less developed states; and the 
"heartland” and the "rimland" states. It is true that on any of the 
three criteria - level of urbanization, degree of development, or 
geographical position - Gujarat, Maharashtra, West Bengal, Tamil Nadu 
and Punjab will always stand in contrast to U.P., M.P., Rajasthan and 
Bihar. But the way in which the other six states are assimilated 
to this fundamental cleavage does differ significantly according to 
which criterion is being discussed. The degree of urbanization is not 
synonomous with the degree of .general economic development, as is 
clear by contrasting Kerala with Jammu and Kashmir. Even less is it 
synonomous with location on the "rimland", as is clear by contrasting 
Andhra and Mysore with Assam, Kerala and Orissa, It follows that the 
equation between rimland location and economic development is far from 
perfect also,^ In other words, the search for an explanation of the
1 Rudolph and Rudolph (1969), Table p.10^3
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empirical associations noted above will probably be more rewarding 
if directed towards further research into inter-state differences in 
urbanization, rather than towards approaches which regard urbanization 
as a proxy for some allegedly more ♦‘basic" geo-political distinction.
Returning, in conclusion, to the question of political influences 
on state government expenditure, one must remain agnostic as to whether 
preferences regarding public expenditure differ markedly between states. 
The direct evidence for such preferences is lacking and the indirect 
evidence in terms of actual expenditure patterns, is too fragmentary 
for sound inference. Where "deviant" spending patterns can be noted 
(e.g. the preference for technical education in Orissa) they reflect 
the personal influence of a local, and inevitably passing, political 
leader. Political influences on spending have rather been of two 
major types. First, strong inter-state rivalry exists, based on a 
mutual suspicion that chronically inhibits cooperation even when the 
gains would be large for all parties. Consequently, the Centre can 
do little that is visible to redistribute income between states. 
Expenditure in most states remains firmly linked to its own resource 
base. Only when very obvious national defence interests are involved 
(e.g. Jammu and Kashmir, Nagaland) can the Centre do otherwise. It 
will be recalled that, in defining the idea of mimetic nationalism in 
Chapter 2, its coexistence with a low level of national integration was 
noted. The inability to re-distribute purchasing power regionally 
except to a few areas under constant military threat is a concrete 
expression of that characteristic.
The second type of political influence is that of Liptonian "urban 
bias". The relative ease with which urban business and labour can be 
politically organized, and their relative proximity, both physical and 
psychological, to the state's civil and military employees have created 
the belief that urban public expenditure is more urgent, and will be
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more productive, than equivalent sums spent in rural areas. The 
political pressures which generate these assumptions combine with the 
more soundly based assumptions that urban spending is easier to finance 
and improves public reinvestment prospects to ensure that, in conditions 




PUBLIC INVESTMENT, PUBLIC SAVING 
AND THE STATE GOVERNMENTS
Overall trends in public investment and public saving during 
the period 1960-70 were surveyed in Chapter 3. It became clear that, 
at least from the end of the Third Five Year Plan, public sector 
investment fell both as a percentage of net domestic product, and of 
total gross fixed capital formation. At the same time, public saving 
showed an absolute decline, despite quickening inflation, and 
therefore (until 1969-70) served as a dwindling source of finance for 
a public sector investment programme that vias virtually stagnant.
The purpose of this chapter is to probe behind the aggregate trends, 
in order to see how the activities of the different types of 
governmental spending agency contributed to them. The approach follows 
that adopted in Chapter 4 in relation to total public expenditure.
That is, we begin by examining changes in the degree of centralization 
of public investment and saving, treating the state governments as a 
unified group that can be contrasted with the central government. 
Thereafter an attempt is made to give estimates of inter-state 
differences in the rate of growth of their investment and saving, and 
to find statistical regularities that might point towards an explanation 
of these differences.
I. Public Investment Centralization
The total gross capital formation done by the public sector can 
be disaggregated to show the shares of the central government, the 
state governments, local authorities (together defined as the "public 
authorities11) and the share of the non—departmental enterprises (i.e.
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government companies and statutory corporations). This breakdown is 
given in Table 7»1*
Table 7.1 : Public Sector Gross Capital Formation by Spending Authority, 
1960-61 to 1969-70
(Percentage shares) 
60-1 61-2 62-3 63-4 64-3 63-6 66-7 67-8 68-9 69-70
A Public
Authorities
a Central Govt. 28 27 31 31 11 23 22 12 12 18
1 New g.f.c.f. 26 28 29 32 30 27 23 20 22 20
2 Change in
stocks 2 (-)l 2 2 3 <-)4 (-03 (-)l (-)9 (-)2
> State Govts 31 28 26 23 SI 27 23 27 11 12
1 New g.f.c.f. 31 30 25 24 24 24 26 24 29 30
2 Change in
stocks (-)l 1 (-)l (-)l 3 (-)3 3 2
; Local
Authorities 6 1 7 1 7 8 7 8 8 8








Enterprises 41 38 36 !§. 1Z 44 48 46 42 4l
1 New g.f.c.f. 30 30 28 31 34 36 39 33 4o 4o
2 Change in
stocks 5 6 6 7 4 8 10 12 10 3
3 Net purchase
of physical
assets 6 2 1 (-)l 1 (-)l (-)l (-)l
C Total gross c.f
by public sector 1137 U 69 1464 1671 1920 2184 2114 2311 2l46 2234 
(Ks. cr,, current 
prides)
(percentage) 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Note : Totals do not necessarily add exactly because of rounding
Source ; C.S.O., National Accounts Statistics, 1960-61 - 1973-74; 
calculated from data in Table 22,
In Table 7.1, we have to operate with data on gross capital
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formation, because there is no available breakdown of public sector 
fixed capital consumption by spending authority. In any case, it may 
be doubted how realistic the aggregate figure of fixed capital 
consumption is, since it is probably determined by the depreciation 
policy of the various public enterprises, which itself is likely to be 
arbitrary. Gross capital formation is the sum of new fixed capital 
formation, the difference between purchases and sales of existing 
physical assets and the difference between the inflow to and outflow 
from owned stocks of physical goods. Because stock changes are 
usually more volatile than changes in fixed capital formation, and 
because they are likely to respond to different economic pressures, 
they have been separately identified.
The story told by the figures in Table 7,1 manifestly falls into 
two chapters, the period of the Third Plan and the succeeding five years. 
During the Third Plan .public sector gross capital formation was growing 
rapidly in money terms, and somewhat less rapidly in real terms. While 
this growth took place, central government increased slightly its 
relative contribution, while the state governments somewhat decreased 
theirs. The slight drift in the relative contribiitions of central and 
state governments is visible regardless of whether ’’state governments" 
are defined narrowly (i,e. to exclude local authorities) or broadly 
(i,e, to include them).
This result is interesting because it shows that, under the Third 
Plan, the growing centralization of total expenditure, which was noted 
in Chapter , was accompanied by a growing centralization of gross 
capital formation. One might be tempted to think that this is additional 
evidence that the centre substantially maintained its development effort 
despite its increased defence commitments in the Sino-Indian border war. 
That inference would be incorrect, because, as explained in Appendix A, 
the Indian definition of capital formation includes expenditure on
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physical construction and machinery and equipment undertaken for defence 
purposes. Since it is impossible to identify separately defence and 
non-defence capital formation, the capital formation data cannot be 
used to add anything to the previous discussions of the extent to 
which defence and development accumulation competed for the central 
government resources.
The capital formation data do, however, serve to confirm previous 
observations about the decentralization of capital spending in the five 
years after the Third Plan, In these five years, public sector capital 
formation was stagnant in.money terms, and as a result of accelerating 
inflation, progressively declining in real terms. Yet, using money 
terms data (since precise deflation by spending authority is not possible), 
the gross capital formation of state governments, local authorities and 
non-departmental enterprises each increased, while that of the central 
government drastically declined. This absolute and relative decline 
of central government capital formation effort is not affected if 
we choose to take account of the Icirge stock decumulation by the centre 
and stock accumulation by the state governments and non-departmental 
enterprises; or if we choose the alternative of ignoring all stock 
changes. The stock changes only reinforce the trends in relative shares 
which are evident in the figures for new fixed capital formation.
We have already argued that the drastic decentralization of 
expenditure for capital formation was the principal influence leading 
to decentralization of total expenditure in the second half of the 1960s. 
The motivation of the central government in cutting back its own capital 
formation while permitting increases in other parts of the public sector 
was discussed in the context of total expenditure centralization, and 
that discussion need not be recapitulated here.
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II. Public Saving Centralization
What changes took place simultaneously in the degree of centralization 
of public saving? Unfortunately, in order to answer this question, 
much murkier conceptual and statistical waters have to be navigated.
Since the saving of non-departmental enterprises has been extremely 
small, the problem is essentially that of determining the correct 
method of allocating the saving of the public authorities between the 
central government, the state governments and the local authorities.
The saving of public authorities is the difference between current 
revenues and current expenditure. To give a more precise definition, 
assume a three-sector world, where the subscripts 1, 2 and 3 refer to 
the public authorities, the remainder of the domestic economy and the 
rest of the world, and a threefold division of the public authorities, 
where the subscripts a, b and c refer to the central government, the 
state governments and the local authorities. Public authoritiesr 
saving is defined as
S = R - (C + Z + ^ 2,3>
when R 5 T + Y + P + (I2 - l’2 ) (2)
Also S 5 (3)
In these definitions, R is current revenue, the sum of taxes (T), 
income from fees, rent, etc., (Y), the operating surpluses of the 
departmental enterprises (P) and net interest earned from loan
i
transactions with sector 2 , (I^ — I 2)* ^ current
consumption of goods and services by the public authorities, Z the
\
payment of subsidies and Q 2 3 current transfers paid to the rest of 
the domestic economy and abroad. Although S is simply the sum of the 
saving of each spending agency, it does not follow that the definition 
of saving, for each spending agency must be identity (1 ) re-written with
13^
appropriate letter subscripts. It does not follow because, of course, 
current transfers and interest-generating loan transactions taken place 
between the three spending agencies in sector 1.
If we wish to take account of these intra-public authorities 
transactions, the definitions of saving for each spending agency will 
be as follows:
Sa “ (Hq + h a  + h a 5 " (Ca + Za + Q'(2,3)a + X'la + ^'la5
Sb B H^b + h b  + hb^ " ^Cb + Zb + ^ h b  + I'lb + ^'lb^ ^
So S (Rc + h o  + he> - (Co + Zc + «'2o + Iho + «hc> (6)
In these definitions 1  ^ and. indicate receipts of interest and
transfers from other agencies in sector 1, and If^  and indicate
payments of interest and transfers to other agencies in sector 1.
Since, as a mere matter of accounting,
h a  + h b  + h e  " Ih a  + Ih b  + I'lo 
and, Qla + + <Jlo a + Q'lb + Q'1c (8)
it can readily be seen that definitions (4) - (6) are consistent with 
definitions (1) and (3).
Now if, for each separate spending agency, its payments of interest 
and transfers to other public authorities equalled its receipts of this 
kind from them, it would make no difference to the amount of its saving 
whether it were estimated with definitions like (4) - (6) or with a 
simpler definition of the form
Sx S h  “ <°* + h  + ^'(2,3)X>
But the whole purpose of intra-public authority loans and transfers, 
both in federations, like India, and in more centralized forms of 
government, is to shift resources to lower levels of government which
135
tend to have expenditure responsibilities markedly in excess of their 
revenue-raising capabilities. That purpose would be defeated if each 
spending agency received back in transfers and loan interest from the 
others exactly what it paid out to them. Instead, one would expect 
fiscal devolution to work roughly as follows:
= Jlc = 0 (9)
“la = <*'lc -
0 (10)
I,la - Iflb Ilb = I’lc 0 (11)
Q 1-,la “ Qlb Q'lb = Qlc 0 (12)
^Lb I«x lb (13)
Qlc 111 lc (1*0
With these weak behavioural assumptions, it could easily be shown that 
the use of definitions (*+) - (6) will give higher values for the saving 
of state governments and local authorities than the use of definition 
(la).
We are now in a position to consider the concept of saving by type 
of government spending agency that is used by the Indian Central 
Statistical Organization. When the first estimates of saving by spending 
agency for the period I960-I to 1969-70 were published in November, 1973* 
the concept used was that of definitions (*+) - (6) - or what can be 
called, for brevity, the post-devolution concept of saving. This can 
be stated with confidence not because the concept is explained in the 
relevant notes, but because the published estimates can be reconciled 
with estimates made from C.S.O. detailed working sheets, on the basis 
of equations (*t) - (6),
The post-devolution concept of saving yields the spending agency
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breakdown set out in Table 7.2, with absolute amounts in current 
prices given in crores of rupees. The percentage shares of each 
spending agency are given in Table 7.3. The picture presented there
Table 7.2 : Public Authorities1 Saving (post-devolution concept) at 
current Prices, 1960-61 to 1969-70
(Rs crores)
60-I 6l-2 62-3 63-** 6**-5 63-6 66-7 67-8 68-9 69-70
Public
authorities' 
total saving 298 366 *LQ8 515 598 5**2 **08 360 5**3 625.
of which,
a by central 
government 89 211 170 207 271 297 **9 (->65 92 190
b by state 
governments 13** 60 131 195 191 136 2** 9 310 322 325
c by local 
authorities 75 95 107 111 136 109 110 115 129 111
Source %: C.S.O., Estimates of National Product, Saving and Capital 
Formation. 1960-61 - 1971-72. Table 9» p.10.
Table 7.3 : Percentage Contributions to Public Authorities' Saving 
(post-devolution concept), 1960-61 to 1969-70
(Percentages)
60-I 61-2 62-3 63-** 6**-5 63-6 66-7 67-8 68-9 69-70





government 30 58 **2 **0 **5 55 12
CO✓—\ l 17 30
state
governments **5 16 32 38 32 25 61 86 59 52
local
authorities 25 26 26 22 23 20 27 32 2** 18
Source : calculated from Table 7.2 above.
shows (i) that local authorities contributed about one-quarter of public
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authority saving, apart from two exceptional years, and (ii) that, of 
the remaining three-quarters, the central government contributed most 
during the Third Plan while the state governments contributed most in 
the last five years of the decade. Thus, in the second five years, 
not only did the central government allow public authorities' capital 
formation to become increasingly decentralized, it allowed public 
authorities' saving (after allowing for fiscal devolution) to become 
more decentralized also.
However, there is a further complication which must be noted.
When the C.S.O. reissued figures for savings by public authorities in 
January, 1975» IE originally simply re-printed the figures given in 
Table 7-2 above. But before the document was published, a new and 
completely different breakdown was pasted in over the top, without any 
explanatory note on why the change had been made or on the basis on 
which the new breakdown had been arrived at. This new breakdown was 
subsequently incorporated in the document National Account Statistics, 
1960-61 - 1973-7^ issued in February, 197& and in National Accounts 
Statistics. I960/6I to 197V75 issued in October, 1976, again without 
a single word of explanation about the reason for the change or its 
conceptual basis. Evidently there had been some internal dispute, probably 
between the C.S.O. and the Reserve Bank of India, about the conceptual 
issues involved, and the C.S.O. has been forced to alter its practice.
But no indication of what these issues are has been permitted to reach 
the public - even the scholarly public.
The "new breakdown11 of public saving (including for the first time 
the saving of the non-departmental enterprises) is reproduced in Table 7.**» 
and the percentage shares derived therefrom are given in Table 7*5. A 
comparison of these figures with those previously given suggests certain 
conclusions about the nature of the new breakdown. First, the saving 
of the non-departmental enterprises can be effectively disregarded, since
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Table 7*4 : Net Saving of Public Sector ("New Breakdown11) at 
Current Prices, 1960-61 to 1969-70
Rs crores)
60-I 6l-2 62-3 63-4 64-3 63-6 66-7 67-8 68-9 69-70
Net saving of
A Public
authorities 298 366 4 08 313 398 542 4o8 360 543 626
of which
£ central 
government 113 236 202 242 311 376 148 59 196 338
ii state
governments 121 49 117 177 173 97 190 217 231 221
iii local
authorities 64 81 89 94 111 69 70 84 96 6 7 ,
B Non-
departmental
enterprises 11 (-)3 . 26 13 30 (-)l (-)5 (-)21 19
Total 309 363 4o8 339 611 392 407 355 522 643
Source : C.S.O., National Accounts Statistics, 1960-61 - 1973-74,
Table 22 , p.50.
Table 7*5 : Percentage Contributions to Net Public Sector 
("New Breakdown"), I96O-6I to 1969-70
• Saving
(Percentage





government 37 63 50 43 51 64 36 17 38 52
state
governments 39 13 29 33 29 16 47 61 48 34
local
authorities 21 22 22 17 18 12 17 24 18 10
non-de par tmental 
enterprises 4 (-)l 5 2 8 (-)l (-)4 3
Note : Columns do not necessarily sum to 100 due to rounding 
Source : calculated from Table 7*4 above*
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in the whole decade it amounted to only 89 crores of rupees. Second, 
since the saving totals for public authorities remain virtually 
unchanged in the new breakdown, it is clear that the basic data has not 
been revised; it has merely been reclassified with a new definition of 
"saving" for each spending agency. Third, if the basic data remains 
that which appears on the original C.S.O. working sheets, we can be sure 
that the new definition is not that of equation (la), i.e. with intra­
public authority interest and transfer payments and receipts totally 
excluded. It must be a compromise definition, with the saving of 
each spending agency being calculated after certain methods of fiscal 
devolution are taken into account, but before certain other methods of 
devolution are allowed for. But it does not seem possible to infer 
directly from the original working sheets precisely which intra-public 
authority transactions are included and which excluded. Fourth, the 
effect of the new definition is easy to see. Whereas in the Third 
Plan period it raises the central government's share of public authority 
saving by abcout 8 percentage points, taken roughly equally from the 
shares of the state governments and the local authorities, in the 
following five years it raises the centre's share by between 15 and jk  
percentage points, taking approximately twice as much from the state 
governments' as from the local authorities' share. In other words, the 
excluded type (or types) of transactions become quantitatively more 
significant as the decade proceeds, and their exclusion has the effect 
of re-attributing a relatively larger segment of saving to the central 
government. Finally, because we are unable to infer precisely what 
the definition behind the unew breakdown" is, it is impossible to 
discuss properly its conceptual validity. It cannot be assumed that 
the change is a cosmetic one, designed to give the centre more credit 
for saving than is its due; but nor can it be assumed that it represents 
a definite conceptual improvement. When we come later to a disaggregated 
study of state government saving, the post-devolution definition of
1A0
saving is used. It may or may not be the most appropriate definition, 
but at least one can be quite sure what the figures actually mean.
However, when looking at state government saving in aggregate, 
it is interesting to note that, even if the "new breakdown” is taken 
to be the most appropriate one, it does not overturn all the conclusions 
derived from the post-devolution definition of saving. It remains 
true that, comparing the Third Plan period with the following five 
years, the centre's contribution to public authority saving fell - from 
50.6 to ^5.0 per cent, while the share either of state governments 
alone or state governments and local authorities taken together rose.
The process of gradual centralization of saving within the Third Plan 
period, followed by gradual decentralization thereafter does disappear 
if the "new breakdown11 figures are accepted. The year-to-year changes 
become larger and more erratic.
It is now possible to go on to explore how the different changes 
in the centralization of public capital formation and public saving 
combined to affect the ability of each type of spending agency to 
finance its own capital formation by its own saving. Given below are 
alternative presentations. Variant A,in Table 7*6, uses the post­
devolution definition of saving, while variant B, in Table 7*7, uses 
the "new breakdown" saving data.
It is evident in these figures that, whichever definition of 
saving is used, the ability of local authorities to save was being 
progressively outstripped by their capital programme. But the choice 
of definition is crucial for assessing the success of both central and 
state governments in matching saving with capital formation. For 
in variant A, the central government's achievement in this respect is 
shown (with the exception of 1967-8) to be roughly constant through 
the decade, while the state governments' performance is shown as 
improving. By contrast, variant B shows the state governments'
l4l
Table 7*6 : Shares of Gross Capital Formation financed by own 
Saving (Variant A), 1960-61 to 1969-70
(Percentages)
60-1 61-2 62-3 63-4 64-5 63-6 66-7 67-8 68-9 69-70
a Central
government 28 66 37 38 42 60 .11 0 36 48
b State
governments 38 18 34 31 43 23 30 50 50 48
c Local
authorities 100/ H O 100/ 0 0 100/ 63 76 60 73 6a
d Non-
departmental
enterprises 2 0 0 4 2 5 0 0 0 2
e Public sector 27 31 28 32 32 27 19 13 ah 29
Note :/During the Third Plan, saving of local authorities exceeded their 
gross capital formation by annual amounts of 8, 18, 6, 2 and 10 
crores of rupees at current prices.
Source : calculated from data in C.S.O., National Accounts Statistics. 
I960-6I - 1973-74, Table 22, pp,30-l and Table above.
Table 7.7 i Shares of Gross Capital Formation financed by own 




60-I 61-2 62-3 63-4 64-5 65-6 66-7 67-8 68-9 69-70 
35 74 44 44 49 75 32 13 76 85
b State
governments 34 13 30 46 39 16 38 35 38 33
c Local
authorities 96 100/ 88 86 88 4l 49 44 54 38
d Non-
departmental
enterprises 2 0 0 4 2 5 0 0 0 2
e Public sector 27 31 28 32 32 27 19 15 24 29
Note : /In 1961-62, saving of local authorities exceeded their gross 
capital formation by 4 crores of rupees at current prices.
Source : calculated from data in C.S.O., National Accounts Statistics. 
1960-61 - 1973-74, Table 22, pp.50-1.
achievement as roughly constant, and that of the central government 
(again excepting I967-8) to be improving. Without knowing the precise
I b 2
meaning of the Variant B figures, it is impossible to draw firm 
conclusions about comparative saving efforts of the central and state 
governments.
However, one conclusion is possible on the basis of Variant A 
figures taken by themselves. We know from the Reserve Bank's analyses 
of state government budgets that, between 1965-6 and 1969-70, the methods 
of fiscal devolution were changing in relative importance. In 
particular, the various arrangements for sharing the proceeds of 
centrally-levied taxes were providing a growing proportion of central 
government assistance to the states, while the importance of central 
loans (net of repayments of past loans) was declining. This change
in method of devolution swells the saving of state government, on 
Variant A definitions, because it involves a substitution of current 
for capital transfers. It' may simply be this change that produced 
the state government's improved ability to finance its own capital 
formation apparent in the Variant A figures. It may also be that the 
secret of the "new breakdown" of public authority savings lies in a 
re-allocation of some elements of the transferred taxes, perhaps those 
central excises whose assignment in part to the states is at the centre's 
discretion. Instead of counting as tax revenues of the state 
governments they may be counted as tax revenues of the centre, with a 
consistent adjustment for taxes levied by state governments and 
distributed to local authorities. If this guess is correct, then it 
is clear that we have entered very thorny ground. In'deciding which 
level of government should be credited with the revenue of transferred 
taxes, legal and constitutional arguments can come into conflict with 
practical arguments' in particular cases. For example, the proceeds 
of the Central Sales Tax belong, under Article 269 of the Constitution,
1 Toye (1973), p.265.
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to the states, and yet the tax is actually levied, for reasons of
sound administration, by the central government, which thus determines
how much revenue the tax shall yield. Thus to follow the
pragmatic rule, that the authority whose policy controls the tax yield
should be credited with revenue does create an allocation which makes
2
no sense from a legal point of view. At the same time, it seems 
the only sensible rule as long as the objective is to arrange statistics 
in such a way that they are relevant to the assessment of policy.
If the "new breakdown” is indeed an attempt to follow this rule more 
closely, then it follows that Variant B figures are superior, and the 
central government can be commended for not allowing its contribution 
to public saving to fall as drastically as its contribution to public 
capital formation. We must rest with this hypothetical judgement until 
the Central Statistical Organisation makes public the conventions 
underlying the "new breakdown".
If enquiry is made for the reasons why public authorities saved 
what they did, it is not really possible to advance explanations such 
as have been offered previously for the rapid cutback on central 
government capital formation. This is because it is highly doubtful 
that public saving is seen by any level of government as a policy target, 
even indirectly, as in the way that a concern to start up (and less 
powerfully, to complete) big projects makes capital formation a policy 
target. It was shox^n at the start of this study that, at the time the 
Fourth Plan was being prepared, the officially articulated view of 
the policy of state accumulation (including the role therein of public 
saving) veered towards confusion and vagueness. It is reasonable 
to suggest that official practice was even more confused, and that 
public saving was a residual, not merely in terms of formal categories
1 Chatterji (1971), pp.62-3.
2 Toye (1973), p.27^.
but in terms of the motivations of those who shaped fiscal policies.
The information that would he needed to make a given level of 
public saving a policy target was available for the central government 
only; but, even for the centre, it is stretching the imagination to 
believe that it was seiflously attended to at budget-making discussions. 
Sectoral sources of finance must have been a minor concern compared 
with the overall budgetary deficit (misleadingly taken as an indicator 
of government-induced inflation) and even the sise of the overall 
deficit was not always attended to very strictly in setting the 
combination of expenditures and instruments of finance. The increase 
of public saving never became the focus of year-to-year budgeting; 
it always remained the last resort of planners squaring the circle for 
the next unfeasible plan, As for the allocation between spending 
agencies of what public saving emerged, that was determined ultimately 
by the allocation of tax bases and spending functions and the poorly 
coordinated and inflexible system of fiscal devolution, as well as the 
parsimony and tax effort of the different levels of government.
III. Inter-State Differences in Growth of Public Capital Formation
Throughout the decade the gross capital formation of the state 
governments and local authorities taken together grew in money and in 
real terms. There were two setbacks,in 1961-2 and 1966-7, but, 
viewed overall, it was a decade of reasonably steady growth. However, 
as has been shown in the previous chapter, total public expenditure, 
adjusted for price changes and population growth, grew at significantly 
different rates in different states (again clubbing together the 
spending of the state government proper and the local authorities 
within its boundary). The inter-state differences in total 
expenditure growth create a presumption that states (in the extended 
use of the term) contributed to the overall growth of capital formation 
in the state and local authority sector in different degrees. The
1A5
task, then, is to explore whether the statistical data hears out this
presumption, and, if so, to test plausible explanations of inter-state
differences in the growth of public capital formation*
Hypotheses about the growth of public capital formation in the
current literature are very sketchy, and suffer from two weaknesses
that lessen their usefulness in the present context. They are
framed to give an account of developments in the very long run, rather
than changes occurring within a mere decade. In addition, they are
not free from European bias, because they assume that certain European
political norms will in fact be adhered to. The underlying idea is
that public capital formation will constitute a relatively larger part
of (a) the government budget, (b) total capital formation and (c) gross
national expenditure in the T,early stages" of economic development,
will decline relatively in the "middle stages" and may increase again
relatively (depending on specific technical, institutional and
1
productivity influences) in the "later stages".
This hypothesis does not appear to have been tested rigorously, 
even for advanced capitalist countries for which long-period historical
p
data are available. Perhaps the most exhaustive econometric
investigation of expenditure determinants of recent times focusses
3exclusively on public consumption expenditure. For India, the most
exhaustive recent analysis of public expenditures lumps capital outlay
in with that amorphous category, social and developmental expenditure,
and relies on the conventional Indian definition of capital outlay,
if
rather than capital formation in the national accounting sense. But, 
although the hypothesis cannot be said to have survived after rigorous
1 Musgrave (1969), pp.75-8; Bird (1970), p.1^ 2; Burkehead and Miner 
(1971), pp.305-6.
2 Musgrave (1969), pp.91-12^*
5 Pryor (1968).
if Reddy (1972), pp.ll^-l6, 216-19.
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testing it retains a certain intuitive appeal as the most plausible 
of possible explanations of changes in public capital formation. If 
this hypothesis were true, one would expect that the rate of growth 
of public capital formation would always be less than the growth 
rate of state income, state government expenditure and total capital 
formation. This is consistent with the idea that public capital 
formation acts as a catalyst for economic growth which is fuelled 
increasingly by private investment. Since, as explained at the 
beginning of Chapter Five, the distribution of central government 
capital formation by state is not known, it is only possible to test 
the hypothesis with data for public capital formation at the state 
level only.
An alternative hypothesis which might also be tested is that the 
economic composition of state government budgets (as between capital 
formation and other items) tends to remain constant, because of 
bureaucratic inertia, or conservative expenditure control practices 
such as incremental budgeting.
Before either of these theories can be confronted with evidence, 
it is necessary to establish precisely what growth rates of state 
public capital formation are to be used. The basic data source is 
again the C.S.O. working sheets used in the compilation of the public 
authorities elements in the national accounts. As in the previous 
statewise analysis of total public expenditure, the operations of local 
authorities within each state boundary are not distinguished from the 
operations of the state government itself, for the reason already 
given. In order to club the two sorts of operations together in 
this way, a slightly arbitrary allocation procedure had to be used to 
distribute total local authorities gross fixed, capital formation 
between the states for the years I96O-I to 1964-5, The capital 
formation for which we give statewise growth rates is indeed gross
Ik 7
fixed capital formation. It is the sum of the gross fixed capital 
formation of the administrative departments of state governments and 
local authorities plus the capital o u t l a y  and the renewals and 
replacements expenditure of their departmental enterprises. Our 
figures thus take no account of the accumulation or decumulation of 
stocks of raw materials and finished products, nor the purchase and 
sale of secondhand assets, nor capital grants given to other sectors 
of the economy for the purpose of capital formation. The reason 
for ignoring stock changes is their considerable year-to-year variation 
in response to short-run circumstances. Net purchase of assets is not 
relevant because it reflects shifts in ownership of assets already 
in existence. Capital transfers for capital formation are ignored 
because they are negligible in size.
Since the rate of price inflation during the decade was different 
in different states, an inter-state comparison of growth rates of 
capital formation requires that due allowance first be made for 
geographically differentiated inflation. Unfortunately, there is 
no very .sophisticated way to make this allowance. Ideally, capital 
formation should be disaggregated by broad type of asset (e.g. 
construction, machinery and equipment) and a separate and appropriate 
price deflator applied to each element. But while such indices exist 
for all-India, they are certainly not publicly available in a state- 
by-state breakdown, and probably are based on too fex*? points of 
observation for it to be possible in principle to extract from them 
a sound statewise breakdown. It is therefore necessary to fall back 
on the much less satisfactory procedure of adjusting the gross fixed 
capital formation figures by the px-ice deflators that are implicit 
in the estimates of state income. The weakness of this procedure 
(apart fx-om the inherent unreliability of some of the state income 
estimates themselves) is obvious. We know that the inter-sectoral
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terms of trade shifted in the relevant period in favour of agriculture. 
Therefore the use of general deflators (reflecting changes in both 
industrial and agricultural prices) will "over-deflate" gross fixed 
capital formation figures at current prices, so that the estimated growth 
rates will be too low for all states. In addition, given that the 
relative importance of the agriciiltural sector varies between states, 
the "over-deflation** will be worse for states with a large agricultural 
sector, thus distorting the inter-state comparison of growth rates.
In this case, it is at least possible to state the direction of the 
bias. The states are ranked by degree of "over-deflation" in the 
final column of Table 7.8. The existence of this bias simply has to
Table 7.8 : Share of Agriculture in State Domestic Product, 1964-65
Rs crores at current prices)
State Total Net Agriculture (2) as Degree
Domestic and Animal percentage "over-
Product Husbandry of (1) deflatj
Sectors - rank
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TJttar Pradesk 2985 1899 63.6 1
Punjab and Haryana 1141 715 62.7 2
Rajasthan 795 486 61.1 3
Jammu and Kashmir 127 66 60.0 4
Assam 580 541 58.7 5
Andhra Pradesh 1690 975 57.7 6
Madhya Pradesh 1320 752 57.0 7
Orissa 658 367 55.8 8
Mysore 1075 569 52.9 9
Bihar 1505 781 51.9 10
Kerala 725 • 558 49.4 11
Gujarat 1189 568 47.8 12
Tamil Nadu: 1552 638 41.1 13
West Bengal 1916 700 36.5 14
Maharashtra 2277 829 36.4 15
Total 19555 10044 51.4
Note : To derive the degree of "over-deflation1* directly from the
of agriculture in state domestic product relies on the assumption 
that the movement of the inter-sectoral terms of trade was uniform 
throughout India. This assumption may not be strictly correct.
Source : Report of the finance Commission, 1969, Table 4, p.127.
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be borne in mind when interpreting the meaning of the growth rates 
estimated with a general deflator. It will not be possible to do 
better than this until the states compile, on a uniform methodology, 
price indices for each major sectoral component of state domestic 
product, as has been recently recommended. Even the adoption of
this improvement will leave the researcher without the statevjise and 
asset-type price indices which, ideally, is the information he needs.
Having deflated the annual figures for gross fixed capital 
formation by states (albeit in a biassed way), a time trend was fitted 
to the data by the method of ordinary least squares, and an annual 
compound growth rate estimated from the initial and final trend values. 
The growth rate of gross fixed capital formation for each state, 
deflated in the manner described, is set out in Table 7*9- These
Table 7.9 : Deflated Growth Rates of Gross Fixed Capital Formation
by State, 19^0-61 to 1969-70
State Annual compound Rank
growth rate of 
deflated G.F.C.F,
(percentages)____
1 Andhra Pradesh (~)0.3 8
2 Assam 4,9 2
3 Bihar (-)1.4 13
A Gujarat 4,4 3
3- Jammu and Kashmir 2.3 4
6 Kerala (-)O.l 7
7 Madhya Pradesh (-)2,1 l4
8 Maharashtra 6.6 1
9 Mysore (-)0.7 10
10 Orissa (-)0.6 9
11 Punjab and Haryana (»)4.8 15
12 Rajasthan (-)1.4 12
13 Tamil Nadu 0.7 6
14 TFttar Pradesh (-)1.2 11
15 'West Bengal 1.2 5
Source : calculated from unpublished C.S.O. working sheets.
1 Committee on Regional Accounts (1974), pp.31, 4-9, 67.
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figures must be read with care, because of the weakness of the 
deflation procedure. All are likely to be somewhat too low, so that 
the large number of states shown to have negative growth rates is 
misleading, Kerala, Andhra, Orissa and Mysore ought possibly to be 
shown with some positive, but small, growth; while the rate of 
contraction for Punjab and Harayana, Madhya Pradesh, U.P. and Rajasthan 
ought to be significantly reduced. But, even after having made these 
kinds of mental adjustments, one could suggest that the areas where 
public capital formation at the state level grew fastest were the more 
developed industrial areas - Maharashtra, Gujarat and West Bengal and - 
to a lesser extent - Tamil Nadu and relatively underdeveloped border 
areas of strategic significance such as Assam and Jammu and Kashmir, 
Before testing the two hypotheses on the growth of public capital 
formation with which this discussion began, it must be decided whether 
the ranking of growth rates given in Table 7*9 is to be allowed to 
stand, or whether, given the different degrees of ’’over-deflation'1 
embodied in that ranking, it would be preferable to re-order some of 
the states. The problem here is the lack of an objective criterion 
according to which a revised ranking might be carried out. Since we 
do not know the quantitative effect of over-deflation on the estimated 
growth rates, only one procedure is justifiable, namely that, where 
two states have clearly similar growth rates, but widely differing 
degrees of over-deflation (as indicated in Table 7*8), the more over­
deflated should be ranked above the less over-deflated. As a comparison 
Tables 7.9 ^nd 7*$ shows, this situation does not in fact arise. Where 
two states have very similar growth rates, their respective degrees of 
over-deflation do not differ very much either. Thus, although the 
ranking of states by growth rates may not be reliable, there is no 
reliable way of making them more so. Thus, logically, they must be 
allowed to stand as they are.
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We can now proceed to test, as far as this is possible, the two 
competing hypotheses on influences on public capital formation, 
beginning with the favoured theory that it declines in relative import­
ance as development takes pilace. It is a handicap here that 
indicators of relative development over time of the different states 
are not available, with the result that the tests must be done in two 
stages.
Some data is available on comparative levels of overall development
of the states in I96I. It is derived from the I96I Census, and makes
use of 35 separate indicators for each district combined to form an
unweighted development index. The states are then ranked by the
percentage of their 1961 population living in districts which, according
to the constructed index, are above the average level of development.
Obviously there must be deficiencies in such an index arising from poor
quality of some of the initial districtwise data, quite apart from the
arbitrariness of giving each of 35 indicators equal weight in the 
1
combined index. However, since this is the mosft thorough exercize
available, it must be pressed into service. It is then possible to 
compare levels of development in 1961 with (a) the share of public 
capital formation in total public expenditure for I96O-I and 
(b) the share of public capital formation in state domestic product 
for 196o~l. The relevant figures are given in Table 7.10, and the 
coefficients of rank correlation are given in Table 7.11.
The correlation coefficients show that there is a tendency for 
less developed states in I96O-I to devote a higher percentage of both 
their total domestic product and total public expenditure to public 
capital formation. However, the coefficients are not significant 
at the 0.05 confidence level, and thus, if this confidence level
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as % of pub. 
exp.
1 Andhra Pradesh 7 4,o4 4o.o6 33.5
2 Assam 8 3.2 28.97 26.0
3 Bihar 3 2.8 29.93 28.5
4 Gujarat 13 4,1 39.86 32.7
5 Jammu and Kashmir 2 11.2 30 38.2
6 Kerala 14 2,52 23 20.5
7 Madhya Pradesh 4 2,48 28 22.9
8 Maharashtra 11 2.9 29.98 29.7
9 Mysore 10 6.0 48 38.8
10 Orissa 1 4.8 42,79 37.3
11 Punjab and Haryana 12 3.97 41,5 29.4
12 Rajasthan 6 4.98 43.1 31.3
13 Tamil Nadu 15 2.3 25 22.5
14 Uttar Pradesh 5 2.0 31 2 6.6
15 West Bengal 9 2.25 27 23.3
Note : * "Development rank" is derived as explained in the text,
but the ranking sequence runs from least to most developed.
Sources : Col.(A), from Rudolph and. Rudolph (1969), p.lo43.
Cols (B) - (D), from C.S.O. unpublished data.
Table 7,11 : Rank Correlation Coefficients for Variables in Table 7.10
Rank Correlation.,
Variables Coefficient (r )*
1 (A) with (B) + 0.24
2 (A) with (C) + 0.42
3 (A) with (D) + 0.37
Note : * The rank correlation coefficient is given by the formula
1 b (aL&i^)r = 1 -   ^---  , where d is the difference in rank
n (n - 1) for each observation, and n is the
number of observations. The
significance test at the 0.03 confidence level is given by
1.96r <"* - — ■— “—  , which with 15 observations means
r 2 : ± 0.5a
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is accepted as our decision rule, the hypothesis must be rejected
because we cannot be sufficiently sure that the observed association
is not a result of chance influences. These negative findings do
not, of course, exclude the possibility that in less developed states
a significantly higher proportion of total capital formation is done
by public authorities. This variation of the hypothesis cannot be
put to the test as long as statewise breakdowns of total capital
1
formation remain to be undertaken. As sometimes happens, the most 
intuitively appealing variant of the hypothesis is the hardest one to 
test. It remains a promising line for future enquiry.
The hypothesis that public capital formation declines in relative 
importance as development occurs is clearly a hypothesis about a 
process. Thus, while cross-section tests such as the foregoing may 
be useful as indirect auxiliary evidence, what is essentially required 
is a test with time-series data. Only such a test can directly 
address the question whether a rapid rate of development is, in 
general, associated with a relatively rapid decline in the two ratios 
on which we have evidence - namely, the ratio of public capital 
formation to state domestic product, and of public capital formation 
to total state public expenditure.
Since rates of development, measured even with the degree of 
sophistication embodied in the estimates of 1961 levels of development 
which we have already used, are unobtainable, it is necessary to use, 
as a proxy for them, rates of growth of state domestic product at 
constant prices. It is not a very satisfactory proxy, and 
furthermore, the figures themselves are unreliable in important ways 
previously mentioned. Their use is only justified on familiar faute 
de mieux grounds. To measure the change in the ratio of public 
capital formation to state domestic product (GFCF/SDP) and of public
1 Committee on Regional Accounts (197*0, P«13.
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Table 7.12 : Indicators of Income Growth and Changes in GFCF/SDP and 
GFCF/Public Expenditure Ratios by States, 1960-70
(E)
Growth rate 












s pe nd ing gr ow t h 
rate
(Rank) (Percentages) (Percentag
1 Andhra Pradesh 12 ** 1.98 (8) 2.3 (12)
2 Assam 3 + 0.59 (13) 1.5 (13)
3 Bihar l4 + 0.1? (12) - 3.1 (10)
4 Gujarat 9 + I.60 (14) - 0.7 (14)
3 Jammu and Kashmir 7 - 0.99 (10) - 5.5 (3)
6 Kerala 6 — 3.32 (4) ■— 5.2 (4)
7 Madhya Pradesh 13 0.13 (11) - 4.1 (7)
8 Maharashtra 10 + 4.08 (15) - 0.7 (15)
9 Mysore 1 - 3.30 (2) — 4.0 (8 )
10 Orissa 13 - 2.11 (7) - 4.6 (5)
11 Punjab and Haryana 2 - 9.33 (1) - 6.0 (2 )
12 Rajasthan - 5.13 (3) - 6.1 (1)
13 Tamil Nadu 3 2.31 (6) — 4.4 (6 )
14 Uttar Pradesh 11 3.04 (5) — 3.5 (9)
1)5 West Bengal 8 - 1.75 (9) - 2.9 (11)
Sources : Growth rates of state domestic product, and SDP per head, 
at I96O-61 prices were calculated from data provided by 
State Statistical Bureaux and collated by the C.S.O. in a 
mimeo, dated December, 1971*
Growth rates of gross fixed capital formation are those 
that appear above in Table 7.9*
at 1960-61 prices 
The bracketed figures are statewise rankings.
Growth rates of state public expenditure 
are those that appear in Table 6.2.
capital formation to total state public expenditure (GFCF/SPE), the 
difference is taken between the GFCF grovjth rate and the SDP growth 
rate for the former, and between the GFCF growth rate and the SPE 
growth rate for the latter. The reasoning here is that if GFCF grows 
more slowly than SDP, or SPE, the GFCF/SDP or GFCF/SPE ratios will 
be declining, and the larger the difference between the two growth 
rates, the larger will the decline in the ratios be. The growth 
rate differences are given in Table 7.12, columns (F) and (G), and 
these can then be correlated with the rate of development proxy
155
variables given in column (E). The rank correlation coefficients 
are given in Table 7.13.
Table 7.15 : Rank Correlation Coefficients for Variables in Table 7.12
Variables r^
1 (E) with (F) + 0.^8
2 (E) with (G) + 0.30
The positive sign of the coefficients indicates that the 
relationship is of the kind which the hypothesis predicts: that
is to say, it is indeed the case that a faster rate of development 
(as measured by the proxy) is accompanied by a greater shrinkage in 
the relative importance of public capital formation as measured by 
the GFCF/SDP and GFCF/SPE ratios. However, neither coefficient is 
significant at the 0.05 confidence level, althoiigh result 1 comes 
very close to being statistically significant.
Prom inspection of our calculated growth rates of capital formation, 
it appeared that the main thrust of public capital formation at the 
state level occurred in two distinct contexts, support to private 
capital and the building up of infrastructure in militarily sensitive 
border areas. The hypothesis under test is logically related to the 
former context. One would expect that the test results could be 
improved by excluding the observations for those two states (Assam and 
Jammu and Kashmir) where a quite different motive for public capital 
formation is thought to operate. If those two states are excluded, 
both correlation coefficients do improve, but not to the same extent.
The coefficient for the association between development rate and fall 
in the GFCF/SDP ratio rises to + 0.66, This is significant at the 
0,05 confidence level, which, with thirteen observations, equals
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+ 0.565. On the other hand, the coefficient relating development 
to the fall in the GFCF/SPE ratio rises only to + 0.38, which remains 
insignificant,
The conclusions to be drawn from this exercise are:
(a) that, provided the militarily sensitive border areas are 
omitted from consideration, the hypothesis that, with development, 
a declining share of state domestic product is channelled to public 
capital formation is not refuted;
(b) that the theory that, with development, the share of public 
capital formation in total state public expenditure also falls has 
to be rejected at the chosen confidence level. This means that, 
as yet, we have no satisfactory explanation of the composition
of state public expenditure between capital and current elements;
(c) that a variant of the hypothesis that might seek to relate the 
share of public to total capital formation and the progress of 
development cannot be tested until a statewise breakdown of total 
capital formation becomes available.
Following 011 from (b) above, it may be asked whether the question 
of economic budget composition can be resolved by using the second major 
hypothesis that was put forward earlier. That hypothesis suggested 
that the economic composition of public spending remained constant as 
spending grew, because of bureaucratic inertia. Intuitively, this 
is a rather far-fetched hypothesis, since it seems to require the use 
of some historical capital-current balance as a rule of thumb in 
budget-making. The point has already been sufficiently laboured that 
there is still in India at the state level inadequate knowledge of the 
economic classification of public spending. Further, from a factual 
point of view, it is evident from inspection of column (G) in Table 7.12, 
that the capital-current balance did not remain constant in the period
1960-70. On the contrary, without a single exception, the share of
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capital formation in state’s spending declined, The size of the 
share was also different in different states, ranging from 20 per cent 
in Kerala to 59 per cent in Mysore, on the basis of ten-year average 
figures, and a hypothesis framed in terms of conventional historic 
norms effectively side-steps the problem of explaining these 
differences in the level of the capital-current balance.
In order to come to grips with these difficulties, it is necessary 
to open up a new line of theorizing. It begins from the notion of 
nthe degree of government activity”. To this rather vague notion, 
some initial clarity may be given by indicating what it does not imply. 
It does not necessarily imply a preference for government activity among 
legislators or voters, since that preference may be strongest, and most 
strongly expressed by elections and legislative votes, precisely in 
those states where the degree of government activity is relatively low. 
It does not necessarily imply sound or effective government, since a 
relatively inactive government may be able to operate more rationally 
and purposefully precisely because the scope of its ambition is more 
narrowly limited. The degree of government activity is a concept of 
how much a government tries to do, whether willed by its citizens or 
not, and regardless of how well or badly it actually does iijhat it 
attempts.
Capital formation is never the first priority of a governmant.
Its priority functions, justice, police, revenue and arms, make their 
financial demands on current expenditure, and the capital services they 
require can, at a pinch, be provided by the existing stock of building 
and equipment in governmant ownership. It follows from this that one 
would expect the capital-current balance in public expenditure to be an 
increasing function of the degree of government activity. The exact 
shape of the function is of no consequence, provided that it is upward- 
sloping in the relevant .range. The major problem in making this
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theory operational is the absence of a unit by which the degree of 
government activity can be measured.
In order to put this theory to the test, it is proposed to take, 
as a proxy for the degree of government activity, the ratio of state 
public expenditure to state domestic product. As is well known, 
this ratio is something of a bastard statistic, since public 
expenditure includes transfer payments while domestic product excludes 
them. It therefore gives only an imperfect measure of the size of 
the public sector. Even so, for comparative purposes, it seems 
reasonable to suggest that more active governments will have a higher 
SPE/SDP ratio than less active governments, and that is the only 
assumption which needs to be valid in this context.
Table 7.14 : Indicators of Government Activity and the Share of Capital 













11 Punjab and Haryana
12 Rajasthan
13 Tamil Nadu
14 Uttar Pradesh 
13 West Bengal
Sources : Figures for total state public expenditure (SPE) and gross 
fixed capital formation by public authorities (GFCF), both 
at current prices, are taken from C.S.O., unpublished data. 
Figures for state domestic product (SDP) for 1960-61 are 
taken from Finance Commission, Report. 1969, Table 4, p.127. 
Figures for SDP in I969-7O are those calculated by State 











(per cent) (per cent) (per cent)
GFCF/SPE
1969-70
10 • 1 4o.l 12.0 25.9
10.9 29.0 15.0 27
9.3 29.9 10.6 21
10.2 39.9 14.8 34
22.5 30 30.9 33
10.9 23 14.7 17.3
8.7 28 7.8 17.4
9.8 30.0 13.1 26.2
12.5 48 13.9 32
11.2 42,8 16.7 22
9.6 41.5 7.1 25.5
11.6 43.1 18.3 23
9.0 25 10.1 20
6 .4 31 6.8 23
8.it 27 11.7 19
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Table 7*15 : Hank Correlation Coefficients for Variables in Table 7.1^
i
Variables r
1 (H) with ( J )  + 0.63
2 (K) with (L) + O.hO
3 (H) with (K) + 0.88
b ( J )  with (L) + 0.66
Results 1 and 2 in Table 7«15 seem to be consistent with the 
hypothesized relationship. But only result 1, for 1960-61, is 
significant at the 0,05 confidence level. How much weight can be 
placed on the apparently satisfactory result for 1960-61? It might 
be objected that the two variables under consideration are not 
independent of each other, since the ratios SPE/SDP and GFCF/SPE both 
contain the common element, SPE. To this objection it can be conceded 
that the observed correlation may not result from co-variation of 
mutually distinct behavioural variables, as should be the case when 
regression analysis is used to test for functional dependence. However, 
the presence of a common element in both ratios does not imply that 
either the hypothesis is tautological, or that the observed correlation 
of the ratios is spurious and a statistical artifact. Variations in 
SPE can arise either from the GFCF element or from the element of state 
spending which does not result in capital formation. It is possible 
that the marginal growth of SPE comes mainly from the non-GFCF element.
If this were indeed the ca.se, it would produce an inverse relationship
1
between the SPE/SDP ratio and the GFCF/SPE ratio. A  positive r , as 
in result 1 and 2 , shows that, while logically possible, this case was 
not the Indian experience. Whilst these results are perhaps not very 
surprising, they are neither meaningless nor contrived. That the 
positive correlation became i^ eaker between I96O-6I and 1969-70 indicates 
that restraint on the growth of capital formation after the Third Plan
l6o
operated rather arbitrarily* Some states (Assam, Gujarat) were 
affected hardly at all, while others (Orissa, Rajasthan) were seriously 
affected, and the severity of restraint had no evident connection with 
the existing extent of state governmental activity. Results 3 and 4 
above show that the weakening of the correlation owes much more to 
changes in GFCF/SPE ratios, than to changes in SPE/SDP ratios.
The main conclusions of the foregoing examination of capital 
formation by state governments may now be summed up. The Indian 
experience is broadly consistent with the theory that the share of 
an economy’s resources devoted to public capital formation declines 
as development takes place. Having said that, one would want to go 
on to criticize the rather abstract and positivistic formulation of the 
proposition. In particular, it should be made clear that development, 
in this context, refers to the irregular and unbalanced growth which 
tends to occur as capitalism penetrates underdeveloped mixed economies. 
The evidence presented should not be taken as a reinforcement of an 
abstract universal proposition, perhaps even with normative overtones.
On the contrary, it merely isolates one characteristic of a specific 
historical and institutional complex, with no normative implications 
at all. The historical and institutional concreteness is underlined 
by the fact that the proposition needs to be qualified to give special 
recognition to the role of public capital formation in underdeveloped, 
but militarily sensitive, areas of the country. This serves as a 
reminder of the ambiguous response to capitalist penetration - a 
synthesis of reception and resistance - which '‘developing" mixed 
economies display.
Since the level of development is not significantly correlated with 
the economic composition of the state government budget, and nor is 
economic composition of the budget a conventional constant, alternative 
explanations were sought. On a cross-section basis, it could be shown
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that budget composition was related to the degree of government activity 
in the state economy, lending support to the notion of capital 
formation as a "superior good" in state government budget-making.
Absence of data, however, makes it impossible at the moment to follow 
the desirable procedure of conducting a further test on a time-series 
basis, Obviously such a test is required. The weakening of the 
cross-section relationship, between I96O-6I and 1969-70 suggests 
that different cross-section and time-series determinants may be at 
work. On the other hand, it may merely indicate the hasty and ill- 
planned nature of restraints on public investments in the late 1960s.
IV. iStatewise Comparison, of Public Capital Formation and Public Saving 
Finally, it may be instructive to enquire whether, at the state 
level, the availability of public saving acts as a constraint on the 
amount of capital formation that is undertaken. At the all-India 
level, total domestic capital formation cannot exceed the sura of total 
domestic saving plus net capital inflow, but public saving can, and 
indeed did, fall as a proportion of public capital formation. This 
happened as a static rate of capital formation was combined in the 
late 1960s with increasing diversion of the saving of other sectors 
to public sector use. In the state government segment of the public 
sector, state governments as a group did not falter in the share of 
their capital formation financed by their own saving, and may (depending 
on the definition of 'saving* to be used) even have raised that share. 
This contrast between the state government segment and the public 
sector as a whole suggests that the state governments may have 
particularly restricted opportunities for diverting non-public sector 
saving to their use, and that they are therefore particularly constrained 
to finance formation of capital by their own saving (including therein
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either all or some of the transfers received from other segments 
of the public sector).
The notion of a public saving constraint on state government 
capital formation is inconsistent, in theory, •with the determinants 
which have fitted our data best up to this point. If the growth 
of state government spending is related to variables like growth of 
income per head and urbanization, and if the division of state 
government spending between capital and current items is related to 
its relative importance in the state economy, or the 1 degree of 
government activity’, changes in the level of capital spending are 
thereby determined. The introduction of an exogenous financial 
constraint, stemming from state revenue effort and the intricacies 
of transfers between public authorities, would leave the original 
simple model over-determined. Thus, one would be inclined to expect 
no relationship between the growth of capital formation and public 
saving at the level of the individual state government.
How well-founded is this expectation? As the lengthy discussion 
of alternative estimates of public saving in a previous section will 
have indicated, the answer to this question cannot be entirely 
straightforward. Without knowing which definition of public saving 
has, since 1975» been used in official publications, saving estimates 
using "new breakdown” definitions cannot be made for individual state 
governments. However, from the pre-1975 working sheets which form 
the empirical basis of this work, the saving of individual state 
governments (and local authorities within state boundaries) are known 
on the "post-devolution” basis, i.e. including all intra-public sector 
transfer payments as a new expenditure, and similar receipts as 
revenue, before calculating saving by subtraction. These figures 
of ”post-devolution” saving have then been deflated for each state, 
using the same implicit deflators as were used for the statewise
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capital formation series. Inspection of the deflated saving figures 
showed that they exhibited much greater year-to-year volatility (including 
13 out of 150 negative values). When observations do not cluster 
around a trend line, the calculation of such a line by the method of 
least squares can be heavily influenced by a few extremely eccentric 
values. The growth rates of deflated "post-devolution" savings over 
the years I96O-I to 1969-70, as shown in Table 7*16, cannot therefore 
be regarded as very reliable.
Table 7.16 : Growth Hates of Deflated "Post-Devolution" Saving by 




1 Andhra Pradesh - 4.2
2 Assam - 6.8
3 Bihar - 3.3
k Gujarat + 3,5
5 Jammu and Kashmir +•12.9 *
6 Kerala + 1*5
7 Madhya Pradesh +13.5
8 Maharashtra - 0.7
9 Mysore +13.9
10 Orissa + 8.8
11 Punjab and Haryana +10.7
12 Rajasthan * *
13 Tamil Nadu + 4.6
14 Uttar Pradesh + 5.2
15 West Bengal - 6.3
Notes : * refers to period I96I-62 to 1968-69 to avoid extreme values
** growth rate cannot be calculated because of some negative
values.
Source : calculated from unpublished C.S.O. data.
We can now compare the saving growth rates shown in column (M) - 
with the deflated GFCF growth rates previously set out in Table 7.9. 
Even allowing that the former contain relatively large margins of error, 
it does not seem unreasonable to assert that there is no relationship 
between the two variables. Orissa, Mysore, Madhya Pradesh and Punjab
iS h
and Haryana show high rates of saving growth with low rates of 
capital formation growth* Maharashtra, Assam and West Bengal had
low saving growth and high capital formation growth. The remaining 
eight of the fifteen states exhibit a closer correspondence of the two 
rates of growth. But even at its closest, this correspondence 
leaves a gap of one percentage point between the two rates (Gujarat).
On the whole, then, the statistical evidence points to a random 
association between saving and capital formation. Thus growth of 
the former seems to be neither a necessary, nor a sufficient, condition 
for growth of the latter. This result is consistent iijith the
previous results noted in this work on the determinants of public 
spending and capital formation at the level of the states.
PART THREE : CONCLUSIONS
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CHAPTER EIGHT
THE INDIAN STATE ACCUMULATION 
POLICY IN RETROSPECT
The empirical core of this work has been a detailed examination 
of the development of public spending at the all-India and at the state 
level. What remains to be done is to connect some of the empirical 
results with the broader themes of mimetic nationalism and state 
accumulation which were explored in the two opening chapters.
It is proposed to examine the connections in three stages of 
argument. The first considers the constraints which mimetic nationalism 
imposes on the process of state accumulation, and suggests what 
additional conditions would have to be satisfied before a state 
accumulation policy could operate successfully within those constraints. 
The second considers the desiderata, purely x^ithin the sphere of the 
public finances, of a successful state accumulation policy against the 
background of the actual state of the Indian public finances. The 
third examines briefly the prospects for improved control over public 
expenditure in the present state of Indian federalism.
I. Mimetic Nationalism and State Accumulation
There is no necessary connection between mimetic nationalism and 
state accumulation. The former is quite compatible with private 
accumulation, and the latter could be brought about in advanced capitalist 
nations on whom the pressures that £>roduce mimetic nationalism do not 
bear. The link between mimetic nationalism and state accumulation 
is historical contingency.
The state accumulation policy was discussed in Chapter One in the
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abstract. The suggested rule of accumulation, maximizing reinvestible 
surplus in the hands of the state, subject to unspecified feasibility 
contraints, is, again, a purely abstract norm. Any concrete realization 
of the policy, however, would have its own historic context which must 
involve departures, in one direction or another, from the clarity and 
simplicity of its abstract form.
In India, in the last thirty years, the historical context which 
has shaped, or distorted, the attempt to realize the policy of state 
accumulation has been that of mimetic nationalism. As the late 
Professor Harry Johnson wrote, in a passage from which we have already 
quoted briefly,
the promotion of economic development by deliberate economic 
policy has throughout modern history been associated with the 
political objective of building a nation-state .... The nationalist 
objective, with its overtones of possible military conflict, 
provides the motivation for bearing the costs of establishing a 
"modern11 national economy and polity .... On the other hand, 
nationalist motivations inevitably lead to economic policies 
that waste economic resources and inhibit the economic develop­
ment they aim to stimulate. 1
Mimetic nationalism sets as the overriding policy goal the acquisition
of desirable types of "modern" property, such as heavy armaments,
industrial factories, public utility systems similar to those of
advanced nations and so on. Johnson suggested that such a goal
was set as a result of an intellectual mistake or misconception of
the true nature of development, which involves the raising of income
rather than the accumulation of property. Other liberal economists
join him when they point out that "there is rather seldom any very
good reason for making (relative or complete) self-sufficiency in
2
particular goods a policy objective". This is surely true within 
the logic of utilitarianism. Whether it is equally true in the
1 Johnson (1967), p.67.
2 Little and Mirrlees (1968), p.4?.
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context of the statecraft forced on an ex-colony by the actual 
international environment of the present day is a much wider, and more 
debatable, question. However, the aim here is not to assay the 
rationality of the objective? it is merely to trace through the 
consequences of its pursuit by successive Indian governments.
The desire to minimize the period before which India acquired 
a comprehensive 'modern' structure of production led the government to 
modify the state accumulation policy in two major ways that are not 
characteristic of the policy in its abstract form. The first 
modification was a pro-industry bias in the allocation of investment.
The second was the adoption of a foreign trade regime which encouraged 
indiscriminate import substitution. It is worth stressing that 
neither of these modifications is inherent in the state accumulation 
policy as such. Maximizing the reinvestible surplus subject to 
feasibility constraints is an accumulation rule which disregards 
entirely the sectoral location of an investment project. It attends 
only to the project's production of reinvestible funds. Similarly, 
it is possible, in principle, to use international prices extensively 
in the appraisal of state investment projects which produce tradable 
goods, with a view to investing only in producing output that would be 
exportable in a free international market. But the Indian 
government, motivated by mimetic nationalism, in fact followed neither 
of these courses.
It is a truism of development planning that one of the most 
common constraints on the overall rate of economic growth is an 
agricultural growth rate which it is very difficult to raise above a 
long run trend of about 3 per cent a year. With such a constraint, 
development can only be balanced if the overall growth rate is somewhere 
in the range of k-)r - per cent. The Indian Second Plan, with 
its 3 year target of 23%, growth, and the Third Plan with its target
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of 30% - and both without any careful annual phasing of investment - 
were attempts to make the economy grow faster than the agricultural 
constraint would permit without imbalances. The consequent imbalances 
are price inflation of the wage good which typically originates in 
the institutionally backward agricultural sector (food), falling real 
wages in the organized sector, an increasingly unequal income 
distribution, internal terms of trade which increasingly favour 
agriculture, and a stimulus to the consumption and production of non- 
essential consumer goods. In the Indian economy of the 1960s, each
one of these imbalances can be observed,
2
(1) The wholesale price of food articles doubled in the decade.
(2) By 1969-70, real wages in the organized sector show a slight
3
decline. Thereafter the decline became more substantial - 
partly owing to the price rise of imported oil, but not wholly 
so.
(3) Several major studies attest the worsening income distribution. 
( k ) The purchasing power over agricultural commodities of sellers
of manufactures fell by more than a quarter, as can be seen 
from Table 8,1.
(9) The exceptionally rapid growth of consumer goods for high-
5
income classes has also been established.
The combination of all these different types of evidence certainly 
makes it plausible to suggest that the growth of India*s industrial 
and services sector was ’'too fast" in relation to the realized growth 
of agriculture. (This statement does not, of course, imply that 
actual growth has been too fast in relation to other criteria, such
1 Lewis (1966), pp.^3-^; ICalecki (1972), pp. 150-*f.
2 Simha (197*0 j p.367, Table 20, Column (B).
3 Ministry of Labour (1972), p.6l, Table 4.8*
4 E.g. Swamy (1967); Dandekar and Hath (1971), p.26 and passim; 
Mukherjee and Chatterjee (I967), pp.1239-68.
5 Malenbaum (1971), pp.129-30.
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Table 8.1 : Price Indices Implicit in National Income Estimates
Year Price Index Price Index Price Index Col.(3)
N.D.P. at factor cost Agricultural Manufacturing -r Col.(2)
Output Outputs
CD (2) (3) (*0
1960-61 100 100 100 100
1961-62 102 102 100 98
1962-63 106 107 102 95
1963-6^ 113 121 109 90
196^-63 126 136 112 82
1963-66 137 15** 119 77
1966-67 157 188 127 67
1967-68 170 202 133 65
1968-69 167 193 135 69
1969-70 173 197 I**** 73
Source : Derived from C.S.O,, Estimates of National Product 1960/61 - 
1969/70, Table 3.1.
as need, or the unrealised growth potential of agriculture).
For the state accumulation policy, the agricultural constraint 
poses a long-term problem. It should be clear that such a policy 
cannot be operated with '’excessive" industrial growth indefinitely.
Even if a government succeeds in keeping its own demand for industrial 
goods at a high and increasing level, sooner or later one of the 
three direct braking mechanisms from the supply side will take effect, 
as discussed in Chapter h . If balanced growth is not planned ex 
ante, it will tend to be realized ex post, either by supply constraints 
on .industrial growth or by the inducement of growth-promoting investment 
in agricultural projects. Balanced growth reached by the first route 
will be slow and wasteful of resources. This was, in a nutshell, 
the history of Indian growth in the 1960s. Balanced growth reached 
by the second route would have been faster and would have led to a 
generalized scarcity of resources. Our Kaleckian analytical framework 
emphasizes that agriculture is not the exclusive constraint on the 
success of a policy of state accumulation. State accumulation can 
take place in its presence if the problem of public saving is solved,
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although the rate of accumulation will necessarily be slow. If
the constraint is lifted, state accumulation can still be frustrated
if the problem of public saving is never solved.
The second major modification ivihich was made in India, under the
pressure of mimetic nationalism to our abstract characterization of a
state accumulation policy was to use indiscriminate import-substitution
as the forcing house for the excessive industrial growth. High and
extensive tariff walls mean that, in the long run, industrial demand
is limited by the size of the domestic market with the prevailing
distribution of income. However, there seems no reason to dissent
from the Indian planners’ view that "the argument that India has
reached the limit with regard to import substituting industrialization,
does not appear to be valid".^ As late as 1966, as much as two-thirds
2
of India’s capital goods requirements were still being imported.
The capital goods crisis of the late 1960s cannot, then, be regarded
as the nemesis of ’inwards-1ooking' industrialization in the ordinary
sense. In the short-run, however, indiscriminate import
substitution, short-sightedly designed to maximize direct savings of
foreign exchange, introduced an additional rigidity into the environment
in which the state accumulation policy had to be operated. Protection
stifficient to prohibit imports was granted to any product previously
imported for which domestic production capability could be demonstrated,
with the result that new domestic industries suffered from costs high
3enough to exclude them from international markets.
Consequently, if, long before the long-term demand constraint 
begins to bite, domestic investment demand for any reason flags, the 
excess supply of capital goods cannot be switched to foreign outlets.
1 Planning Commission (197*0, p.17.
2 Medhora (1972), p.1326.
3 Bhagwati and Desai (1970), p. ; Nagyar (I976), pp.3^7-50.
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Levels of capacity utilization instead fall, and with them the 
industrial growth rate. Indiscriminate import substitution 
eliminates potential export i>roceeds from the capital goods sector, 
which, had they existed, could finance extra consumer goods imports.
Thus a shift in domestic expenditure towards consumption cannot leave
X
the previously planned pattern of domestic output undisturbed. This 
rigidity was originally claimed as a virtue of the chosen complex of 
economic policies. The phrase attribiited to Mahalanobis that "people 
cannot eat steel" implies no wish to use foreign trade transformation 
to enable them to do so.
The only way to relax this rigidity is for the government to 
offer incentives to capital goods exporters. But it is very difficult 
to create incentives that work in a form which does not involve either 
additional public expenditure or the foregoing of tax revenue, and 
thus a reduction in the level of public saving.
A 'pure1 or unmodified state accumulation policy is by no stretch 
of the imagination an easy policy to initiate and persist with. But 
the state accumulation policy moulded by the pressures of mimetic 
nationalism was not so much difficult as totally impossible in the 
Indian political economy of the 1950s and 1960s. What it amounted to 
was the pursuit by the luckless Indian planners not only of a policy 
of state accumulation, but of one that would generate a predetermined 
structure of production, i.e. a comprehensive ’modern’ structure, while 
effectively ruling out foreign trade as a method of reconciling domestic 
production with domestic consumption and investment. To succeed in 
that task, and, at the same time, to avoid creating gross imabalances 
between the goods supplied and the goods demanded in the domestic 
economy, it is necessary, as a mere matter of logic, that domestic
1 Ezelcial (1971), p.ll83.
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demand be so controlled that the planned volume and pattern of
production, and not any other, is in fact always purchased. However
much social democrats and Fabians would like to believe otherwise,
the Indian government was simply not in a position to exercise the
required degree of control over the level and composition of demand,
because it was unable to control the volume or structure of money
incomes generated by the state industrialization drive.^
It has been said that the owl of Minerva flies at night, and,
in India, several nights after that. The validity of what is argued
above has had belated official recognition in the following passage:
If the development process is not to generate disproportionalities 
of various sorts, the needed changes in the structure of demand 
and production must harmonise. If ... the pattern of output 
capacity is changed in favour of investment goods but there is 
no corresponding change in the structure of gross national 
expenditure in favour of investment outlays, the economy could 
experience underutilization of capacity in the industries 
producing investment goods and strong inflationary pressure 
in respect of consumer goods sectors. It was this 
disproportionality that lay at the root of the phenomenon of 
so-called stagflation - stagnation in some sectors and inflation 
in others - that characterized the greater part of the period 
of Plan holiday in the mid-sixties. 2
Official recognition of this not very esoteric point remains, however,
inadequate. The suggestion that the disproportionality correctly
identified did not appear before the Plan Holiday, and ended with it,
is not, as has been shown, consistent with the facts. The
identification of the appropriate remedy as "selective and effective
curbs on private consumption" seems to overlook entirely the role of
public consumption in producing the disproportionality.
Nonetheless, in its limited way, this is a significant admission that
the instruments normally relied on to curb private sector consumption,
and guide it into appropriate channels (namely taxes and subsidies) do
1 Bagchi.(1971), p.1673.
2 Planning Commission (197*0 » pp.11-12.
3 Ibid. (197*0» p.12, emphasis added.
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not prove effective, for a variety of political and administrative
reasons. This ineffectiveness would continue to frustrate a state
accumulation policy, even given balanced agriculture-industry growth,
as long as domestic industry remains internationally uncompetitive.
In these circumstances, state accumulation still could not be self-
sustaining; it would produce only an episode of growth, as did
Colbertism in seventeenth century France,
But, as has just been suggested, inability to control private
consumption is by no means the whole story of the government’s failure
to manage demand. Formally, at least, the balance of supply and
demand in the capital goods sector is much more within the government’s
area of control than it is in the consumer goods sector. In 1965*
the public sector was probably producing at least one-third of the
output of the capital goods industries (bearing in mind how difficult
the public/private comparisons are vjhen public output is administratively
under-priced); while the public sector share in their paid-up capital
almost certainly exceeded 50 per cent.'*" On the demand side, ’’the
bulk of development outlay in those sectors which are substantial
2users of investment goods comes out of government expenditure1’. Yet 
it has been shown that it was in the capital goods sector that the 
industrial recession was most pronounced. It was severest in those 
industries, such as railway equipment, where, for all practical 
purposes, the government is a monopsonist. Thus, in assessing the 
causes of India’s poor economic performance in the second half of the 
1960s, the temptation to exaggerate the catastrophic effects of the 
mid-1960s harvest failures should be avoided. The industrial 
recession of the late 1960s onwards was primarily a crisis of the 
capital goods industries, the bulk of which were of very recent origin.
1 Sitararaaswami (1968), pp^!2-l4; Shirokov (1973), pp.1^ - 5. 
Z Ohaudhuri (1971), p.85,
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They had been largely established by the state in the initial phase 
of the industrialization strategy and their profitability largely 
dex>ended on the maintenance of a high level of demand by the public 
sector itself. Yet, public sector demand in total, and the most 
relevant components of that demand, can be shown to be decelerating 
during the Third Plan period, that is, well before the harvest failures 
struck.
II. State Accumulation and Public Expenditure
Although it is probably true that failures in public finance 
policy have been overshadowed by larger macroeconomic inhibitions to 
rapid economic growth in India, it remains important to document them 
for two reasons. On the one hand, it is important to be clear why the 
modest potential for successful state accumulation was far from fully 
realised. On the other hand, it is necessary to establish which 
existing trends in public finance would have to be reversed if rapid 
economic growth in the near future were to become a real possibility, 
and if it were desired to try and avoid the visual social and economic 
consequences of a burgeoning private capitalism.
The elements of the problem of financing a state accumulation 
policy are simple enough. The government can expect to have 
difficulty raising the marginal saving rate in the private sector, so 
that rapid expansion of public (and so total) investment depends on 
finding ways of -filling a rapidly increasing saving gap. In India, 
household savings as a share of G.N.P. are estimated to have risen 
from 6-J/7-J* per cent to only 9 per cent, over the fifteen years up to 
I965* Private corporate saving still makes a very small
contribution to the total, despite recent rapid growth. The saving
1 Raj (1970), p. 29 .^
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gap can be filled by domestic public saving, net capital inflows from 
abroad on government account or large scale deficit finance (i.e. money 
creation not covered either by revenues or borrowings from the private 
sector).'*'
But vie have seen that the programme of domestic public saving
has, for a whole variety of different reasons, fallen markedly below
v ih a t is required for any sensible and consistent plan, official or 
2
unofficial. This failure was less important during the period
1958-6^ when net foreign capital inflows on government account
increased very considerably. Alas, that increase itself was
necessarily a transient phenomenon, given that t.he bulk of the inflows
were in the form of loans. To maintain an increasing inflow of net
loan naid", even if it could have been secured from the various
"donors" consortia, would have forced a request for debt cancellation
3much sooner than the eventual date of December, 1973.
It could be argued that a financial constraint on a state
accumulation policy need never' operate, since whatever the shortfall
of public saving and net foreign capital inflows, it can always be
filled by means of deficit finance. Price stability - at least for
essential commodities - is normally assumed, or recommended, to be one
k
of the objectives of fiscal policy for development. Deficit
finance, in an economy where specific bottlenecks produced "structural 
inflation" of the type that has been described, does not have a simple, 
calculable impact on the general level of prices. But, 011 the other
hand, this in 110 way implies that limitless deficit finance can be 
undertaken without producing some severe inflationary consequences.
1 Cutt (1969), PP-*M, 383.
2 E.g. Planning Commission (197&), P.^2; cf, .Swarny (1971), pp.118-19.
3 Bauer (197*0, pp.**9-50,
^ E.g. ICalecki (1972), p. 1*0; Cutt (1969), pp.66-73.
3 Myrdal (I968), pp.1923-32.
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In India, some of the normal reasons for avoiding these consequences 
are irrelevant: international economic competitiveness is not an
important objective, and the balance of payments is subject to extensive 
quantitative controls. The potentially damaging consequences of 
severe inflation is a domestic one - the political effects of a rapid 
redistribution of real income, away from landless labourers, poor 
farmers, the urban under-employed and those in the modern sectors 
whose money wages and salaries are sticky upwards. It is true that 
the Indian government had since the Second Plan undertaken markedly more 
in the way of inflationary deficit finance than both the planners and 
their critics considered prudent. However, one cannot infer from this 
that it would have been indifferent, in the then existing political 
framework, to the much greater deviation from prudence that would have 
been required to continue a state accumulation policy with both public 
saving and net foreign capital inflows levelling off. It may well be 
that the most affected groups would have been precisely those on whom 
Congress relies marginally more than other parties for support. In 
addition, the whole drive for a domestic consensus would have been 
threatened by a widespread and drastic change of this sort.
Of course it is always possible for the public sector to dis-save, 
and finance part of its current expenditure with part of the saving 
of the domestic household and enterprise sectors. This leaves a 
financing problem. Additional taxation will have to be raised to 
service a greater volume of debt at higher interest rates than those 
currently prevailing. Further the very soliition of this financing 
problem will worsen the income distribution, since it requires transfers, 
presumably found by additional commodity taxation, to those with the 
capacity to save, who are the relatively well-off. Thus this is not 
a path which could be recommended, although it may be the one which 
India actually follows.
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Tlrus, if the state accumulation policy is to be revived, some 
solution to India’s budgetary problems will have to be found. It 
seems very doubtful that those weaknesses that have to be highlighted 
on the revenue side (in agricultural taxation and public enterprise 
surplus) can be remedied by the sort of measures that the government 
is prepared to execute. Nor can it be assumed that the staple 
revenue producers of the past, the various types of commodity taxation, 
will be as productive of additional revenue in the future. The 
coverage of excises in the last ten years has been greatly extended, 
and the most recently taxed items have been the poorest revenue 
producers. The rates, although extremely diverse, are in many cases 
quite high on an ad valorem basis. Increasing the revenue from sales 
taxation requires the active cooperation of the state governments, as 
would any proposal to replace sales taxes with a value added tax.
A major part of the solution to her current budgetary impasse
1must be restraint in the growth of current government expenditure.
It must be recognized, however, that the design of a sensible policy
of government current expenditure control is far from being the
straightforward matter it is often represented to be. It is
perfectly true, for example, that the public authorities expanded the
number on their payroll very much faster than did the organized part
of the private sector in the 1960s, as is shown in Table 8.2. But
it will not do to characterize this as "the reckless expansion of the
bureaucracy" and to define all public authorities’ employees as
2
•'Unproductive workers". This is no doubt an important element in 
the growth of current expenditure. But to mistake it for the only 
element is to imply that a drastic curb on all forms of public authority 
employment is a sufficient remedy. On the contrary, the essence of
1 Edwards (1969), p.l6.
2 Cf. Jha (1973).
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Table 8.2 : Employment in the
1961-71
Public and Organized Private S<
1961* 1966* 1971 ‘
1 Public Sector 7*1 9.^ 10.7
a Central Government 2.1 2.6 2.8
b State Government 3.0 3.7 k . 2
c Local bodies 1.2 1.7 1.9
Sub-total 6.3 8.0 8.9
d Other public sector 0.8 1.3 1*9
2 Private Organized Sector + 5.0 6,8 6.7
Notes : * Figures relate to the position at the end of March in each 
year.
+ These figures exaggerate the increase in private organized 
sector employment, because from I966 coverage was widened 
to include establishments employing 10 - 2k vjorkers, 
whereas in previous years the cut-off point was 25 workers.
Source : G.O.I., Economic Survey, 1971-72, pp.105-6.
the problem is selection*. The need is to attack those types of 
current expenditure which do not raise the productivity of labour in 
the commodity production sector, either in the present or in the future. 
After all, government emploj^ees include not a negligible proportion of 
teachers and doctors. The purchase of their services can, in part, 
be regarded correctly as "productive*1 consumption. They create a flow 
of future benefits, and, in greater measure, contribute to the present 
productivity of labour in the commodity producing sector.
There is little indication that the Indian government is tackling 
seriously the task of planning and, much more vitally, controlling 
public expenditure. The planners continue to provide detailed 
estimates of Centre and States non-Plan revenue expenditure for the 
five years ahead which are arithmetically consistent with the total 
required Plan outlay and its anticipated sources of finance. But the
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method used to arrive at the estimates is not disclosed, except to note 
that the public expenditure variables are given exogenously and not 
endogenously by the planning model. Because there is no year-by-year 
breakdown, the estimated growth rate cannot be compared with the 
experience of the immediate past. The separation of non-Plan and Plan 
revenue expenditure, the latter being given no sectoral breakdown, 
compounds the difficulty of making such a comparison. This makes it 
almost impossible to test the feasibility, as distinct from the 
consistency, of the estimates. Previous plans have regularly turned 
out to be not feasible.
As is rightly noted in the Approach to the Fifth Plan, 197^-9*
"in the past, major efforts at resource mobilization were often largely 
neutralised by unanticipated increases in non-developmental outlays"
and, in the future, "the order of public saving envisaged calls for ...
1a high degree of fiscal discipline". It is necessary, therefore,
to ask what new political and administrative machinery has been devised 
to ensure this fiscal discipline, and the "rigorous restraints on 
inessential ... public consumption" which are called for. One may 
search the Chapter of the Approach Document devoted to "implementation" 
in vain for any mention of this as a task of implementation, despite 
the stern warning that "any complacency can lead to a serious 
inflationary situation". Yet some system of coordinated administrative 
control over expenditure is obviously needed. The need arises to 
ensure that the Plan estimates of non-Plan revenue expenditure are not 
exceeded in aggregate, if all the other targets and assumptions of the 
Plan are being fulfilled. But since that condition is most unlikely 
to be met, given the incorrigible over-optimism of the planners and 
the shocks that unexpected events can give to the most realistic plan,
1 Planning Commission (1973)* p#27.
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the need also arises to ensure that, if overall growth is slower, 
new and lower estimates of non-Plan revenue expenditure can he decided 
upon and adhered to. India simply does not seem to possess, or be 
willing or able to devise, any political and administrative machinery 
which would make possible the coordinated and flexible management of 
public expenditure. One high official in the Expenditure Department 
of the Ministry of Finance indicated that expenditure decisions in 
India were reached by achieving ’’understandings at the highest possible 
level”. In other words, where public expenditure decisions are 
concerned, India has experienced not government by Cabinet, but 
government by courtiers. She has suffered from the age-old vices 
of courtly control of financial decisions - short-sightedness, 
incoherence and amateurism.
sadly, one must emphasize that there is no simple professional 
expenditure control technique, whose adoption will quickly set matters 
right. Such techniques are, of course, well known in India, and their 
transposition from the developed countries where they originate, with 
the minimum delay, is one feature of the modernism characteristic of 
mimetic nationalism. In Appendix A the diffusion of the technique 
of economic/functional classification of public spending has been 
analysed in detail. In that case it was impossible not to remark 
the gulf which existed between the formal adoption of the technique 
and its integration with the process by which expenditure decisions 
actually get taken.
Another germane example is the technique of programme and 
performance budgeting. In 1968, the Administrative Reforms Commission 
advised, and the government accepted, the immediate introduction of 
this budgeting technique for departments at central and state level 
responsible for development projects. By 1970, a rash of the required 
documents had issued forth. As far as one can tell, the rationality
l8l
1of the "budget process has improved, as a result, hardly at all.
In any case, such a measure does nothing to prevent the swelling of 
non-development spending.
Since disillusion with programme and performance budgeting has 
grown in advanced countries so quickly after its formal adoption in 
India, no doubt the disillusion will soon be imported too. Let us 
hop® that, if it is, the disillusion will become a radical disillusion. 
No expenditure control technique nworks,f in the sense that, if wound 
and opened, a musical box works by playing a pretty tune. It is 
too mechanistic even to think of them as tools that have to be worked. 
They are less tools, than rules that are invented and imposed in the 
course of some specific historical conflict, such as the conflict 
between civilian politicians and bureaucrats on one side, and the 
chiefs of the armed forces on the other, for control over US and UK 
military decision-making in the 1950s and early 1960s.
The conflicts within the Congress Party leadership at the end of 
the 1960s did produce attempts to concentrate and centralize political 
control. These steps expanded the size, and tightened the line of 
command, of federal police and paramilitary forces. They reflect 
the decay rather than the growth of institutions of governmental 
d e c isi on-making.
Even the further upheavals in India in the mid-1970s were not of
a character to strengthen control over public spending - rather the 
3
reverse. On the other hand, the Emergency years of 1975-7 marked
the culmination of- a government campaign to break the power of organized 
labour, particularly in the public sector. Draconian anti-labour 
measures did have a marked effect on the economic performance of the
1 Cf. United Nations (1975), P#l6.
2 Cf. Caiden and Wildavsky (197^), pp.159-65 and Premchand (I969),
pp.26-8.
3 Toye (1977), p.312.
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public sector enterprises. Their output and level of capacity 
utilization increased sharply, and so did their financial surpluses 
and the rate of return on their assets. ** If this improvement in the 
profits of public enterprises were to be sustained, the prospects 
for the success of the state accumulation policy in India would 
obviously be improved also, unless the addition to the surplus in 
government hands were at the same time offset by laxer public 
expenditure control or more generous tax concessions. The fact that 
the Congress Party, at the twilight of its uninterrupted rule in India, 
chose to attach the obstacles to state accumulation by repressing the 
public sector labour force, rather than by improving its own public 
expenditure control or its taxation performance is an eloquent 
reminder that,
... while squeezing out imperial capital, the state capitalists 
share with imperial capital an interest in maximizing 
exploitation of the labour force; the slogans and goals include 
maintaining production, labour discipline and popular 
demobilization •••• The initial poly-class euphoria and mass 
appeals which accompany the initial period during which the 
state capitalists come to power and foreclose the imperial 
option is ... followed by repressive measures against the trade 
unions and autonomous working class mobilization. 2
III. Public Expenditure Control and the States
The fiscal problem of the Indian state governments is normally 
understood to be one of excessive and increasing "dependency" on the 
central government for financial assistance, as a result of inadequate 
tax bases and a crushing burden of debt. Such an understanding may 
have had some relevance to changes which took place in the 1950s.
But for the period between i960 and 1970 it is completely misleading.
All the major adjustments of federal fiscal relations made the financial
1 Toye (1977), p.510.
2 Petras (1977), pp.13, 1^.
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position of state governments more comfortable and independent.
The percentage of the state governments' total revenue plus net
capital receipts contributed in various forms by the central
government rose from Al to kZ percent between I96O-I and 1969-70.
The composition of central assistance shifted away from the more onerous
form (repayable loans) to less onerous forms, such as transferred taxes
X
and grants-in-aid. Successive Finance Commissions have raised the
states' share of central income tax from 50 to 75 pe** cent, and
increased the absolute size of the divisible pool of excise revenues
2by bringing more and more excises into the distributable pool. At 
the end of the decade, the use of Article 282 grants by the central 
government to promote the adoption by state governments of centrally- 
sponsored plan schemes was restricted, and the bulk of central grant- 
aid was fixed for an entire five-year plan period in relation to 
population (60 per cent of the total), income per head (10 per cent),
3tax effort (10 per cent) and large project commitments (10 per cent).
In the 1960s, the fiscal problem of the state governments centred 
on the increasing independence of state governments from the central 
control over public expenditure. When, after the National Development 
Council meetings of July and September, 1968, it was agreed to limit 
severely the use of Article 282 grants to promote specific plan 
projects in the states, the central government's sole instrument 
(.apart from ineffective moral.suasion) for influencing the composition 
of state plans was blunted. The size of the state plans henceforth 
depended on their block grants plus their own ability to mobilize 
resources. The composition of state plans now depended entirely on 
the state government, paying as much or as little heed to the advice
1 Toye (1973), pp.26^-5.
2 Eapen (1970), p.5^1*
3 Chatterji (I971), pp.97-8.
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and wishes of the central government that it cared to.
It should further be borne in mind that, while there are lengthy
centre-state consultations on the contents of state plans, there is
hardly any centre-state consultations 011 the state governments’ annual
estimates, which are the operational documents for the sanctioning of
much (but not all) plan expenditure by -the states. Further, there
is not machinery at the national level for the scrutiny of, and joint
centre-state deliberations on, non-Plan expenditure of the state 
1governments. Thus, from the viewpoint of the central planners,
through the 1960s the public expenditure of the state governments
became increasingly like a Juggernaut’s car.
It was easy for state governments to depart from the level and
pattern of outlay in their state plans. Until 1968, it was very
difficult for the central government to reconcile the figures that
appeared in the state budgets with those that appeared in its own
budget, because the development heads in the two budgets were quite 
2different. Even when these departures from plan could be traced 
by the central government and the plan grant withdrawn, its loss could
be made good by a miscellaneous development loan, or, until 1972, by
3
an unauthorized overdraft at the Reserve Bank of India. Nothing in
the long process of Uentre-state consultation, negotiation and 
bargaining gave the centre control over the outcome of state plans.
If one compares public expenditure control in a federation with 
that in a centralized state, one would expect central influence over 
lower-level authorities’ expenditure to be both absolutely weaker in 
the former, and of a kind less suited to bringing about changes in the 
short run. Therefore, the burden of adjustment, to what the central 
government considers to be the public expenditure requirements of the 
economic conjuncture, would tend to fall much more heavily in a 
federation on the expenditure of the central government itself. This
1 Eapen (1970), p.555.
2 A.R.C. (1968b), pp.28-9.
5 Hanson (1968), p.27; Griffiths (I969).
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seems to be true of India's experience in the 1960s. State 
government spending was less flexible in terms of its rate of growth 
and pattern of composition, than that of the central government.
The greater flexibility of central spending was what produced the short­
term changes in the centralization ratio noted in Chapter Five for 
public expenditure as a whole, and in Chapter Seven for capital formation. 
One is brought up against the possibility that, if the central 
government cannot control state government spending, and if it is 
forced frequently enough to treat its own capital budget as the residual 
in macroeconomic adjustment, the consequence will be a ratchet-like 
decentralization of public authorities’ capital formation, and perhaps 
even of public expenditure. There are many in India who would consider 
that possibility as something to hope for, either out of respect for 
a Constitution which, strangely, makes no provision for planning; or 
from powerful regional loyalties; or from the backwoodsman's sentiment 
that the-only good government is hardly any government at all. Two 
inconvenient facts should be brought to their attention. One is that 
between i960 and 1970 the share of state government expenditure devoted 
to developmental uses declined from 62 to 59 pe1" cent. The second 
is that, in the same period, expenditure priorities switched away from
agricultural and industrial infrastructure and towards health and
1education spending. Both of these tendencies are detrimental to
a policy of state accumulation of industrial property and skills 
(except where education spending is for relevant technical education).
The Resolution establishing the Indian Planning Commission noted 
that "the States will give the fullest measure of help to the 
Commission so as to secure the maximum coordination of policy and 
unity of effort". It quickly became clear that this was merely a 
pious hope. Any federal system is a politically conservative system, 
because "the sharing of responsibility and authority for governmental
1 Toye (1973), pp.267-9.
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programmes is inherently ponderous” In highly particularistic
societies, even a well-contrived federal regime might, as Shils puts
it, ”be recalcitrant to the idea of a strong state, such as is thought
2necessary for an energetic programme of modernization”. The political
and administrative assumption underlying the state accumulation policy
was voiced by Nehru when he told the National Development Council
in 195^ that "planning was cent per cent centralization and nothing 
■3
else”. But, the reality was different. As one of Nehru’s Finance 
Ministers acknowledged, "political arrangements are such as to make 
central ministers very much dependent on the goodwill of local party 
leaders so that__/ many decisions are not taken /_ so m u c h o n  their 
merit as on the insistence of strong local leaders.
Just as, for the economy as a whole, the state accumulation policy 
broke down because, in the end, the government could not control the 
level and pattern of consumption in the private sector, so, for the 
government sector itself, the policy broke down because state government 
expenditure increasingly departed from the level and pattern that would 
be consistent with rapid, self-reliant and government-promoted 
industrialization. While central fiscal devolution continued to fill 
the expenditure gap in the states’ budgets, the one potential instrument 
of central influence on state government expenditure (Article 282 Plan 
grants) was virtually dismantled. The state accumulation policy was 
free to fade gently into revered desuetude.
1 Burkehead and Miner,(1971), P*239*
2 Shils (1965), p.33.
3 Nayar (1972), p.6o, n,8l.




Public expenditure is discussed by economists in a variety of 
different abstract frameworks. Wagner’s "law of expanding state 
activity", expressed as the functional dependence of the ratio of 
government spending to G.N.P. on per capita.. G.N.P., correctly 
characterizes a feature of modern economic growth, but does little to 
explain that feature. As a theory of the long run, it is not 
susceptible to testing with medium-term empirical evidence. Peacock 
and Wiseman's public spending "displacement effect" is not, pace 
K.N. Reddy, visible in Indian expenditure data, which is unsurprising 
since it is an abstraction from the U.K.’s social and economic history. 
Apart from these theories of the long run, economists view public 
spending from two other perspectives, one derived from microeconomics 
and the other from macroeconomics. The microeconomic perspective, 
explored in the literature on "public goods", is a branch of welfare 
economics, so that attempts to use it for description or explanation 
are misconceived. The macroeconomic perspective leads to the building 
of macroeconomic models incorporating a disaggregated government sector. 
These models are intended to simulate the consequences of changes in 
fiscal policy. But the fiscal changes are themselves exogenous to 
the model, and thus inexplicable, apart from the fact that their 
consequences are worked out in a drastically simplified environment. 
Dissatisfaction with all these types of theorizing led in the 1960s 
to a proliferation of ultra-empirical public expenditure studies, 
hoping to produce inductive generalizations from the covariances 
detected by regression analysis. Among the several weaknesses of
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these studies -were the false inference of diachronic changes from 
cross-section differences and the uncritical use of the simple 
regression technique.
The "basic value premise of this work is the desire for rapid 
improvement of living conditions for the Indian masses. This implies 
a concern with active, dirigistic development and the attempt to 
mould an entire economy into a rationally pre-selected form. Our 
interest in public expenditure is solely in relation to this attempt.
In India, the concrete manifestation of this attempt was a policy of 
state accumulation. One perspective on public expenditure is,
therefore, as one of the major policy variables that regulate the rate 
of state accumulation. In the absence of foreign "aidTT, inter­
sector borrowing and lending and saving forced by the printing of extra 
money, the rate of government sector accumulation is inversely related 
the level of government expenditure on current account. The rate 
of public sector capital formation can also be raised by either 
increasing government revenues, or by increasing the surpluses of non- 
departmental public enterprises.
The question of whether the state accumulation policy, and the 
planning and control of public expenditure which, it implies, is a
i
’’progressive" policy is often not confronted directly. Potentially, 
the state is a superior agent of accumulation to the private sector.
It is better able to mobilize the existing surplus for productive 
investment, and to enlarge the actual surplus. In countries with a 
weak fiscal system, these potential advantages cannot be secured merely 
by state direction of investment; public ownership of productive assets 
is necessary. It is possible to operate a state accumulation policy 
in a way that improves income distribution as well as increasing public 
capital; and also in a way that moderates the anarchy of private 
accumulation. however, whether a state accumulation policy is a 
progressive policy depends on the social structure of the regime which
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attempts it. It is doubtful that an economy where a powerful private 
sector is retained will realize the xootential advantages of state 
accumulation. But those who criticize the naivety of social 
democratic advocacy of state accumulation themselves fall into self- 
contradiction. For they, too, regard the state accumulation policy 
as progressive, after overturning all the bases on which such a belief 
could rest.
The forces which influenced state action in India must be 
delineated to place the Indian state accumulation policy in its proper 
historical context, Wo single social class dominates Indian 
society; social dominance is shared uneasily by a number of different 
class and groups. The state's partial independence of this uneasy 
coalition of classes and groups is increased because of the relative 
"overdevelopment11 of the post-colonial state vis a vis all indigenous 
classes. But the overdeveloped state faces the pressures generated 
by the outwards penetration of the capitalist mode of prodxaction from 
its European places of origin. Its response to these pressures is 
double-sided, a combination of resistance to European social and 
political hegemony and an absorption of the techno-economic basis of 
that hegemony. This historical materialist view of Indian nationalism 
must be distinguished both from liberal accounts of economic nationalism 
and teleological theories of a 'modernization imperative'. Mimetic 
nationalism has three characteristic attributes: first, it coexists
with a low level national integration; second, its style of politics 
is populist and its political institutions centre on a "united front" 
which is heterogeneous in terms of class; third, despite an initial 
radical anti-imperialism, it begins to accept foreign resources in 
the hope of accelerating the transition to economic independence.
The early history of the state accumulation policy in India 
shows that it was never urged on a laissez faire colonial government
190
by a progressive nationalist movement. Its first feeble manifestations 
came under the aegis of the British government of India. Meanwhile, 
Indian nationalist opinion favoured indirect state promotion of private 
industry by means of tariffs, procurement and banking regulation.
Nehru’s socialistic ideas were timid and confused, and always 
subordinated to his desire to preserve the nationalist united front.
Even on the verge of the transfer of state power, it is impossible to 
ascribe a coherent policy on state accumulation to Congress’ National 
Planning Committee. In the nationalist camp much greater agreement 
existed on the need for rapid industrialisation (whether private or 
public) as the means to encourage national economic independence and 
self-defence. This near-consensus was faithfully reflected in the 
economic strategy that was adopted after Independence. From the mid- 
1950s onwards, industrialization took place with substantial public and 
private investment after 1958 with heavy quota and tariff protection. 
Thus the environment of the Indian state accumulation policy was an 
industrialization drive in a heavily protected economy.
The overall performance of the public sector in the period 1960/61 
to 1969/70 parallels the change from the confidence in the public sector 
voiced in the Third Plan to the confusion about its role in the 
abortive Fourth Plan, Over the whole decade, the share of the public 
aiithorities in total national expenditure increased, as did the level 
of real public expenditure per head. But both of these increases 
reached a peak in 196^/65* after which they were partially reversed.
The ’’Wagnerian” tendencies visible in the Third Plan public 
expenditure statistics merely indicate the government’s efforts to 
operate a state accumulation policy. A functional breakdown of 
public authority spending shows that, even during the Third Plan, non­
development spending was growing faster than development spending, to 
which the doubling of the defence budget in real terms was a major
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contribution, (One cannot, however, conclude that the increment to 
defence spending was a direct subtraction from the public development 
outlay that would otherwise have taken place.) In the second half 
of the 1960s, public spending grew very little in real terms, while 
a marked change in programme priorities took place. Non-development 
spending continued to increase its share of the total, but not because 
of defence spending. In this sub-period, the expanding programmes 
were famine relief, food subsidies and expenditureon police forces. 
.Plan development spending shrank in real terms, particularly 
irrigation and flood control, small scale industries, transport and 
communications, education and scientific research and health and 
family planning. Non-plan development expenditure grew. This 
probably reflects the shift in responsibility for many development 
projects from the national planners to the state governments; except 
in the case of transport and communications, which suffered severe 
cuts in real terms. The economic composition of government spending 
was mostly stable during the Third Plan, but changed markedly in 
the 1969-70 period, as gross fixed capital formation was cut back.
The "Plan holiday" cutback in public authority and public sector 
investment led to a decline in both public authorities' and public' 
sector capital formation, as a share of G.N.P. and of total fixed 
capital formation. Despite these falls in the level of public 
investment, a diminishing proportion of public investment was financed 
by public sector saving. The drastic decline of public sector saving 
stemmed from the inability to exploit the two revenue sources which 
constitute the crucial advantages of the state as agent of capital 
accumulation - taxation of the subsistence sector, and the surpluses 
of public enterprises. While the excessive fragmentation of Indian 
land holdings may mean that large revenues camiot be raised equitably
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from the former source, the removal of existing inequities would 
produce a non-negligible increment to tax revenue. The reasorswhy 
the public enterprises never produced the anticipated surpluses are 
various. The departmental enterprises of state governments, such as 
electricity and irrigation, concentrated too heavily on grandiose 
schemes, were managed badly and continuously under-priced their 
products. The departmental enterprises of the central government 
are dominated by the railways where the small size of surpluses is 
attributable to excessive labour costs and irrational tariff-making. 
Among the non-departmental public enterprises, the losses incurred by 
the public steel units were usually sufficient to offset any profits 
made by smaller and better-run public enterprises. However, the 
public sector investment famine of the late 1960s cannot be construed 
as a deliberate policy switch decided on in the light of the failures 
of public entrepreneurship.
The mid-decade switch from economic growth to recession is normally 
attributed to the double harvest failure which started in 1965-6.
But it has also been suggested that government policies themselves 
provoked and/or prolonged the recession. Analysis of production 
statistics indicates that the post-1965 recession in the organized 
sector was largely confined to capital goods industries, and especially 
transport equipment. The debate over the role of government in 
reducing the demand for the products of capital goods industries has 
suffered from some conceptual confusion and empirical weakness. A 
more searching examination of public expenditure statistics indicates 
a deceleration of the rate of growth of public spending in the three 
financial years before the harvest failures of 1965-6. The growth 
rate of the departmental enterprises1 gross fixed capital formation 
also decelerated between 1962—5 and I965-6 both in money and in real 
terms. The government's deflationary reaction to the onset of
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drought was thus superimposed on a drift towards deflation which is
discernible from the middle of the Third Plan. Once the immediate crisis
of agricultural supply was over, the government did not move to raise 
again its own demand for the capital goods whose production capacity
its past investments had created.
Since India has a federal government, the role of public expenditure 
in a state accumulation policy must be studied for both levels of 
government, the central and the state (including in the latter all local 
authorities). For various reasons, however, it is not possible to 
measure the regional impact of Indian public expenditure. Instead, 
the initial concern is with changes in the centralization of public 
spending. The attempt to apply Peacock and Wiseman's theory of the 
expenditure concentration process to India is basically misguided. A 
proper measure of the centralization ratio indicates nearly the same 
figure at the end of the decade as at the beginning, but with a lurch 
towards centralization at the time of the Sino-Indian border war and 
its aftermath. To accommodate the extra spending caused by that war 
while maintaining central development outlay on its growth path, state 
government capital spending was held in check, thereby increasing the 
expenditure centralization ratio.
The double harvest failures of 1965-6 aad I966-.7 caused an initial 
small shift towards further centralization, as central responsibilities 
for income redistribution through transfer payments were acted on.
However, this shift was more than cancelled out by another shift in 
the opposite direction caused by a cutback on capital spending that 
bit much deeper into the centre's capital budget than into those 
of the states. Such a cutback is difficult to justify in terms of 
normal economic logic. If explanations are sought in the realm of 
politics, it might be suggested that the Congress losses in the 
1967 general Election weakened the political power of the centre 
vis-a-vis the state governments. But the political record does not
support this argument* Post-1967 state-level opposition to the 
Congress Party was localized, uncoordinated and unstable. Its main 
achievement seems to have been the dismantling of the apparatus by 
which central planners exercized detailed control over the bulk of state- 
level plan schemes- but this was as much the achievement of the Congress 
as of the non-Congress states.
A more convincing political explanation for the post-1967 
decentralization of capital, and thus total expenditure starts from the 
proposition that the I967 Election was indecisive, and prevented' any 
change in leadership by "syndicate raj" presided over by a new and 
hesitant Prime Minister. Internal Congress intrigues and faction fights 
preempted the time and energy required for economic decision-making, 
and in the policy vacuum, the Finance Ministry became dominant. The 
Finance Ministry hoped to stave off the effects of a sharp decline in 
the net inflow of foreign resources by increasing private foreign and 
domestic investment, concentrating agricultural investment on a "green 
revolution", and building up the foreign exchange reserves. The 
other element in the orthodox policy package was a severe cutback in 
public investment in the organized sector, which was achieved largely 
on central government account.
One would not expect that states with different levels and growth 
rates of income and population density, as well perhaps as differences 
in political preferences, would exhibit the same levels or growth 
rates of public expenditure. To test this expectation it is first 
necessary to deflate the money expenditure figures of the state 
governments to allow for inflation at different rates in different parts 
of the country. If the issue is improvement in the standards of 
public provision, allowance must also be made for simple population 
growth. After these allowances are made, it is clear that substantial 
inter-state differences remain in the growth rate of real public
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spending per head. Thus during the 1960s, the disparities in the 
standards of public provision by the state governments and local 
authorities increased. Using rank correlation analysis, the variables 
associated with real public expenditure growth per head were sought.
The results obtained were not very clear-cut. It appeared that the 
states which were least urbanised in i960 had public expenditure growth 
rates significantly associated with state income growth rates. At 
the same time, the states which were most urbanized in i960 had public 
expenditure growth rates significantly associated with the progress 
of urbanization. It is difficult to explain this apparent causal 
assymetry without further research into the process of migration and 
urbanization during the 1960s.
Just as total expenditure became more centralized during the 
Third Plan, so did the gross capital formation of the Indian public 
authorities. However, the definition of capital formation includes 
machinery and equipment used for defence purposes, so the developmental 
implications of more centralized capital formation are obscure. In 
the 1965~70 sub-period, the central government's money expenditures on 
capital formation declined, while those of all other public authorities 
increased, thereby more than offsetting the centralization that had 
occurred during the Third Plan,
The attempt to examine changes in the centralization of public 
saving is hindered because of a change in the Central Statistical 
Organization's practice in attributing public saving to different 
spending authorities. This change relates to the treatment of 
transfers between one spending authority and another. If one looks 
at the breakdown of public saving after all intra-authority transfers 
have been made, the state government's contribution to total public 
saving shows an absolute and a relative increase. If the new 
breakdown of public saving is taken to be more appropriate, the central
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government's average share during the Third Plan was 51 per cent and 
in the 1965-70 sub-period fell to an average of ^5 per cent.
The effect of the public capital formation and public saving 
changes taken together also depends on whether the post-devolution or 
the nnew breakdown" concept of saving is used. If the former concept 
is used, the central government's ability to finance its capital 
formation by its own saving remained roughly constant, while that of 
the state governments improved. If the latter concept is used, 
this conclusion is reversed, i.e. the state governments' ability to 
finance their capital formation by their own saving remained constant, 
while that of the central government improved, Choice between these 
alternative concepts of saving would still be difficult even if (as is 
not the case) the definitions employed in the "new breakdown" were 
known. Under the revenue-sharing provisions of the Indian Constitution, 
revenue can legally "belong" to one spending authority, while the 
policy and practice of levying it is entirely the responsibility of 
another spending authority. There is no reason to believe that 
levels of public saving were ever policy targets of any type of 
spending authority, so that the outcomes registered in national 
accounts statistics cannot even be regarded as plans that failed.
It is often argued that, as economic development takes place, 
the share of public capital formation in (a) the government budget,
(b) total capital formation and (c) gross national expenditure gradually 
declines. There is some correlation between level of development in 
1960/61 and the share of state product and state government expenditure 
devoted to public capital formation, and between the rate of development 
and the shrinkage in the share of public capital formation in state 
income and state government expenditure. Neither of these 
correlations is statistically significant, however. If one excludes
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militarily sensitive border states, there is a significant correlation 
between the rate of development and the shrinkage of the share of public 
capital formation in state income. Explaining the economic 
composition of state government budgets remains a problem. The 
supposition of constant economic composition, because of bureaucratic 
inertia or conservative budgeting procedures is clearly against the 
empirical evidence. Budget composition seems to be related to the 
degree of government activity, with those states where the public 
sector is largest being those in which the share of the state devoted 
to capital formation is the largest. Evidence for this view, 
however, comes only from cross-section analysis, and a time series test 
may refute it. Any suggestion that state governments' capital 
formation is constrained by volume of resources which they save has 
no empirical backing.
A retrospective survey of the Indian state accumulation policy 
indicates that, although in the abstract there is no necessary 
connection between state accumulation and mimetic nationalism, the 
latter did in fact provide the historical context within which the 
policy of state accumulation was attempted in India. Mimetic 
nationalism influenced the policy of state accumulation in two ways.
The first was a pro-heavy industry bias in the allocation of investment 
which caused grovjth to be unbalanced in the sense of Lewis and Kalecki, 
The second was to use indiscriminate import-substitution to force 
unbalanced growth, and the proliferation of domestic industries with 
unit costs so high that they were unable to export. Thus the Indian 
state accumulation policy was set the task of producing a x>re-determined 
structure of output without the possibility of using foreign trade to 
reconcile domestic production with domestic consumption and investment. 
Thus the planned structure of domestic production had to match the 
structure of domestic demand. But in fact, with its small public
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sector and weak fiscal system, the Indian state was quite unable 
to shape the structure of domestic demand to the form which its 
domestic production plans required. Even in the public sector itself, 
where the government had most control over supply and demand, a match 
between them was not achieved.
Although these macroeconomic mismanagements dominated the evolution 
of the Indian economy in the 1960s, so that even sound public finance 
policies could only have produced a slow rate of state accumulation, 
it is still necessary to see what policy changes must be made in the 
public finances against the possibility that macroeconomic circumstances 
will alter. Since borrowing abroad and at home, and printing money 
are financial devices which have been used to, and indeed beyond, the 
limits of prudence, the revival of the state accumulation policy in 
India must rest 011 the solution to budgetary problems, particularly on 
the expenditure si&e of the budget.
The problem of expenditure control is not one to be solved by 
insisting 011 across-the-board reductions on a radical scale. It is 
a problem of intelligent selection based on detailed information 
about the economic effects of existing and potential items of public 
expenditure. There is little indication that this is understood by 
government circles in India. The planners do not reveal how they 
arrive at the public expenditure figures which appear in the plans, and 
there is not the slightest indication that the administrative and 
political institutions which would be needed to operate the choice 
process for public expenditure are being built up. The formal adoption 
of the administrative technique of programme and performance budgeting 
is no substitute for the creation of a series of official and political 
Cabinet committees whose remit is to decide priorities over the entire 
field of public expenditure. Even setting up such committees will
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achieve little unless they become the arena for conflicts between 
centralizing and decentralizing political forces. Such conflicts were 
not evident in India in the 1960s, not even up to and including the 
"Emergency” of 1975-77. If anything, the 1960s saw a drift towards 
decentralization of control over public finance as the methods used 
for fiscal devolution became increasingly favourable to the 
independence of the states. While this was happening the state 
governments were switching their own spending priorities away from 
agricultural and industrial infrastructure and towards health and 
education programmes, and away from developmental to non-developmental 
outlay. The way in which the central government used its own capital 
budget as the balancing factor in macroeconomic adjustment suggests 
that the continuing decentralization of public expenditure is a real 
possibility. The operation of a state accumulation policy is hard 
enough in an inherently conservative political framework such as 
federalism. If public expenditure does continue to become more 
decentralized, now that the old Article 282 planning grants have been 
drastically reduced, the state accumulation policy in India will only 




THE INTERPRETATION OF INDIAN PUBLIC 
EXPENDITURE STATISTICS
I. Primary Documents and Secondary Reclassifications
Our focus of interest has been governmental fiscal activity, 
more especially on the expenditure side, and yet no direct use was 
made of the documents on budgets and accounts which have an operational 
role in the fiscal cycle. Our main source has been the various 
re-classifications of accounts and budgets, produced, on a number of 
differing bases, by either the government or quasi-governmental bodies. 
It is thus necessary to explain:
(a) why reclassifications are preferable to the "primary" 
budgeting and accounting documents;
(b) the rationale of the different possible reclassifications;
(c) why one of these, based on national accounting conventions, 
is more suitable to the present purpose than the others;
(d) the differences between the existing attempts at national 
accounting reclassifications.
Because of the costs of statistical production, there are 
relatively few pure sets of social statistics. Most social 
statistics are by-products of some existing social process, and can only 
be interpreted with knowledge of that process. The primary budgetary 
documents, i.e. those with an operational role in the fiscal cycle, 
ar6 drawn up for only one purpose, to gain legal authorisation for the 
governments annual expenditiire and taxation proposals and to check 
ex post whether the legally authorized limits were exceeded. This 
purpose governs the form of the annual Financial Statements, Demands 
for Grants, Budget Memoranda, Estimates of Plan Schemes and Revenue
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and Finance Accounts of the central and state governments in India.
But the legal requirements of a particular parliamentary system will
not, except as a result either of coincidence or elaborate contrivance,
produce information in a form suitable for economic and political
analysis. Expenditure will be excluded if it does not require
parliamentary sanction; pure accounting transactions will appear as
"expenditure11; expenditure will be analysed by spending department
and category of input rather than by function and type of output.
These defects are shared by all abridgements of the primary documents -
the "budget-in-brief" pamphlets and the budgetary data in the various
state and central government economic surveys, statistical abstracts
1
and statistical histories.
There is also a near-universal tendency for primary budget documents 
to become archaic. The reasons for this, however, differ according to the 
kind of polity in which the budgetary process takes place. They are 
quite different, for example, as between the U.K. and India, The 
colonial and post-colonial situation has been the important determinant 
in the Indian case. In the British period, the colonial povjer took 
a broadly static view of the functions of government, which meant that 
for a long time the original form of estimates and accounts kept more 
or less in line with the reality of government policies. At the same 
time, there was no domestic political forum attempting to scrutinize 
and use the information presented, and so no demand for a more 
realistic or informative presentation. With Independence, the lack 
of a domestic political forum was remedied. But the bureaucracy 
retained a deep respect for the formal conventions of British style 
budgeting, guarding them braliminically as a sacred inheritance at the 
very time that they came to lose their relevance to actual conditions
1 Cf, C.S.O. (19^6); Government of Rajasthan (1970).
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moire rapidly than ever before.
Thus it could be authoritatively reported in 1968 that "in recent
years there has been an enormous expansion in the activities and
functions of Government ... (but) although attempts have been made to
amend the structure of accounting heads from time to time, the
1essential framework has remained more or less intact11. In its 
century-long existence, the accounting framework has, indeed, undergone 
only a few experiences of minor surgery. Some changes were made in 
1957 to accommodate provincial autonomy; in 1990 the double accounts 
system was introduced; and since then the only concession to 
development planning was the alteration in I96I-3 of certain major
2
heads of account to permit their grouping in semi-functional form.
The unfortunate consequence of archaic primary bvidget documents 
is that the government's problems is following any consistent line of 
policy become more severe. The information that is readily available 
becomes less and less comprehensive, increasingly loaded with irrelevant 
detail and more tortuous in interpretation as attempts are made to 
incorporate new developments into the straight-jacket of an obsolete 
framework. In the end, this "information" becomes so obscure that 
its meaning can only be teased out by those who, by training and 
practice acquired in long years of compiling it, can act as specialized 
interpreters of its lore and lack of logic. Even although it is able 
to draw upon the services of such specialized interpreters (who are, 
of course, its own employees) a government in this position will find 
that it needs, if it is to follow through any consistent line of policy, 
secondary analyses of the primary documents. The government, or 
quasi-government institutions such as the central bank, then begin to 
produce these secondary analyses. Characteristically, and in contrast
1 A.R.C. (1968a), p.9.
2 Premchand (1966), pp.529-32; (1969), pp.93-100.
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with the primary documents, secondary analyses play no part in the 
political process that legitimates governmental acquisition and disposal 
of resources. They show how the information in the primary documents 
must be re-arranged to be consistent with information on other 
economic magnitudes - the government's deficit or surplus, the public 
sector component of the development plan or the national accounts 
aggregat.es. It is these secondary analyses that are normally treated 
as original sources by economic researchers, a sensible practice given 
the near-impossibility of avoiding error in the use of the primary 
documents.
The production of secondary analyses should not be thought of as 
the ideal solution to the problem of supplying financial information 
relevant to policy. In theory, it would be preferable to have a 
single accounting system embodying a hierarchy of different classific­
ations, one of which is desighed for purposes of accountability and the 
rest designed to meet different informational needs. Using a 
computer, it would then be possible to produce any one of a number of 
different arrangements of the basic data at mil.
It would also be misleading to infer from what has been said above 
that the production of secondary analyses of budget material in India 
is in fact the result of internal government pressures for information 
more directly relevant to its policy objectives. It is difficult to 
escape the impression that in India the motive has been, in part, 
mimetic. The desire oa to imitate the best practice of advanced 
countries, without too much regard for whether achievement of chosen 
objectives is actually aided thereby. This impression is not equally 
strong in relation to all the different secondary analyses: it is
much stronger for the reconciliations with national accounts aggregates 
than for the reconciliations with Plan and money supply statistics.
The former, at any rate, seem to be produced in an institutional
2 ok
vacuum, it being no one’s responsibility to ensure that the information 
they contain is properly integrated into the decision-making process. 
Although it is frequently claimed by the civil servants responsible 
for producing the secondary analyses that their primary purpose is to 
educate politicians about the consequences of their decisions, there 
is little evidence that any such educational effect does exist, or 
that the existing political system gives much scope for it to develop,
II. Schemes of Reclassification: A Critique
Two of the main types of secondary analysis of budget material can
be mentioned fairly briefly, because, for reasons that will be
explained, they are not particularly useful in providing time series
of public expenditure and its economic components.
At the end of the 1960s, proper reconciliations of budget documents
with planning figures of plan outlay and resources began to be produced,
1
on the recommendation of the Administrative Reforms Commission. This
was a long overdue step forward in rationalizing the financial side of
the planning process. On the other hand, such reconciliations are
not very helpful in the analysis of public expenditure, because, as is
well known, ?,plan outlay” (like "plan resources") is an administrative
and not an economic concept. Plan outlay is not government development
expenditure, since it excludes development expenditure arising from
schemes accepted in previous plans, and development expenditure on
schemes undertaken in the present plan period but not deemed eligible
for plan grants. Nor is it that part of government investment
included in the present plan, because plan schemes usually include
2both capital and current elements. Plan outlay simply means that 
part of public expenditure which, at the end of the long and heavily
1 A.P.O. (1968a), pp.28-9.
2 Venkataraman (1968), pp.69-70; Chanda (1965), pp.220-1.
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political planning negotiations between the Planning Commission, and 
central and state government departments, has been agreed to be 
eligible for payment of Plan grants. As such, they are of no very 
great interest from the purely economic viewpoint.
Secondly, the Reserve Bank of India publishes its own analyses of 
the central government budget, the railways budget, the finances of 
state governments, the union territories and of local authorities.
The Bank's work stems from its responsibility for the control of inflation 
and the repercussions of this on the balance of payments. Its aim is 
to derive from its fiscal analyses the size of the overall surplus or 
deficit 011 government account, as a measure of the impact of government 
operations on the money supply. But it is possible to measure the 
overall surplus or deficit without throwing up as a by-product 
statistics which are useful for the analysis of public expenditure.
The reasons for this are as follows. First, the Bank's coverage is 
weak where no possibility of a surplus or deficit exists. In the case 
of local authorities, the information is drawn from a series of 
(slightly different) sample surveys, excluding from their scope 
panchayati ra.j institutions and covering only the years 1962-3, 1964-5, 
1965-6, and 1966-7. Second, the measurement of government stir plus 
or deficit does not require any departure from the existing system of 
double accounts (which is misleading from an economic point of view), 
or any uniformity of functional classification between the central 
government and the states. Third, although uniformity between states 
in any one year is usually achieved, a number of changes in the definition 
of particular expenditure items were made during the 1960s. Only one 
of these changes alters the concept of surplus and deficit employed, 
but all of them interfere with strict intertemporal comparisons of
1 R.B.I. (1970), p.1471.
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expenditure components* ' Lack of comprehensiveness, lack of uniformity
and lack of definitional stability through time rather badly weaken
the usefulness of the Reserve Bank of India's data for general fiscal
analysis, although on some important questions it is still the best
available, if handled with sufficient caution.
The type of secondary reclassification of expenditure which, we
use most extensively is the economic classification of government
transactions. What are the reasons for relying so heavily on
expenditure information in this form? The reasons can be summarized
under the following headings:
(i) Relatively comprehensive definition of the government 
sector;
(ii) Uniformity of treatment of different levels of government; 
(iii) Improved conceptual linkage with macroeconomic aggregates; 
(iv) Elimination of double-counting in measuring expenditure;
(v) A superior measure of government capital formation.
Although this is an impressive list of advantages, it is not contended
that even the economic classification is absolutely adequate for the
purpose of illuminating the fiscal aspects of state accumulation. To
explain its advantages more fully and thus also pinpoint the remaining
deficiencies, each of the above headings requires more detailed
examination.
(i) Definition of '’Government"
In the neo-classicial view, there is no problem of defining the 
government sector of the economy. Governments spend on public goods 
(justice, police, arms) because the exclusion principle fails to 
operate, on "merit wants" in other cases of market failure and on 
transfers to correct income distribution or macroeconomic instability; 
financing all this expenditure by politically determined levies. 
Meanwhile, in the non-government sector, firms and households exchange
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factor services and the production made possible thereby. Obviously, 
there is no place for state accumulation in this vision, and the
adoption of a state accumulation policy opens up the question of where 
the boundary of the government sector lies. Do public enterprises form 
part of it or not? Are they non-government because, like firms, they 
produce output for sale in the market, or are they government because 
their market operations are limited by "social obligations" and other 
less explicit forms of government influence?
In India, the resolution of this problem has been to divide public 
enterprises into two groups, "departmental" and "non-departmental".
The first are assimilated into the government sector on the grounds 
that they are less like firms, while the second are assimilated into 
the corporate sector, because they are more like firms. The 
departmental enterprises are those set up under the auspices of, and 
run subject to the direct supervision of, ministries of the Gentral 
or State governments. They are not incorporated, but owned and 
controlled by a government department. They do not hold or manage 
financial assets and liabilities, apart from their working balances 
and business accounts. The Central government's departmental 
enterprises are the railways, posts and telegraphs, overseas 
communication service and defence raatrufacturing establishments. Those 
of the State governments are irrigation and electricity schemes, 
forestry and logging and certain road and water transport services.
Some types of departmental enterprise are undertaken jointly - mainly 
multi-purpose river schemes and government printing -p re s s e s . By 
contrast, the non-departmental enterprises have three different 
institutional forms - government corrqpanies, in which at least 51 per 
cent of the paid-up share capital is held by the government; 
subsidiaries of government companies; and statutory corporations 
established by special legislation. Their sphere of operations covers
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air transport, a whole range of concerns in the heavy industrial 
sector such as steel, engineering, petro-chemicals, and fertilisers, 
and financial and trading activities in insurance, banking, foreign 
trade, food-grain procurement, et cetera. The variety of operation 
is so great that it does not lend itself to neat summary.
The Indian practice of defining the government sector (or, as it 
is called, the "public authorities") to include the departmental, but 
exclude the non-departmental enterprises is, t£> some extent, a fiction. 
For the purpose of getting empirical evidence on the progress of state 
accumulation, it is necessary to have accounts which show the operation 
of the public sector as a whole, that is, of the 'public authorities' 
as at present defined plus the non-departmental enterprises.
(ii) Uniformity of Treatment
Apart from the departmental enterprises, the term "public 
authorities" or government sector covers all the three main levels of 
government in India - the Union or Central government, the governments 
of all the States and Union Territories and the sub-state local 
governments such as municipalities and the various panchayati ra.j 
institutions. Clearly, if the relationship between the three levels 
of government is to be seen correctly, and if the data for all three 
levels is to be capable of aggregation in a correct picture for all- 
India, the principles according to which data is organized must be the 
same at each level. It is tempting to do otherwise, since the 
activities of the three levels differ considerably, and different 
data breakdowns would better highlight the major functions and 
transactions of each. But to study public expenditure at any level 
in isolation is unnecessarily arbitrary, given that activity at any 
level is part of a larger inter-related system. It is certainly 
desirable to disaggregate data at least to the State level, but this
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is conditional on having correctly aggregated data in the first place. 
This requires uniformity of classification at all levels, which is 
the great advantage of a consistent use of national accounting 
concepts over, e.g. the R.B.I. type of analyses.
(iii) Linking Public Expenditure with Macroeconomic Aggregates
The term "public expenditure" has no unique, accepted meaning, 
so that variations in its usage (usually relatively minor) occur both 
between countries and from time to time in the same country. The 
reason for attempting a definition is that the government (itself, as 
we have just seen, not a homogeneous entity) influences by its manifold 
transactions, with varying degrees of directness, the disposition of 
available economic resourdes. Measuring the growth and composition 
of public expenditure is designed to indicate the extent and nature 
of this influence, as exercized on the disbursement side of government 
operations. Although "public expenditure" is not a term in the 
national accounts lexicon, if the impact of government spending on the 
economy is to be measured, it is preferable that it be defined in 
relation to national accounting categories, since these are^the 
categories commonly used for the analysis of the total economy, not 
withstanding all their vjell-known defects.
The major economic distinction of the various impacts that 
government spending can have is between spending that is "exhaustive" 
of available resources, and. that which is'hon-exhaustive". The first 
directly appropriates part of the supply of output available in the 
current accounting period, and is therefore the government's direct 
share in the total of national expenditure. Exhaustive expenditure 
then breaks down by use - according to whether it is for consumption, 
gross domestic fixed capital formation or changes in stocks. Non- 
exhaustive spending, on the other hand, merely transfers purchasing
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power to other sectors of the domestic economy, or abroad. Public 
debt interest, grants, subsidies, net sales of assets, et cetera, have 
only an indirect impact on the ecoiiomy by altering the income constraint 
on non-government demand for current output. The advantage of an 
economic reclassification of expenditure is that it allows these 
various types of impact to be distinguished. Of course, we cannot 
concern ourselves with each and every one of them. Since our focus 
is mainly on the question of the government as an agent of accumulation, 
we are interested primarily in the government's impact on capital 
formation and consumption. But it must be emphasized that the 
government's activity in these areas cannot be measured unless the 
conceptual basis of the expenditure statistics we use is identical with 
that used by national accountants who measure the total capital 
formation and consumption in the whole economy. Further, the actual 
government accounts, in India as elsewhere, do not provide expenditure
statistics on this basis, because they were designed for the quite 
different purpose of ensuring the legality of expenditure in accord 
with certain parliamentary procedures. It is an elementary point, 
but one too often ignored by economists themselves.
There is one respect, however, in which the Indian economic 
expenditure reclassifications are not entirely consonant with the 
conceptual basis of the national accounts. They are reclassifications 
of cash accounts. Cash accounts represent the state of receipts and 
disbursements, that is the actual payments for goods and services, 
without regard to when ordered, received or consumed. Cash accounting 
is essential to meet the prime requirements of government solvency, 
for receipts must be adequate to cover payments. By contrast, accrual 
accounts represent the state of income receivable and bills payable 
in respect of goods and services received, without regard to when 
ordered, paid for or consumed.'*" We are not concerned here with the
1 TT.W. (1970), p.43.
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question whether the cash or accrual basis is in some sense better
for government accounts, on which differences of opinion flourish.*^
The point is that the national accounts are themselves drawn up 011 an
accrual basis, in terms of receivables and payables, and that therefore
"magnitudes in government accounts corresponding to national income
concepts should strictly speaking also be measured on an accrual
2
basis if like is to be compared with like". The data difficulties
involved in converting cash to accrual figures are so formidable that 
xao single sciiolar could possibly make the conversion in any reasonable 
time period. Until an accrual basis is adopted by the government 
as a matter of policy, we can only work, faute de mieux, with 
reclassifications of cash expenditure statistics.
(iv) Elimination of Double-Counting
In what sense do the actual government accounts involve the 
double-counting of expenditure? What constitutes double-counting 
depends on what one is trying to count. For some analyses of production 
we may wish our totals to be gross of inter-industrial supplies, but 
not in estimating national product, where the inclusion of inter­
industrial supplies constitutes double-counting. Similarly, for some
analytical purposes we may wish to have figures for gross public
expenditure, which is what appears in actual government accounts.
But this is not so when we are concerned with the economic impact of 
government spending on the rest of the economy, either through 
exhaustive or non-exhaustive spending as previously defined. For 
this purpose, it must be noted that certain expenditures appear in the 
actual accounts which do not have an economic impact independently of 
and separate from certain other expenditures which also appear.
These must be netted out because, if that is not done, the total of 
’public expenditure with an economic impact’ will be over-estimated.
1 Cf. TT.N. (1970), p . M a t t h e w s  (1975), pp.237-8.
2 Chelli&h (1968), p.30.
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Or, to put it another way, the totals of public expenditure will be 
higher than the total of 'public expenditure with an economic impact1, 
and it is only with the latter that economists need trouble.
Of all the expenditures which appear in actual government accounts, 
the following are those which must be eliminated if double-counting 
in the above sense is to be avoided,
(1) Transfers within the government sector
Intra-government sector transfers comprise transactions 
(a) between "funds" and (b) between different levels of government. 
Category (a) arise in the absence of a consolidated fund into 
which all revenues are paid regardless of source and from which all 
payments are made regardless of purpose. Of course, India has a 
Consolidated Fund, but in addition various other types of fund 
also coexist with it, and a certain amount of borrowing and lending 
takes place between the different funds. These inter-fund 
adjustments will all be recorded in the accounts. So will the 
transactions between different levels of government, such as 
borrowing and lending and the making of grants which arise from a 
disparity between the expenditure responsibilities on the one hand 
and the revenue possibilities on the other, of the central and 
local levels of government.
From the viewpoint of the government sector as a whole, both of 
these types of transactions amount simply to a shifting of money 
from one pocket of a purse to another pocket of the same purse.
They have no economic impact separate from that of the expenditure 
of the recipient fund or level of government, which will also be 
recorded in the accounts. These intra-government sector transfers, 
therefore, ought to be excluded from an economic concept of 
public expenditure. To include them is, in the national 
accounts framework, double-counting. Also, since the total of
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public expenditure, defined to include them, would fluctuate 
according to the size and frequency of these pocket-to-pocket 
shifts, synchronic and diachronic- public spending comparisons 
would lose all their economic meaning.
(2) Operating expenditure of public enterprises
If public enterprises are to continue to function, their 
operating expenses must be covered either by the proceeds of the 
sale of the goods and services that they produce, or by subsidies 
out of general revenue. In the first case, the sale proceeds 
will, sooner or later, enter the national accounts as the 
consumption expenditure of households. In the second case, the 
subsidies will be automatically included as a part of public 
expenditure if this is defined by the national accounts categories 
which have been listed already. There is no reason to include 
public enterprises operating expenses in the total of public 
spending.
(3) Expenditure matched by certain types of charges
We have so far examined the problem of quasi-commercial activity 
in the public sector only in its major manifestation, that of 
public enterprises. There is a minor variant of the same problem 
when the government proper undertakes quasi-commercial activity.
The government itself sometimes provides goods and services which 
are not collective in nature, in that it is technically quite 
possible to exclude from their benefits individuals whom, for some 
reason, it is desired to exclude. Further, the principle of 
exclusion is often the commercial one of individuals1 willingness 
to pay a charge related to the cost of providing the goods and 
services in question. An example would be the public operation 
of fee-paying schools or medical services.
2±h
If the arguments for ignoring the operating expenses of 
departmental public enterprises in calculating public expenditure 
are sound, they will apply with equal force to the quasi-commercial 
activity of the public authorities. The method for eliminating 
recorded expenditure on quasi-commercial activity is to calculate 
public expenditure net of the quasi-commercial charges. These 
may be defined as charges which (a) are clearly and directly linked 
to the acquisition of specific goods and services and (b) are 
consistently related to the cost of their provision. It will be 
clear from (b) that not all government charges are quasi-commercial, 
and that consequently there is no justification for calculating 
public spending net of all types of charge. Whereas purchases 
of goods and services are calculated net of sales of goods and 
services, interest payments are net of commercial interest receipts, 
additions to stocks and assets are net of disposals, etc., as 
important range of government charges are not netted off from 
public expenditure, but appear on the revenue side of the account 
as income from property and fees and miscellaneous receipts.
Strictly speaking, a definition of public expenditure that is 
consistent with the national accounts requires more than simply the 
exclusion of transactions of types (1) - (3) from actual government 
accounts. It also requires the addition of certain types of 
expenditure which do not have a counterpart in monetary transactions.
The best known example is that of imputing a rental cost for buildings 
which the government has built for itself. In practice, as with other 
types of national accounting imputations, this bristles with 
difficulties and is often, for that reason, omitted. The amounts 
involved can be quite large relative to total public expenditure, and 
the margin of error in the estimates is usually large also. This 
leads to an unsatisfactory situation where total public expenditure can
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fluctuate quite noticeably over time simply because statisticians make 
different estimates of the true cost of imputed rents. For these 
reasons, no imputation is attempted in the statistics used here.
(v) The Measure of Government Capital Formation
The nearest the actual government accounts come to providing a
measure of government capital formation is by means of its system of 
double accounts. (This is not to be confused with a system of double 
entry book-keeping. That the Indian public authorities practice 
single entry book-keeping is entirely irrelevant to this discussion.)
The system of double accounts is the division of all receipts and
payments between two accounts, one "current" and the other Mcapital11,
both of which are required to balance.
The principle on which ’'capital*1 items are to be distinguished 
from "current" is rather hard to discern, even in an ideal system of 
double accounts. According to the United Nations' manual of 
government accounting, the distinction is "similar to the one used in 
commercial practice to distinguish between charges that relate to 
operating accounts and those that affect balance sheet accounts,
(which) should be recognized as different from the classification by 
economic nature". As an example, it is claimed that expenditure 
to establish a military installation, which would be current consumption 
in the economic reclassification of expenditures "may be treated as a 
capital outlay in the accounts".1 This certainly cuts across the 
U.N.'s own earlier advice. Arguing in 1951 against the adoption of 
double accounts as a device to rationalize government debt creation 
(by implying that all "capital" expenditure could be financed by 
government bori’owing quite safely), it was urged that double accounting
1 U.N, (1970), p.63.
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should be adopted "where it will contribute to an analysis of the 
economic significance of government activities".*^ But if, as is 
currently claimed, the distinction between the two accounts differs 
from that between consumption and investment expenditure, it is 
difficult to see how the system could illuminate the question of 
economic significance, The attempt to define items of government
spending as 'capital' by analogy with commercial accounting practice 
simply breaks down to the extent that the purpose of government activity 
differs from that of commercial firms. In all those areas of operation 
where the government does not (like a firm) seek to maintain a stock 
of resources as the basis for deriving its own periodic income, what 
substance can be given to the notion of a government balance sheet?
The government, qua agent of accumulation, in part creates assets for 
the purpose of raising national income, and so its expenditures should 
be classified to make them intelligible within the framework of the 
national accounts.
But, in the Indian practice of government accounting, neither the 
earlier nor the later TJ.N, advice is followed. The allocation of 
items between the two accounts follows no single, clear-cut principle.
It is true that the bulk of government consumption spending falls into 
the current ("revenue") accoiint, while the bulk of government investment 
falls into the capital account. But there remains an important minority 
of items which have been officially allocated to the "wrong" account, 
from the point of view of the consumption/investment distinction.
Doubtful items have, from time to time, been allocated to one account 
or the other by the Comptroller and Auditor-General of India on the 
basis of an administrative case law which does not lend itself to any 
kind of logical reduction.^ Nevertheless, simply because the primary
1 U.N. (1970), p.¥t.
2 Gupta (I970), pp.169-70; Premchand (1966), pp.1^8-9; Caiden and 
Wildavsky (197^), pp.89-90.
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budget documents are drawn as double accounts, many analysts of Indian 
public finance continue to treat the existing distinction with great 
respect, as if expenditure on revenue or on capital account did have 
a precise economic meaning.
If it is desired to persist with the current/capital distinction, 




































A Revised Scheme of Double 
Accounts: Expenditure Side
Even on this basis, the capital account is far from showing the flows 
which ought to be represented in a set of national government balance 
sheets. This is because fixed capital formation and the purchases 
(less sales) of existing assets are recorded, while the consumption of 
capital is left unrecorded. But our argument is that gathering the 
information to write a government balance sheet is the pursuit of a 
misconceived ideal, and that dividing expenditure into the two accounts 
adds almost nothing to our knowledge once an expenditure classification 
as shown in the third column of the Figure has been carried out.
Thus far, however, we have not confronted the question whether 
the national accounts categories of expenditure are themselves really
meaningful. This we must now do, given that considerable reliance 
is placed in Part Two on expenditure statistics classified by these 
categories. It may be objected that this is an unsound method, since 
national accounts concepts are not ’'appropriate” to the conditions 
that obtain in South Asia. Professor Myrdal, particularly, has been 
a protagonist of this view. Put as briefly as possible, the doctrine 
of inappi*opriateness states that national accounts concepts were 
elaborated by the governments of advanced capitalist countries aiming 
at short-run demand management, and were chosen to be appropriate to 
that objective. If, however, the policy objective is one of long- 
run growth, they are inappropriate unless one accepts the validity of 
post-Keynesian growth models such as those of Harrod and Domar.^
This line of generalized criticism, which is reiterated by Myrdal, is 
weak and superficial, an excellent example of what has been called 
Myrdal's "show of iconoclasm”. On the one.hand, it exaggerates the
snugness of fit between concepts and policy in advanced capitalist 
countries, while on the other it carries the implication that national 
accounting will be impossible in India until we have a fully-fledged 
theory of economic growth capable of replacing Harrod-Domar.
Any searching criticism of the conventions of the national accounts 
must start from their philosophical roots in the utilitarian theory of 
the market. Government has no obvious place in this theory, and no 
place can be created for it without setting up internal contradictions 
in it. Utilitarians want to argue that governments provide services 
which generate utility, in the sense that, if they could be offered as 
private goods, they would find ready buyers; while at the same time it 
is clear that there can be no market test of the value of government
1 Cf, Oshima (19^5), pp.8-9; Seers and Jolly (1966), pp.196-7.
2 Byres (1969), p.1780
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services, and some kind of market test is the only criterion of value
which the theory recognizes. This difficulty is met by treating
government services as a final good, but valuing them at the cost of
their inputs.*^ Such a compromise immediately produces another
dilemma. If a government becomes more efficient in its use of inputs
of labour or land, the value added by government declines, ceteris
paribus. and with it the measured national income, while increased
inefficiency will raise value added by government, and thus national 
2income. Myrdal is oblivious of this fundamental difficulty, seeming
indeed to deny its existence by saying that ’’meaningful estimates of
inputs and outputs, both actual and planned, can be ascertained in
3
the public sector”.
But how does the dilemma of incorporating government in a
utilitarian market theory affect the concept of government capital
formation? Some authorities regard this concept as unproblematical.
If government services are a final good, "it is only logical to include
all government capital formation in gross domestic capital formation".
If they are an intermediate good, ’’court houses and military
installations are included” as capital formation on the analogy of
private capital formation ’’where blast furnaces .. are considered part
of capital formation though pig iron is strictly an intermediate 
4
product”. But these conclusions rest on a particular interpretation 
of what it is that the government, qua consumer, purchases from 
itself, qua producer. Is the government, qua consumer, deemed to 
purchase from itself government services (e.g. administration services 
or defence services), or, along with the services of its own employees, 
real assets (e.g. court houses and military installations)? If it
1 Van Arkadie and Frank (1969), pp.18^-7; Van Arkadie (1973), pp.23-*K
2 Ward (197*0, p.31.
3 Myrdal (1968), p.2306.
k Van Arkadie and Frank (1969), pp.186, 188.
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is the former, then the real assets bought by the government are part
of gross domestic capital formation. But if its the latter, they are
1
merely part of the government's consumption. In other words, the 
question of the content of government capital formation cannot be 
settled within the logic of the national accounts conventions themselves, 
Nor, pace Myrdal, is an answer to be had merely by asking what is 
convenient from the point of view of Keynesian demand management policy, 
Keynes wished to distinguish investment from consumption because his 
thesis was that they had quite distinct determinants. But, as Hicks 
has pointed out, in the case of government demand, the distinction is 
much less important since, with the exception of the investment demand 
of the public enterprises, both consumption and investment expenditure 
come from the same source, and are decided upon together in the light 
of government policies. It follows that "the line between them is 
inevitably an arbitrary line (and that) useful and intelligible accounts 
could be constructed with the line drawn in several different places". 
Drawing of the line in several different places is exactly what one 
finds on examining the national accounts conventions of advanced 
capitalist economies. In the U.K., all durable assets purchased by 
government, except (most of) those with military uses, are treated as
3
fixed capital formation. In the sphere of capital formation, the
claims that national accounts concepts are monolithic, and shaped to 
the pursuit of Keynesian stabilization objectives are quite incorrect.
The Indian practice in defining the content of government capital 
formation has varied, and at present seems to differ from both that of 
the U.K. and the U.S. In 19&9, the Indian C.S.O. published Estimates 
of Uapital Formation in India. 1960-.6I to 1965-66 in which the U.K. 
definition was used. By 1973, however, this had been altered in that
1 O.E.C.D. (1972), pp.101-2.
2 Ohlsson (1953), p.2^7.
3 Buggies and Buggies (1970), p.33.
221
"capital expenditure in Defence ... (was) reclassified as ’capital
formation1, instead of classification under ’'current expenditure*
1followed earlier". Since the capital formation series published
in 1973 correspond exactly with that published in 1971 except where
the estimates are stated to be "provisional", it seems safe to
conclude that the new definition also applied in 1971, despite the fact
that this is not made clear in the definition of "gross fixed capital
2
formation" supplied at that time,
Myrdal*s argument for the inappropriateness of national accounts 
in less developed countries does not relate to the arbitrariness of 
the definition of government capital formation of the kind that is 
pointed out above, That he seems content to ignore. Instead it 
rests on the proposition that in South Asian economies "the basic 
distinction between investment and consumption does not hold (since) 
higher consumption forms "investment" - that is, raises production - 
and at the same time remains consumption". Clearly, this is quite
a different line of criticism. The question of how to draw the
boundary line between investment and consumption across the government *s
real asset purchases pre-supposes a valid distinction between 
consumption and investment, which Myrdal denies, Nor is Myrdal merely 
raising the question of whether some present consumption spending 
should properly be thought of as intangible investment, for that, too, 
presupposes a valid consumption/investment distinction. In claiming 
that this dichotomy can, and ought to be, abolished, he has taken up 
an extreme position which is not defensible, and has advanced invalid 
reasoning to back up his charge of inappropriateness.
To arrive at the conclusion that consumption and investment are 
indistinguishable, he assumed that the conventional definition of
1 C.S.O. (1973), p.31.
2 C.S.O. (1971), p.^7.
3 Myrdal (1968), p.1916.
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investment is “any expenditure that raises production", and then 
suggests that in poor countries almost all consumption expenditures 
raise production. The trouble with this argument is that it is based 
on a false assumption. The conventional definition of investment in 
national accounting is as a residual: it is the portion of the income
generated in one time period (normally, a year) that is not spent on 
goods and services which are used up, extinguished or destroyed within 
that time period. In physical terms investment is the goods produced 
in the year which, at the end of the year, are still available, either 
as stocks or fixed structures, to satisfy future consumption needs.
It is clear that this Keynesian definition neither asserts that 
investment is in fact productive, nor does it deny that consumption 
may have consequences for future production. On the first point, 
the carried over stocks may deteriorate and go to x^aste; the carried 
over new fixed structures may lie idle, or work flat out to produce 
nil or negative value added. No definition can guarantee that 
investment will not be infructuous, and disappoint the expectations 
on which it x«jas made. On the second point, the definition of 
consumption leaves its productivity effects an open question. To 
say of goods and services that they are extinguished or destroyed by 
use in an accounting period is not to deny that these acts of 
extinction or destructive use can have consequences for production in 
future periods.
To claim, with Myrdal, that most consumption is productive is 
not a formal contradiction of the conventional definition of consumption. 
The claim, hoxtfever, does have other weaknesses. The proposal is 
that "the new term ’investment in man' should include not only the 
consumption of educational and health facilities but practically all 
essential consumption".•** This formulation disguises two important
1 Myrdal (1968), p.1530.
2.2k
aspects of the productivity effects of consumption. It obscures 
differences in the time-profile of these effects. A unit of resources 
devoted to extra nutrition will raise production now but not in the 
future, while the same unit devoted to education will actually reduce 
production now in the expectation of raising production by a much 
greater amount in the distant future. By lumping together under the 
label 'productive consumption* expenditures whose effects on 
production have completely contrasted time~profiles, Myrdal obscures 
the fact that in choosing between types of consumption, the basic 
choice between benefits now and benefits later remains. The 'discovery'
of productive consumption does not abolish this choice. The other
aspect which Myrdal's formulation does not sufficiently emphasise 
is that increments to existing types of consumption have very small 
productivity effects. It is only when quite different types of 
food, education and health care are consumed that large productivity 
effects will ensue.
If, for the sake of argument, we grant Myrdalfs premises, his
conclusion that consumption and investment are indistinguishable does
not follow. He has not abolished the distinction, but merely complicated
it to the point where the two original categories become three -
productive consumption, unproductive consumption, and productive non-
1
consumption (i.e. investment in the conventional sense). Policy
still requires a choice of some mixture of these three categories.
Even if the second is disregarded as being possible to eliminate 
and undesirable without qualification, a policy choice remains between 
productive consumption and conventional investment. If the consumption/ 
investment distinction had no validity, this policy choice would be 
inconceivable, Since it is not, Myrdal's attack on national
1 Cf. Stanfield (1973), p.22.
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accounting must be rejected.
Unfortunately a rebuttal of Myrdal*s more extravagent views does
not dispose of the question whether certain expenditure now called
consumption should be treated in the accounts in the same way as
conventional investment. The most popular candidate, in the poor
country context, for treatment as 'intangible investment' is
educational spending.^ The proposal here is for a reform of the
investment/consumption distinction - a reform which Myrdal, arguing
from the alleged all-pervasive nature of productive consumption, holds 
2
to be impossible. The proposal is to redefine 'investment* in a
way that is relevant to long-run growth: consumption now becomes a
residual, namely all those expenditures within the accounting period 
which do not contribute to the economy's future growth potential.
All that do become 'investment*. The fundamental objection to such 
a change is that it assumes that we have a theory of long-run growth 
as soundly based as the Keynesian theory of short-run income 
determination. What grounds are there for making such an assumption? 
The association between educational spending and increased labour 
productivity (to the extent that it has been established empirically 
at all), rests on evidence from advanced capitalist countries.
Moreover, there are well-known difficulties to frustrate calculations 
of "returns" to educational spending in countries where a colonial 
pattern of reward differentials still remains. Existing empirical 
techniques are not good enough to quantify the links between today's 
educational (or for that matter, health) spending, and tomorrow's 
economic growth. As to which kinds of education are growth-promoting, 
we remain in the realm of qualitative judgements. Seers and Jolly 
may be correct in their appreciation of the importance of any kind
1 Cf, Seers and Jolly (1966).
2 Myrdal (1968), pp.1916-7.
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of education to growth in East and Central Africa. On the other
1hand, for Asia, quite contrary views are put forward. If the 
compromise view is taken that some forms of education do add to 
growth while others do not, how should the two kinds he separated?
In Ceylon, the practice of treating the training of accountants, 
tradesmen, etc. as intangible investment, but not any other kind of 
education, was abandoned because in the end such arbitrariness was 
considered to be indefensible. Until the problem of identifying 
educational spending which does yield output beyond the accounting 
period is solved, no one can say hox*j misleading the conventional 
notion of investment is from the long-run growth perspective.
Other considerations which bear on the debate about 'intangible
investment1 are relatively minor in comparison with the weak theoretical
and empirical links between intangible investment and growth. From
a statistical view point it is objected that the recognition of
intangible investment would add a great deal to the element of
imputation in the national accounts, and would thus make them less
reliable overall. Logic would require estimates of intangible
investment to be made for households, firms and non-profit institutions
as well as the government. It would also require an estimate of the
flow of present services from the past additions to the intangible
asset stock, which in turn vjould require estimates of the rate of
depreciation of the intangible assets. If national accountants blanch
at imputation on this scale, so do individual scholars faced with
the task of adjusting past capital formation series in line with such 
2
a reform. For India, where standard breakdowns of conventional 
investment are only just beginning to be published, it might seem 
better to improve the measures of the narrower concept, rather than
1 O.E.C.D. (1972), pp.8?, 13^.
2 Cf. Reynolds (1971), pp.518-20.
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make less precise estimates of a broader concept. But, basically, 
-pleas to reform the national accounts to make them ’’appropriate11 to 
conditions in poor countries are disguised claims that some new growth 
theory can be made the basis of development policy. The proposal 
that education should be classed as ’’iiivestment1 assumes that the 
augmentation of labour skills plus increments to physical assets are 
the keys to long-run growth. To those who do not accept that growth 
has yet been satisfactorily attributed to any small number of 'key 
factors', such reform programmes will appeal little, even without 
taking account of the statistical objections.
But to national accounts theorists such a reform does have a
particular ideological appeal. It is odd, but true, that the
conventional concept of Investment is the Marxist one of material means
of production, despite the fact that immaterial services are included
in the value of total product.'1’ The recognition of intangible
investment would eliminate this, and thereby improve the consistency
2
of utilitarian accounting. But concepts become hypostatized. It 
is but a short step from saying that in one economic aspect tangible 
and intangible investment are similar to the erroneous conclusion that 
in all aspects of social reality they are identical. On the contrary, 
tangible capital lends itself far more readily than intangible capital 
to concentration of ownership. There is a fairly low ceiling on the 
amount of intangible capital that any one individual can acquire and 
will wish to acquire. This explains the different historical roles 
which have been played by tangible and intangible capital in the 
process of accumulation in advanced capitalist countries. The demand 
for large-scale government intangible investment arose as part of a
1 Ruggles and Ruggles (1970), p.^2.
2 Dobb (1937), p.^3.
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political struggle against the economic power of the owners of 
tangible capital, precisely by those who were excluded from such 
ownership. Thus if one needs economic categories relevant for 
broader sociological analysis, it is fortunate that existing national 
accounts concepts inconsistently retain a Marxist notion of investment. 
On a more pragmatic level, the aim of this work is to explore in 
quantitative terms the consequences of the attempt to use the state 
as the engine of accumulation in India, Obviously in the first 
instance we want to look at physical capital formation, because that 
is the meaning given to accumulation both by writers on state 
capitalism in the Soviet Union and by non-Soviet exponents of state 
accumulation as a development strategy. This does not debar questions 
about the relation between the state's role in accumulation in this 
sense and its role in the accumulation of intangible assets. But
the taking of government expenditure on education and health as an 
indicator of the latter can only be done subject to the severe cautions 
which we have already given about the difficulty of doing this,
III. Indian Versions of the National Accounts Reclassification
It remains to be seen to what extent the economic (in the national 
account sense) expenditure reclassifications that have actually been 
produced in India do allow one to produce a picture of the government 
sector which is complete, integrated and diachronically comparable.
It is well known that the earliest Indian economic classifications 
of government budgets were prepared in the late 1950s and early 1960s 
by the central government, Finance Ministry and two non-government 
bodies, Punjab University and the National Council of Applied Economic 
Research. The central Finance Ministry has maintained a continuous 
series for the central government budget since 1957? expanding the 
economic classification into an economic-cum-functional one since 1967.
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The two non-government bodies, however, after completing pioneering
studies of both central and state government budgets, have retired
from the field as work on state government budgets was gradually taken
up by the statistical bureaux of the states (hereafter S.S.B.s),
The work done by the S.S.B.s in producing economic classifications
seems to be very little known, even by well-informed sources inside
India. For example, the leader writer of an excellent Indian economic
journal stated as recently as July, 1973» that
From an analytical point of view the (Central Finance Ministry) 
classification suffers from certain serious limitations.
Firstly, it covers only the Central government budget and does 
not include the state budgets and budgets of semi-government 
bodies ... Nor is the expenditure of state governments and ^
government bodies classified in a similar manner anywhere else ...
This last assertion is, as we shall see, very far from being the case.
Even academic authorities on the subject have a very restricted
notion of thw scope of S.S.B. work on the economic classification of 
2expenditure. It may therefore be useful to give some account of 
it, both to set the record straight, and because the record itself 
provides an apt illustration of the problems of statistical policy 
in less developed countries.
The 1960s saw a rapid rise in the number of S.S.B.s producing 
economic classifications of state government expenditure. A detailed 
check-list of all economic and economic/functional classifications 
produced by the S.S.B.s and inspected by the author is given in 
Appendix B. In 1960, this work was done only in Assam, and there 
in a truncated form. By 1970, an economic classification for at 
least one year had been produced by all S.S.B.s except those of Bihar, 
Himachal Pradesh and West Bengal, and by all the statistical bureaux 
of the Union Territories except those of Delhi, Chandigarh,
1 Anon (1973), p.885, emphasis added,
2 Cf, Premchand (1969)1 note 17*
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Pondicherry and Goa, Daman and Diu. Further, in Andhra, Jammu and 
Kashmir, Madhya Pradesh and Orissa, the S.S.B.s had followed the 
central Finance Ministry's 19&7 initiative by preparing an economic-cum- 
functional classification for at least one year.
But, even though the S.S.B.s have been much more active than 
they have been given credit for, it is necessarily decentralized 
activity, and the statistics produced show many of the classic defects 
of statistical decentralization. The speed with which individual
S.S.B.s took on this new responsibility varied, generating output that 
is, from the all-India viewpoint, uneven both quantitatively and 
qualitatively.
Quantitatively, the staggered start on the work has prevented all 
but a few states - Madras/Tamil Nadu, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, 
Punjab, Rajashtan and Andhra - completing a series of five or more 
consecutive years. (Assam, despite its initial lead, produced no 
classifications between I962 and 1969*) The bulk of the S.S.B. 
classifications, and certainly the more reliable ones, relate to the 
late 1960s. They might have been usable for inter-temporal comparisons 
if they could have been matched up with the pioneering studies done by 
Punjab University and the N.C.A.E.R. at the end of the 1930s.^ But 
the Punjab University study provides accounts data (1956-?) for only 
six of the states; while the N.C.A.E.R. analyses differ widely in their 
results from the analyses done by the central Finance Ministry for the 
same year. This suggests that S.S.B. work (following central Finance 
Ministry methods) cannot be comparable either with the work of the 
N.C.A.E.R. The only comparability is between the two different years 
of the N.C.A.E.R. study - 1931-2 (provisional accounts) and 1937-8 
(provisional or final accounts).
1 Rangnekar (1958); N.C.A.E.R. (i960) and (1961).
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The unevenness of the S.S.B. work is also qualitative. Even by 
the end of the 1960s, not all classifications were prepared according 
to a standard methodology. They are, therefore, non-comparable on a 
cross-section basis, apart from the fact that in no single year is a 
classification available for every state. The Central Statistical 
Organization, discharging its responsibility for evolving a national 
statistical policy, has been pursuing a standard methodology as a 
policy objective. In 1968, the C.S.O. prepared a model economic 
and functional classification (called "the Madras model" because it 
used Government of Madras revised estimates fox- 1965-6) which was 
circulated to all S.S.B.s in the hope of persuading them all to adopt 
it. The main incentive to change is the C.S.Q.'s ability to offer
B.S.B. personnel a good level of technical training in the task of 
economic classification - but using the "Madras model" as the vehicle 
for instruction. But how has the pursuit of standardization actually 
worked?
Two states, Andhra and Assam, did switch immediately to the 
Madras model. As a result, of course, discontinuities appear in 
their time series. With Andhra, the analyses starting with 1966-7 
(accounts) figures are not comparable with those going before, and, 
with Assam, there is a discontinuity from 1967-8 (accounts) onwards.
Yet by the end of 1971» the latest published classifications of six \ 
states (Kerala, Madhyra Pradesh, Maharashtra, Madras/Tamil Nadu,
Orissa and Rajasthan) had not yet adopted the conventions of the Madras 
model. They preferred to persevere with, for example, the convention 
of classing government servants' pensions as an unrequited payment, 
and thus a current transfer, rather than as compensation to employees 
and therefore as an item of government consximption, as recommended in
1 Government of Andhra Pradesh (n.d., 1970?), preface and p.5;
Government of Assam (1970)1 preface and pp,17-2A.
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the Madras model. So the two states which did incur the short-run 
costs of change have made very little difference to the balance of 
support of the tvjo different methodologies. The long-run benefits 
of standardization, which are supposed more than to offset the short- 
run costs, are still merely a prospect of the future.
If the process of standardization is too slow, however, it will 
be out-paced by the evolution of statistical norms. This has indeed 
happened already to the attempt to standardise the principles of the 
functional classification. The methodology of the functional 
classification, as well as the economic classification has differed 
between states. Of the states making economic-cum-functional 
expenditure classifications in 1971, Andhra, Gujarat, Jammu and 
Kashmir and Madhya Pradesh were using the four-function scheme of the 
Madras model. But Orissa was not, and Kerala was assimilating its 
original functional classification to that of Orissa, rather than that 
of the Madras model states. The Madras model's four-function division 
of expenditure into (i) general, (ii). community, (iii) social and 
(iv) economic services represents what was regarded as "best practice" 
in these matters in 1958, when the United Nations issued its manual 
on methods. But without the 1958 best practice ever having been 
uniformly adopted throughout the Indian states, scholarly notions of 
best practice are beginning to change. The four-function division 
has been persuasively criticized on the grounds that functions (ii)
2
and (iv) do not represent mutually exclusive categories of expenditure. 
The elimination of community services as a separate function xijould 
result in a three-function division closely akin to that already in 
use in Orissa. The dilemma for the designers of a national 
statistical policy is whether now to change the standard model. The
1 United Nations (1958).
2 Matthews (1973), pp.2^-7.
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point is that, if the pace of standardization is slow enough, national 
uniformity and the use of current best practice become alternative 
policies, rather than goals capable of simultaneous achievement.
In sum, then, the work of the S.S.B.s on expenditure classifications 
has been weak for three reasons.
(1) The incentives at the command of the C.S.O. have not been strong 
enough to induce all S.S.B.s to give the work the same degree of 
priority. Accordingly, there is wide inter-state variation in 
how much of the work has been done, and, in a few states and 
Union Territories, nothing has been done at all. From the all- 
India viewpoint, coverage is simply patchy and sporadic.
(2) Where the work has been done, it suffers from the defects inherent 
in a decentralized statistical system. These defects have been 
well described as "duplication of effort, and inconsistency or 
non-comparability among similar parts of related systems; ... 
(confronting) users with apparently conflicting sets of data, with 
no way to bridge the gap except through elaborate reconciliation
1
tables which explain the conceptual and statistical differences11. 
Different methodologies prevent cross-section comparison, and, in 
the short-run, the switch to a standard methodology, when it does 
take place, makes the change-over state's time-series discontinuous,
(3) As seen by the statisticians, their problem is the meagreness of 
the resources put at their disposal. There is a sense in which 
this is correct. Given the present inefficient organization of 
statistical production, a greater resource input would result in 
more and better quality statistics - for example, it would speed 
up the process of standardization and mitigate the uniformity 
versus best practice dilemma. However, on a wider view,
1 Buggies and Buggies (1970), p.6l.
Z$h
meagreness of resources for statistics is not merely an exogenous
constraint. Politicians and bureaucrats either do not understand,
or understand but regard as redundant, the use of statistical
information as an aid to rational decision-making. They regard
the statistics produced with the current level of resources as
extensive and refined enough to meet all requirements except that
of prestige* As previously implied, the motive for undertaking
1
expenditure classification at all is, in part, a mimetic one.
It should now be clear that, were it necessary to rely on the
S.S.B.s spending classifications, the analysis of Indian public 
expenditure could only remain fragmentary and obscure. Fortunately, 
for the economic classification, such reliance is not necessary.
For while the C.S.O. has been supervising the S.S.B.s1 work, it has 
been doing very closely related work on its own. This is one more 
illustration of the duplication of effort that occurs in a decentralized 
statistical system. The C.S.O.'s own work on expenditure classification 
arises from the central government’s decision to produce a set of 
national accounts which increasingly conforms to the recommendations 
of the United Nations Statistical Office as set out in the 1968 System 
of National Accounts. The basic format is a production, income and 
capital account for all-India, plus a consolidated account of India’s 
transactions with the rest of the world. The accounts are compiled 
by first making up the same set of accounts for the three sectors 
of the economy recognized for the purposes of social accounting - 
households, businesses and the public authorities. As far as the 
public authorities are concerned, "a detailed economic and functional 
classification of the budgets of Central and state governments'as well 
as local authorities is necessary in order to get data in respect
1 Cf. Anon. (I967), p.II98.
2 U.N. (1968); O.E.C.D. (1972), p.173.
235
of all the flows which are needed in order to prepare income, outlay
1
and capital finance accounts as recommended by the S,N.A.M
This work has resulted in the publication, by the C.S.O. of the
set of consolidated national accounts, accounts for the public
authorities at the all-India level and tables 011 all-India saving and
2
capital formation. In the chapters of this work we rely heavily
on these sources for data. But, in addition, when it is necessary to 
disaggregate the data below the all-India level, it is possible to do 
this by consulting the C.S.O.'s unpublished working sheets. The 
unpublished working sheets permit, subject to qualifications to be 
noted shoi“tly, a disaggregation of the all-India public authorities 
accounts into separate accounts for central government and Union 
Territories (taken together) and for each of the individual states 
(including all the local bodies in that state).
We have already specified the detailed advantages which accrue 
from analysing budgetary transactions within the framework of national 
accounts concepts and definitions. We now take these advantages as 
given, and discuss the relative merits of national accounts expenditure 
data produced 011 the one hand by the S.S.B.s and on the other by the
C.S.O. The comparison involves four main topics, (a) coverage and 
consistency, (b) the economic classification, (c) the functional 
classification and (d) the treatment of local authorities.
(a) Coverage and Consistency
We have already described the main defects in coverage of the
S.S.B. classifications. The C.S.O. classifications stand in startling 
contrast. They have very few, and then very minor, defects of 
geographical and temporal coverage. Broadly speaking, they cover 
all states having statehood at the relevant time, for all years between
1 O.E.C.D. (1972), p.183*
2 C.S.O. (1971, 1973, 1975, 1976).
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I960-I and 1969-70 inclusive. The blemishes that there are arise 
either because, for one or two states for one or two years, "revised 
estimates" rather than "accounts" data is analysed, or because the 
coverage of local authorities is weak (though progress is made on 
eliminating some of the weaknesses through the decade). The S.S.B. 
classification, of course, do not cover local authorities at all - a 
point discussed at greater length at (d) below.
We have already discussed the methodological differences that 
plague the work done by the S.S.B.s. Again, in strong contrast, the
C.S.O. has follovjed one method throughout. Thus the comparisons 
that are necessary for both cross-section and time-series analysis are 
relatively straight-forward. This consistency holds not only for the 
treatment of expenditure of the different state governments, but for 
all the governmental bodies included under the term "public authorities"
(b) The Economic Classification
When it comes to the degree of detailed information available 
from their respective economic classifications, however, the work of 
the C.S.O. compares unfavourably with that of the S.S.B.s. In the
S.S.B. economic classification, the information is arranged in the 
form of six accounts. The first three of these six are accounts of 
transactions in commodities and services: the current account for
Government Administration (I); the current account for departmental 
commercial enterprises (II); and the capital account for both 
Administration and commercial enterprises (III). The last three 
accounts are statements for both Administration and commercial 
enterprises of changes in financial assets (IV) and liabilities (V) 
and a cash and capital reconciliation account (VI) deriving from the 
balancing items in accounts III - V. The C.S.O. national accounts 
expenditure data relates only to transactions in commodities and
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services, capital and current. This means that the C.S.O. figures 
can he rearranged to provide broadly the same information as can be 
found in S.S.B. model economic classification accounts I - III. No 
information is gathered by the C.S.O. about changes in financial assets 
and liabilities, and hence there is no C.S.O. equivalent model accounts 
IV - VI.
Although the C.S.O. data can be re-cast to give broadly the 
same information as S.S.B. model accounts I - III, there is not an exact 
correspondence between the two. Certain detail which is available in 
the S.S.B. model accounts is not available from the C.S.O. data. The 
lost detail relates to (a) types of taxes, (b) types of transfer 
recipient, (c) the distinguishing of maintenance expenditure from 
fixed capital formation, and the division of the latter into broad 
and (d) information on the sources of commercial enterprise surpluses.
The result of these information deficiencies in the C.S.O. 
economic classification of expenditure is to prevent inter-state 
comparisons of:
(i) methods of financing capital expenditure - ovjing to the 
absence of accounts IV and V;
(ii) financial investment and net lending to the rest of the 
economy;
(iii) financial assistance received from various central sources, 
and given by the state government to its own local bodies.
This is because the transferred portion of income and 
excise taxes is not separately identified by the C.S.O.; 
and Central lending to the state government is included 
along with other items (such as inter-state debt settlement, 
remittances, etc.) in a single item on the receipts side 
of the capital account. The C.S.O* data, therefore, cannot 
be used directly as a guide to the size and nature of the 
flows of finance between the different levels of government. 
For flows of finance between central and state governments, 
the best source remains the figures published by the Reserve 
Bank of India, although these too, as has already been
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mentioned, present difficulties for intertemporal 
1comparisons,
(c) The Functional Classification
The most serious limitation imposed by use of the C.S.O. data 
is undoubtedly the absence of any functional classification of 
expenditure. The reason for this omission is that a functional 
breakdown of expenditure is not required for the income and outlay 
and capital accounts of the public authorities, in the form in which 
this information, is currently being published by the C.S.O. It is, 
however, required if the C.S.O. is to publish its national accounts 
in the form recommended in the TJ.N. 1968 System of National Accounts, 
Tables ^ , 13, 21 and 22 of the S.N.A. can only be completed once a 
functional classification is available. Since the progressive move 
towards the S.N.A. format is an Indian policy objective, it may be 
assumed that the preparation of a functional classification is now 
being undertaken, although not yet completed. The completion of this 
work should make possible a major improvement in our understanding of 
Indian public spending.
In the meanwhile, the position remains highly unsatisfactory. 
Information may be sought from two sources. One is the S.S.B, analyses, 
with all their defects of coverage and consistency. These limit 
analysis to the Central government and a few state governments using 
different functional classification schemes in a few yeai’s only.
The other is the data published by the Reserve Bank of India, which 
again applies only to central and state governments (not local 
authorities); which uses the so-called ,rsemi-functionaln scheme of 
expenditure classification introduced in 1962 (an improvement on the 
old classification, but still a long way from being a true functional 
scheme); and which nevertheless still has discontinuities which
1 Toye (1973), pp.262-3.
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interfere with intertemporal comparison.
(d) Treatment of Local Authorities
Whereas the S.S.B. analyses of expenditure confine themselves to 
the expenditure of state governments only, the C.S.O. analyses are for 
the public authorities as a whole, i.e. the expenditure of central, 
state and local governments (as well as their departmental commercial 
enterprises). This comprehensiveness is a great advantage, but it 
also brings with it two problems of interpretation.
The first concerns the expenditure of the Union Territories, which 
are a collection of smallish areas in India that are judged unsuitable 
for incorporation in existing states or for elaborate and relatively 
autonomous administrations of their own, as are enjoyed by the states. 
Their governments are therefore simpler and more open to the influence 
of the central government than are those of the states. A problem 
arises because, during the 1960s, some Union Territories which had 
previously been funded through the central government budget were 
allowed to establish their own budgetary mechanisms. If U.T. 
expenditure is identified separately from that of the central government, 
the figures for U.T.s will thus exaggerate their rate of expenditure 
growth while the figures for the central government will understate 
its true rate of expenditure growth. It therefore seems preferable 
to include U.T, expenditure with that of the central government 
throughout, and this has in fact been done. Even this does not 
entirely solve the problem of handling the U.T.s, because of the 
annexure of Goa, Daman and Diu from Portugal in 19&2, and the 
establishment of the city of Chandigarh as a U.T. rather than as part 
of Punjab in 1967.
The second problem concerns the treatment of local authorities
1 Toye (1973), PP.267-9, 273.
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that operate within the area administered by state governments.
These local authorities are both traditional (municipal corporations,
municipalities and part trusts) and the panchayati ra.j institutions
(aila parishads, gram panchayats, etc.) established in the wake
of the Balvantry Mehta Report.'*' The C.S.O. data identifies their
expenditure as a separate aggregate for I96O-I to 1964-5, but then
merges it into the totals for the individual states for I965-6 to
I969-7O. It is clear that the latter method of treatment is the
more useful. It reflects both the constitutional form and political
reality of the relationship between state governments and local
authorities. State governments delegate to local bodies (who have
no constitutional standing) some of the functions which are
constitutionally theirs, and assign for purposes of local finance, in
whole or part, taxes which appear in the states1 list in the constitution^
In practice, too, because of the panchayati raj institutions1 heavy
dependence on conditional grants from the state governments, "the
3
scope for local initiative is limited ... to minor matters". Apart
from this, it is important to note that the functions and expenditure
4
of local bodies varies very considerably from state to state.
Aggregate spending by local bodies can be analysed into three roughly 
equal parts: one-third is accounted for by Maharashtra alone, one- 
third by the three states of Madras, Andhra Pradesh and Gujarat 
taken together, and the final third by all the other states except 
these four. In this situation, the exclusion of local bodies1 
expenditure from inter-state expenditure comparison would simply produce
1 Planning Commission, C.O.P.P. (1957)*
2 Ministry of Finance (1955), p.l4.
3 Raj (1971), p.l6ll.
4 Venkataraman (I965), PP-56-7 and p.57, note 1.
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arbitrary and misleading interstate comparisons. To quote one 
authority, "comparisons of state government expenditures are 
treacherous (because) in State A the government may perform functions 
that in State B are left to localities’1 .*** Accordingly better 
comparisons result if state government and local bodies1 expenditure 
is combined.
To do this, the aggregate local bodies1 expenditure figures for 
I96O-I to 1964-5 in the C.S.O. data must be allocated to the states.
It cannot be ignored on de minimis grounds because it accounts for 
one-fifth of all expenditure at the state level and below. Nor can 
it be allocated in equal shares between the states because of the 
great inequality known to prevail in 1965-6. Our procedure was to 
allocate the local bodies total to states according to percentage share 
of each state in 1965-6. This is a crude procedure because it 
assumes constant shares by states during a period when democratic 
decentralization was proceeding at different speeds in different 
states. But it was the most convenient method that did not appear to 
lead to gross distortions of the true positions.
It should be obvious from this discussion that, if an all-India 
perspective is desired - that is, some grasp of the national position 
plus some understanding of inter-state variations - the national 
accounts data produced by the C.S.O. will be vastly more informative 
than any attempt to patch together conclusions from the data 
produced by the various S.S.B.s. The C.S.O.'s advantages of 
coverage, consistency and comprehensiveness far outweigh the information 
loss arising from an abbreviated economic classification and the 
absence of a functional classification. Even if an analysis of one 
particular state government’s expenditure were all that were required,
1 Maxwell (1969)* pp.2-5.
2b 2
it would be difficult to point to S.S.B.s who have produced more 
useful data than the C.S.O. Only two S.S.B.s, in fact, those for 
Andhra Pradesh and Madhyra Pradesh, have managed to produce an 
economic classification of their own state government's spending for 
five or more consecutive years plus an economic-and-functional 
classification. With hindsight, therefore, it seems that the C.S.O.’s 
own effort has fallen between two stools. It might have done better 
to have allowed the S.S.B.s entirely to follow their own devices, and 
to have devoted the manpower resources saved thereby to producing their 
own urgently needed functional classification of the budget data they 
have already classified by economic category.
2h3
APPENDIX B
CHECKLIST OF STATE-PRODUCED ECONOMIC RECLASSIFICATIONS
(Note : This list covers all economic reclassifications of state 
government budgets that (a) were produced by state statistical 
bureaux and (b) were known to the author at the time of writing 
this work. It therefore excludes (i) economic 
reclassifications of state government budgets that were 
produced by other bodies than the state governments themselves 
"by the C.S.O., the N.C.A.E.R., etc.) and (ii) economic 
reclassifications of other budgets than state budgets (e.g. the 
Central Finance Ministry’s reclassification of central 
government budget). Also, it is not claimed that the list 
is exhaustive for the period 1960-70. Other examples are 
believed to exist, but it was not possible to inspect them for 
one reason or another. The list is arranged alphabetically 
by state, and then chronologically by date of publication.)
Andhra Pradesh
1. Bureau of Economics and Statistics, Hyderabad, ”An Economic 
Classification of Public Revenue and Expenditure of the Government 
of Andhra Pradesh for 196^-65, 1965-66, 1966-67 and 1967-68”,
no date.
2. Ibid., ”An Economic and Functional Classification of Budgetary 
Transactions of the Government of Andhra Pradesh for the years
1966-67 (Accounts), 1967-68 (Revised Estimates), 1967-68 (Budget
Estimates)”, 110 date,
5. Ibid., ”An Economic and Functional Classification of Budgetai'y 
Transactions of the Government of Andhra Pradesh for the years




Department of Economics and Statistics, Government of Assam, "An 
Economic Classification of the State Government Budget, 1959-60 
to I962-65", 1962.
5. Ibid., "An Economic Classification of Assam Government Budget, 
1969-70", 1969.
Gu.jarat
6. The Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Vol.IX, No.2 gives 
a reclassification of state budgets for 1966-67 (Accounts), 
1967-68 (Revised Estimates) and 1968-69 (Budget Estimates).
7. Bureau of Economics and Statistics, Government of Gujarat, 
Ahmedabad, "An Economic and Functional Classification of the 
Gujarat Government Budget, 1967-68 to 1969-70", 1971*
Haryana
8. Economic and Statistical Adviser to the Government of Haryana, 
"An Economic Classification of the Haryana Government Budget,
1967-68", 1968.
9* Ibid., "An Economic Classification of the Haryana Government 
Budget, 1968-69", 1969*
10. Ibid., "An Economic Classification of the Haryana Government 
Budget, 1969-70", 1970.
11. Ibid., "An Economic Classification of the Haryana Government 
Budget, 1970-71", 1970.
12. Ibid., "An Economic Classification of the Haryana Government 
Budget, 1971-72", 1971.
Jammu and Kashmir
15. Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Jammu and Kashmir
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Government, Srinagar, "An Economic-cura-Functional Classification 
of the Jaminu and Kashmir State Government Budget, 1966-67 (Accounts)", 
no-date, probably 1971*
Kerala
14 . Bureau of Economics and Statistics, Trivandrum, "An Economic
Classification of the Kerala Government Budgets, 1962-63 to 1964-65",
1965.
15. Ibid., "An Economic and Functional Classification of the Kerala 
Government Budget 1963-64 to 1967-68", 1967.
Madhya Pradesh
16. Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Madhya Pradesh, "An 
Economic Classification of the State Government Budget, 1965-66",
1966.
17. Ibid., "An Economic Classification of the State Government Budget,
I966-67", 1968.
18. Ibid., "Economic and Functional Classification of State Government 
Budget, 1968-69", 1970.
Maharashtra
19. Maharashtra Quarterly Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Vol.IX,
No.2, July - September, 1968, "An Economic Classification of the 
Maharashtra Government Budget I96I-62 to 1966-67".
20. Bureau of Economics and Statistics, Bombay, "Economic Classification 
of Maharashtra State Government Budgets, 1965-66 (Accounts),
1966-67 (Accounts) and 1967-68 (Accounts)", 1971.
Mysore
21. Finance Department (Research Section), Government of Mysore, "An 
Economic Classification of the Mysore Budget (1966-67 Accounts),
1968.
Orissa-
22. Bureau of Statistics and Economics, Orissa, Cuttack, "An Economic 
Classification of the Orissa Government Budget 1970-71", no date.
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APPENDIX C
THE CALCULATION OF EXPENDITURE CENTRALIZATION 
RATIOS FROM DATA ON A RATIONAL ACCOUNTS BASIS
In Table 5*2 of the main text the degree of centralization of 
government expenditure was calculated from data reclassified by the 
Indian C.S.O. on a national accounts basis. Appendix C considers 
whether there are valid objections to this.
The national accounts approach has been described as one designed 
"to show the outlay actually made by each (_ level of_J7 government for 
goods and services and transfer payments regardless of the source of 
funds".^ Thus all transfers between levels of government, e.g. 
central grants to states, or state grants to municipalities, are 
shown once only. They are shown as part of the expenditure of the 
receiving government. This implies that the states' measured share 
in total expenditure will be higher on a national accounts basis than 
on any other. If these inter-level transfers are counted twice, 
once as the expenditure of the receiving government and once as the 
expenditure of the donor government (which is what Reddy seems to have 
done) the states' measured share will obviously be reduced. This is
indicated by a comparison of the figure for 1968 in Table 5*1 (using
Reddy's statistics) which is 50*5 per cent with the figure for I968-9 
in Table 5*2, which is 58 per cent. Counting inter-level transfers 
once, but as the expenditure of the donor government would reduce the 
states’ share even further, assuming that states always receive more 
in such transfers than they pass down to local authorities.
It may be asked whether, if such transfers are an exercize of
power by the higher-level government to determine the spending patterns
1 Bird (1970), p.55; cf. Pryor (1968), p.70, note 1.
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of the lower-level government, counting them once, and towards the 
donor's expenditure, would not give a more realistic picture of the 
degree of expenditure centralization. This can be answered with two 
arguments, one general in nature, the other connected with specific 
developments in India.
The general objection to abandoning the national accounts 
approach is that it makes the measure of expenditure centralization 
more arbitrary. In order to achieve the added realism which is 
wanted, it would be necessary to distinguish between types of inter­
level transfer, according to the closeness of their link with 
specific patterns of spending. After all, some of these inter­
level transfers are given for the purpose of general budgetary 
assistance, which, if anything, expands the scope for local autonomy. 
Yet such distinctions are very hard to draw. It is not even true 
that matching grants, which presumably embody the greatest degree of 
central direction, ahways infringe local autonomy. They can 
substitute for the local finance of the programme; they do not always 
stimulate spending on a programme that would otherwise not have been 
undertaken. To decide their effect in particular cases would require 
knowledge of, or guesses about, what the receiving government would 
have been prepared to spend themselves on the particular programme 
which is being supported. Further, there is: every incentive for a 
receiving government to conceal its true intentions, and deny that 
matching grants have any substitution effects. These difficulties 
indicate why it may be more reliable, as well as more convenient, to 
retain the national accounts approach.
Nevertheless, it must be asked whether, in India, there is 
evidence of changes in the indirect centralization of expenditure 
which Table 5.2 implicitly ignores. This is the question, often 
aired in the literature, whether the states were becoming increasingly
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dependent on the centre for the finance of their expenditure.
This problem can be formulated in a number of different ways. But
a crude approximation of the degree of states' financial self-reliance 
can be obtained by asking how much of their total expenditure had to 
be financed by means other than direct and indirect taxation and the 
surpluses of departmental public enterprises. The amount of state 
spending financed by none of these methods may be termed the 
"expenditure gap", which will be largely bridged by various forms of 
assistance from the centre. (It is not an exact measure, because 
to a small extent it is bridged by fees, income from property and 
interest receipts from non-government sources.) Table C.l gives 
figures for this gap in absolute terms, and as a percentage of total 
states' expenditure.













Source : C.S.O. unpublished data.




































1 See Chelliah (1969), p.159; Sastri (1966), pp.1-9; Venkataraman 
(1968), p.19; Watson (1965), pp.123-4.
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is no indication of an increasing; gap relative to total expenditure.
The share of spending which had to be financed from sources other than 
taxation and enterprise surpluses was declining slightly. It is true
that the figures of tax yield used in the calculation includes the
amounts of centrally-levied taxes assigned to the states on the 
recommendation of the Finance Commission. But these tax transfers 
are, of all the forms of central assistance to the states, those most 
distinctly in the nature of general budgetary support. Although they 
should be excluded from any measure of the revenue-raising performance 
of the states, this does not seem to be necessary when the aim is to 
measure the degree of state autonomy in deciding its own expenditure 
patterns. The channels of central influence over state spending are 
(a) central grants which are conditional on certain state expenditures 
and (b) central loans intended to finance specific projects agreed'in 
the process of planning. There is the other evidence, based on 
K.B.I. data, that these two channels diminished in relative
quantitative importance in the 1960s. Moreover, the centre's
Article 282 grants, which were a particularly strong channel of 
central influence were modified in 19&9 to permit greater state 
autonomy.^
Thus, while it is perfectly true that expenditure centralisation 
ratios based on national accounts data ignore "indirect" 
centralisation by means of inter-level transfer that affect state 
expenditure patterns, it does not appear that the degree of this 
indirect centralisation changed very much in India in the 1960s. 
(Constancy of indirect centralization may not be true as between the 
early 1950s and early 1960s, or between the late 1960s and early 
1970s - but that is irrelevant here.) Therefore the changes noted
1 Toye (1973), p.265, Table 2.
2 Administrative .Reforms Commission (1969), p.10; Planning Commission 
(1970), pp.5^-7.
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in the text in the centralization ratio do not seem to have "been in 
any -way offset by changes in the degree of indirect centralization.
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APPENDIX D
PROBLEMS ARISING IN THE PREPARATION OF 
STa TEwISE CONSTANT PRICE EXPENDITURE SERIES
As argued in the text, in the presence of general inflation
expenditure series at current prices exaggerate the changes in the
volume of resources being absorbed by the government as its inputs -
and in the volume of government outputs also, if these are assumed
to be directly correlated with inputs.
Theoretically, inflation can involve a further complication, when
it is accompanied by a change in the relative price of a key input,
such as labour. Government activities, in India as elsewhere,
have an above average labour content.^ Faster rising labour
productivity in the private sector may lead to an increase in the
relative price of labour. In such circumstances, even a constant
price expenditure series will understate spending growth in terms 
2
of actual cost. This complication has been ignored for three
main reasons. First, reliable estimates of governmental labour
3productivity do not exist. Second, in the small Indian modern
manufacturing sector, the real earnings of workers seem to have been 
static in the 1960s. Finally, in developed economies, such as
the U.K., the required adjustment for the relative price effect is 
small, only 0.6 per cent per annum. For India, therefore, it would 
be a work of superrogation to attempt any refinement on a normal 
constant price series.
1 Ovens (1968), p.152.
2 Rees and Thompson (1972).
3 Gf. Pryor (1968), pp.403-4.
4 Ministry of Labour (1972), p.6l, Table 4.8.
5 H.M. Treasury (1972), p.23.
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Obviously, for inter-state comparisons the current price data
must be deflated by indices which reflect geographical differences in
the rate of general inflation, A priori, such differences could be
expected to be significant. Economic activity takes place in sets
of regional markets which are poorly integrated. The ready movement
of goods and factors between markets which would minimize such
differences cannot be assumed; rather, where we have evidence, as
with foodgrain prices, it is for the "unreasonable" persistence
1of inter-state differentials.
Only one Indian price index relevant to government spending is 
geographically differentiated - the urban non-manual consumers' 
index, for the major population centres including the state capitals. 
Assuming, as seems to be the case, that state governments have 
increased dearness allowances in line with the cost of living, this 
index can be used to deflate expenditure arising from payment of 
employees.
For other expenditure, a cruder method of deflation had perforce
to be resorted to. As Reddy also noted, estimates of national
income at current and constant prices, taken in conjunction with
2
each other, imply an index of price change. The same argument
applies to estimates of state domestic product at current and 
constant prices. Despite the serious doubts that must exist about 
the state income estimates made by the different state statistical 
bueaux, the price indices implicit therein have been applied to 
expenditure other than payment of employees. The difficulty with 
this metnod is that the S.S.B.s do not all use the same methodology 
in preparing their income estimates. The states most obviously 
out of line are Assam, Madhya Pradesh, Mysore and Rajasthan. Their
1 Raj (1966), pp. +^9-52.
2 Reddy (1972), p.20.
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Their price indices, for example, can only be given a I96O-I base 
by the technically illegitimate process of arithmetic manipulation.
It is a characteristic of the price indices implicit in the 
income estimates of these four states that they show slower price 
inflation than is general in the other states. It would be useful 
to have some independent check on whether this feature is a mere 
accident or whether it is the result of their constant price income 
series having base years earlier than I96O-I. Such a check is 
available in the form of wholesale price indices for these states, 
which are set out in Table D.l. As the Table shows, in general
Table D.l : Comparison of Price Indices in Four States
1960/61 1969/70
1 Assam
a Implicit from state income
estimates; base 1948-49 123 191
b Index of wholesale prices;
base 1953 135 243
2 Madhya Pradesh
a Implicit from state income
estimates; base 1952-53 111 223
b Index of agricultural 
wholesale prices;
base 1959-60 to 1961-62 100 222
a Implicit from state income
estimates; base 1956-57 120 173
b Index of agricultiiral wholesale
prices; base 1952-53 l4l 237
4 Pa .j as than
a Implicit from state income
estimates; base 1954-55 134 178
b Index of wholesale prices;
base 1952-53 123 242
Sources: Lines l-4a calculated from C.S.O. unpublished data on state
income,
Line lb Government of Assam, Economic Survey of Assam 1970 
pp. 71-2. --- ------*— --
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Line 2b Directorate of Economics and Statistics. M.P.,S ources:
Tcontinued) Economic Survey of Madhya Pradesh, 1970-71? p.111.
Line 3b Government of Mysore, Economic Development of 
Mysore 1956-69» p.l8^, Figure for 1968-69.
Line ^b Government of Rajasthan, 15 Years of Rajasthanis 
:onomy, p.28; Statistical Abstract Rajasthan, 1989? P*9l*
the wholesale price indices do suggest a somewhat faster rate of 
inflation than the indices derived from state income estimates. But 
the discrepancy only appears to be a serious one in the case of 
Rajasthan. The very high calculated expenditure growth rate for 
Rajasthan (using the implicit price index as deflator) accordingly 
is probably spurious. If it is assumed that the wholesale price 
index is the true deflator for the non-labour element of expenditure, 
the expenditure growth rate falls from 8.8 to ^.7 per cent per annum. 
We have accepted this assumption, and used the lower growth rate in 
all inter-state comparisons. For Assam, Madhya Pradesh and Mysore, 
however, the growth rates calculated with the implicit price index as 
a deflator have been allowed to stand, on the supposition that they 
are not seriously misleading.
256
APPENDIX E
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